the economics of science and scholarship : an analysis of the Althoff system by Vereeck, L.M.C.
  
 
the economics of science and scholarship : an
analysis of the Althoff system
Citation for published version (APA):
Vereeck, L. M. C. (1993). the economics of science and scholarship : an analysis of the Althoff system.
Maastricht: Datawyse / Universitaire Pers Maastricht.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/1993
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
THE ECONOMICS OF SCIENCE AND SCHOLARSHIP
An Analysis or the AlthofT System
DE WETENSCHAPSECONOMIE
Een studie van hel AlthofT systeem
DIE WIRTSCHAFTLICHE WISSENSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG
Eine Analyse des Systems Althoff
THE ECONOMICS OF SCIENCE AND SCHOLARSHIP
An Analysis of the Althoff System
PROEFSCHRIFT
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Rijksuniversiteit Limburg te Maastricht,
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus. Prof mr M.J. Cohen,
volgens het besluit van het College van Dekanen,
in het openbaar te verdedigen op
donderdag, 4 februari 1993 om 16.00 uur
door
Lode Maria Corneel Vereeck
UPM
UNIVERSITAIRE PERS MAASTRICHT
Promotor: Prof.dr. J.G. Backhaus
Co-promotor: Dr. G. Meijer
Beoordelingscommissie: Prof.dr. W.F.J. Buijink (voorzitter)
Prof.dr W Albeda
Prof.dr. B.S. Frey (Univ. Zurich)
Prof.dr. T.L.C.M. Groot
ISBN 90-9005735-8
Copyngal 1992. L M C Verwek, Maaancbt
Alle rechlea worbetaoifdni Nieu urt deze uitgave maf wordea ververivoiatfiga'. opgHlagra ia eea gr—tniti ieeni gegeveajbeataad. of
npealiaar gaauaki. ia ewge vona of op tajgc «njxe. artuj ekfcuoanca. am aaaii'h 4oor fotokopie^a. nfaiiara of eatge aadm laiairr
toade* voonfgaaade icanftflijkr loeateaiaiiaf vaa de uilgevef
Voor tovet «et aufcea vaa fnluiiifte^a uit drie uitgave i» loagoalMB op |«Md vaa artikel I6B Auleumrvf 1912 jo bel Betluil vaa 20 ;uai
1474. Sit 151, loall »e»-|jugj l»j bet healuil vaa :< auguittii 19CS. Mi «Tl e« artatd 17 A a r n i M 1912. * e * » e a de daarvoof n o d i j t
wnckaldigde v«gordiag te voMoea aaa de SHvbtiag Reprombl iPttadm U 2 . I l » AW A a a d v e * » Voot ae< oveonBea vaa gedntlwa)
Mil dete uitgave ia MoemWiage*. readen e« aadere coaaptlalirwcTke« lanikeJ 16 AMetifvwl 1912) d w « atom z*ca lol de aitfever te « r a A a
No pan of IBJ« book May be prodared ia asy for«. b)> pnal. yhumpiial. aucrofilai or aay other aMaaa amkoal Ihe pnor wnnca p f f i i a w of
Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction 9
Chapter 2: Method of Analysts 13
2.1. Economic Analysis IS
2.1.1. Economic Properties of Academic Knowledge IS
2.1.2. Standard Economic Theory on Academic Performance 19
2.1.3. New Institutional Economics 22
2.2. Historical Analysis 23
Chapter 3: Prussian Public Administration in the Second Empire 27
3.1. Life and Career of Friedrich Althoff (1839-1908) 29
3.2. Althoff s Administration 31
3.3. Organizational Structure of the Ministry of Culture 34
3.4. External Relations of the Ministry of Culture 38
3.4.1. Federal and Prussian Authorities 38
3.4.2. German Countries and Austria 39
3.4.3. Public Relations and Public Opinion 40
The economics
of science and scholarship
an analysis of the Althoff system
L.M.C. Vereeck
Friedrich Althoff (1839-1908)
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
University of Limburg
Maastricht
The Netherlands
Dissertation nr. 93-11
THE ECONOMICS OF SCIENCE AND SCHOLARSHIP
An Analysis or the AlthofT System
DE WETENSCHAPSECONOMIE
Een studie van hel AlthofT systeem
DIE WIRTSCHAFTLICHE WISSENSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG
Eine Analyse des Systems Althoff
THE ECONOMICS OF SCIENCE AND SCHOLARSHIP
An Analysis of the Althoff System
PROEFSCHRIFT
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Rijksuniversiteit Limburg te Maastricht,
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus. Prof mr M.J. Cohen,
volgens het besluit van het College van Dekanen,
in het openbaar te verdedigen op
donderdag, 4 februari 1993 om 16.00 uur
door
Lode Maria Corneel Vereeck
UPM
UNIVERSITAIRE PERS MAASTRICHT
Promotor: Prof.dr. J.G. Backhaus
Co-promotor: Dr. G. Meijer
Beoordelingscommissie: Prof.dr. W.F.J. Buijink (voorzitter)
Prof.dr W Albeda
Prof.dr. B.S. Frey (Univ. Zurich)
Prof.dr. T.L.C.M. Groot
ISBN 90-9005735-8
Copyngal 1992. L M C Verwek, Maaancbt
Alle rechlea worbetaoifdni Nieu urt deze uitgave maf wordea ververivoiatfiga'. opgHlagra ia eea gr—tniti ieeni gegeveajbeataad. of
npealiaar gaauaki. ia ewge vona of op tajgc «njxe. artuj ekfcuoanca. am aaaii'h 4oor fotokopie^a. nfaiiara of eatge aadm laiairr
toade* voonfgaaade icanftflijkr loeateaiaiiaf vaa de uilgevef
Voor tovet «et aufcea vaa fnluiiifte^a uit drie uitgave i» loagoalMB op |«Md vaa artikel I6B Auleumrvf 1912 jo bel Betluil vaa 20 ;uai
1474. Sit 151, loall »e»-|jugj l»j bet healuil vaa :< auguittii 19CS. Mi «Tl e« artatd 17 A a r n i M 1912. * e * » e a de daarvoof n o d i j t
wnckaldigde v«gordiag te voMoea aaa de SHvbtiag Reprombl iPttadm U 2 . I l » AW A a a d v e * » Voot ae< oveonBea vaa gedntlwa)
Mil dete uitgave ia MoemWiage*. readen e« aadere coaaptlalirwcTke« lanikeJ 16 AMetifvwl 1912) d w « atom z*ca lol de aitfever te « r a A a
No pan of IBJ« book May be prodared ia asy for«. b)> pnal. yhumpiial. aucrofilai or aay other aMaaa amkoal Ihe pnor wnnca p f f i i a w of
Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction 9
Chapter 2: Method of Analysts 13
2.1. Economic Analysis IS
2.1.1. Economic Properties of Academic Knowledge IS
2.1.2. Standard Economic Theory on Academic Performance 19
2.1.3. New Institutional Economics 22
2.2. Historical Analysis 23
Chapter 3: Prussian Public Administration in the Second Empire 27
3.1. Life and Career of Friedrich Althoff (1839-1908) 29
3.2. Althoff s Administration 31
3.3. Organizational Structure of the Ministry of Culture 34
3.4. External Relations of the Ministry of Culture 38
3.4.1. Federal and Prussian Authorities 38
3.4.2. German Countries and Austria 39
3.4.3. Public Relations and Public Opinion 40
The economics
of science and scholarship
an analysis of the Althoff system
L.M.C. Vereeck
Friedrich Althoff (1839-1908)
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
University of Limburg
Maastricht
The Netherlands
Dissertation nr. 93-11
THE ECONOMICS OF SCIENCE AND SCHOLARSHIP
An Analysis or the AlthofT System
DE WETENSCHAPSECONOMIE
Een studie van hel AlthofT systeem
DIE WIRTSCHAFTLICHE WISSENSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG
Eine Analyse des Systems Althoff
THE ECONOMICS OF SCIENCE AND SCHOLARSHIP
An Analysis of the Althoff System
PROEFSCHRIFT
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Rijksuniversiteit Limburg te Maastricht,
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus. Prof mr M.J. Cohen,
volgens het besluit van het College van Dekanen,
in het openbaar te verdedigen op
donderdag, 4 februari 1993 om 16.00 uur
door
Lode Maria Corneel Vereeck
UPM
UNIVERSITAIRE PERS MAASTRICHT
Promotor: Prof.dr. J.G. Backhaus
Co-promotor: Dr. G. Meijer
Beoordelingscommissie: Prof.dr. W.F.J. Buijink (voorzitter)
Prof.dr W Albeda
Prof.dr. B.S. Frey (Univ. Zurich)
Prof.dr. T.L.C.M. Groot
ISBN 90-9005735-8
Copyngal 1992. L M C Verwek, Maaancbt
Alle rechlea worbetaoifdni Nieu urt deze uitgave maf wordea ververivoiatfiga'. opgHlagra ia eea gr—tniti ieeni gegeveajbeataad. of
npealiaar gaauaki. ia ewge vona of op tajgc «njxe. artuj ekfcuoanca. am aaaii'h 4oor fotokopie^a. nfaiiara of eatge aadm laiairr
toade* voonfgaaade icanftflijkr loeateaiaiiaf vaa de uilgevef
Voor tovet «et aufcea vaa fnluiiifte^a uit drie uitgave i» loagoalMB op |«Md vaa artikel I6B Auleumrvf 1912 jo bel Betluil vaa 20 ;uai
1474. Sit 151, loall »e»-|jugj l»j bet healuil vaa :< auguittii 19CS. Mi «Tl e« artatd 17 A a r n i M 1912. * e * » e a de daarvoof n o d i j t
wnckaldigde v«gordiag te voMoea aaa de SHvbtiag Reprombl iPttadm U 2 . I l » AW A a a d v e * » Voot ae< oveonBea vaa gedntlwa)
Mil dete uitgave ia MoemWiage*. readen e« aadere coaaptlalirwcTke« lanikeJ 16 AMetifvwl 1912) d w « atom z*ca lol de aitfever te « r a A a
No pan of IBJ« book May be prodared ia asy for«. b)> pnal. yhumpiial. aucrofilai or aay other aMaaa amkoal Ihe pnor wnnca p f f i i a w of
Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction 9
Chapter 2: Method of Analysts 13
2.1. Economic Analysis IS
2.1.1. Economic Properties of Academic Knowledge IS
2.1.2. Standard Economic Theory on Academic Performance 19
2.1.3. New Institutional Economics 22
2.2. Historical Analysis 23
Chapter 3: Prussian Public Administration in the Second Empire 27
3.1. Life and Career of Friedrich Althoff (1839-1908) 29
3.2. Althoff s Administration 31
3.3. Organizational Structure of the Ministry of Culture 34
3.4. External Relations of the Ministry of Culture 38
3.4.1. Federal and Prussian Authorities 38
3.4.2. German Countries and Austria 39
3.4.3. Public Relations and Public Opinion 40
6 77
Chapter 4: Growth and Institutional Reform of the Academic System 43
4.1. Humboldtian Principle 45
4.2. University of StraBburg, the Embryonic Althoff System 46
4.3. Growth of the Academic System 47
4.4. Althoffs Institutional Reforms and Innovations 51
4.4.1. Independent Research Institutes 51
4.4.2. Seminar Research Method 54
4.4.3. Professional Library System 54
4.4.4. University Regulations 55
4.4.5. Academic Compensation 57
4.4.6. International Science Policy 58
Chapter 5. Methods and Means of the Althoff System 61
5.1. Academic Information 63
5.1.1. Academic Statistics 63
5.1.2. Network of Confidential Agents 63
5.2. Academic Appointments 67
5.2.1. Selection Procedure 67
5.2.2. Researchers of Genius 71
5.2.3. Minorities 72
5.3. Academic Freedom 74
5.4. Financial Resources 75
5.4.1. Prussian Ministry of Finance 76
5.4.2. Local Authorities, Chambers of Commerce and Academies 77
5.4.3. Industry and Banking 78
5.4.4. Private Foundations 78
5.4.5. Incentives to Finance Academic Research 80
Chapter 6: Scholarly Behavior and Academic Institutions 83
6.1. Scientific Community 83
6.1.1. Verification 86
6.1.2. Dissemination 89
6.2. Transaction Costs of Academic Production 91
6.3. Property Rights 95
6.3.1. Externalities 96
6.3.2. Principal-Agent Relations 98
6.3.3. Academic Organization 98
Chapter 7: Academic Property Rights and Scientific Production 103
7.1. Academic Appointments 105
7.1.1. Cooptation Right 105
7.1.2. Selection of Candidates 107
7.1.3. Residual Claimancy 108
7.2. Academic Compensation 112
7.2.1. Implicit Contracts 112
7.2.2. Academic Salaries 115
7.2.3. Research Facilities and Prizes 116
7.2.4. Academic Tenure 118
7.2.5. Teaching and Research 123
Chapter 8: Bureaucratic Governance 127
8.1. Bureaucratic Control Loss 130
8.2. Authority 135
8.3. Networks 141
8.4. Public Entrepreneurship 144
o/f/i*
Chapter 9: Conclusions 147
9.1. The Althoff System 149
9.2. Economics of Science and Scholarship 157
9.2.1. Science Policy 157
9.2.2. Economic Theory 161
References 165
Appendix 177
A.I. List of Assumptions 177
A 2 List of Observation» 178
A 3 List of Propositions 180
A.4. List of Hypotheses 183
A.5. List of Conclusions 184
Summary 185
Samenvatting 186
Zusammenfassung 187
Acknowledgements 189
Curriculum Vitae 191
1. Introduction
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1. Introduction
This study views the goal of science policy as that of creating an institutional
environment in which science and scholarship can prosper. It is embedded in the
Maastricht problem-oriented approach to research. The first purpose of (he book is to
understand the reasons for the outstanding performance of (he Prussian German
academic system at the turn of the nineteenth into the twentieth century. By studying
a true benchmark in the history of science administration, the so-called /iMq^"
rymm,' the institutional conditions for productive academic activity are exposed. The
task of the historical empirical analysis is to provide a solid base for economic theory.
The economics of science and scholarship is an infant line of research, compared with
the sociological and philosophical tradition of Popper, Kuhn. Lakatos and Mcrton.'
Therefore, this study makes an attempt to develop the theoretical framework, which
models the relationship between the institutional structure in which academic
production is being carried out and the scientific performance of the scholars in
question. The purpose is to understand the institutional requirements for productive
academic research, the influence of institutional change on scholarly behavior and the
conditions for an efficient allocation of academic resources. The important relation
that exists between academic research and teaching and the performance of (he
economy makes it a relevant study of economic policy and applied public finance.'
The organization of the book is as follows. Chapter 2 considers the method of
analysis that underlies this study. It expresses a dissatisfaction with the standard
economic performance analysis and stresses the importance of the new institutional
economics for science and scholarship. The next three chapters are a survey of the
Althoff system. Chapter 3 takes up the Prussian public bureaucracy as (he engine of
the German academic reform. It also emphasizes Althoff s specific style and position
1. The Althoff system is named after its originator, the German administrator of science Friedrich
Althoff (1839-1908). While the Althoff system may not seem to be a system in the modern
(American) sense of the word, this study claims that there is a "systematical" approach behind
Althoff s science policy which allows its literal translation from German.
2. See: Karl R. Popper (1934), Log/* d>r forjcnunfl, Mohr, Tubingen, repr. (1976); Karl R. Popper
(1963), Con/>crurM and rt^/taaHonj. 7 V Growrn <>/• Sci«i/i/ic fffioufa/fe, Routledge and Kegan
Paul, London; Thomas S. Kuhn (1962), 7Tw Srrucru/* o / 5c«n///ïc fovo/u/to/u, University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 2nd. ed (1970); Imre Lakatos and A. Musgrave (1970), Criririjm and
rnc CroKtA o / Afnowi>d£*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Robert K. Merton (1973),
7fcf Socio/ogy <?ƒ Sri#ncr- 7Vorfrica/ and £>n/wrica/ /nvfwijaffo/u. University of Chicago Press,
Chicago.
3. The results of academic research and teaching are a potential source of innovations, which are the
basis of productivity increases and economic growth. Although it is beyond dispute that the
quality of the academic system affects the performance of an economy, the macro-economic
effects are hard to model. While it can take years before the results of research are put into
practical use, it can take decades before the education of a new generation leads to productivity
increases as a result of better decision-making or improved production methods. See: Mark Blaug
(1970), .4/1 /nrrot/ucrion ;o tte Economic* o/Education, Penguin Books, Middlesex.
12 77i* Eco/uvmcj o/Sc/>/ic# a/u/ ScAo/arjtop. /4/i /4na/yj/j o / rA
in the administration. Chapter 4 traces the history of the Althoff system, in which the
University of StraAburg played a pioneering role. More important, it deals with the
measures that were taken to reform the Prussian academic system, some of which
were boldly innovative. Chapter S looks at the methods of academic administration
and illustrates the role of the scientific community in the Althoff system. The
characteristic features of the Althoff system are summarized in a set of 33
observations to be used in the economic analysis.
Chapter 6 starts with an economic model of scholarly behavior, based on the seminal
work by Gordon Tullock.' It stresses the vital role of the scientific community for
maintaining the quality of academic output. In the chapter, this theoretical framework
is further developed, drawing upon the new institutional economics, namely
transaction cost analysis and property rights theory. The extended model points out
how academic institutions influence scholarly performance. Chapter 7 is concerned
with the optimization of academic performance by means of institutional change. It
deals, in particular, with academic appointments and compensation. The economic
propositions, derived from the theory, are applied to the Althoff system in an effort to
assess the efficiency of the Prussian academic system and the efficacy of Prussian
science policy. Chapter 8 addresses the alleged (in)efficiency of academic
bureaucracies. It also tries to explain Althoffs style and public entrepreneurship.
Chapter 9 ends with the major conclusions, that can be drawn from the analysis. It
assesses the performance of the Althoff system and the limits and opportunities of
science policy. 40 propositions about science and scholarship, in general, and 15
hypotheses about the Althoff system, in particular, form the core of this study. They
are listed in the appendix, along with the observations, the assumptions and the
conclusions.
4. Gordon Tullock (1966). 7V Orgoii&irion of/mfuiry. Duke University Press, Durham N.C..
13
2. Method of Analysis
2.1. Economic Analysis
2.1.1. Economic Properties of Academic Knowledge
Assumption 1: Academic output is a public good, loaded with externalities.
Ass. 2: The economic properties of academic output make it very difficult
to assess its value by means of quantitative indicators alone.
2.1.2. Standard Economic Theory on Academic Performance
2.1.3. New Institutional Economics
2.2. Historical Analysis
14 77* Economic* o/ Sc/>nc< rot ScAofarjAfp.- /In ^na/y5« o / r t *
IS
2. Method of Analysis
How can an economic study about academic performance be set up in a theoretical
way? What makes the Althoff system so well suited for this line of research? This
study takes a close look at the standard economic analysis, but favors a new
institutional economic approach for the analysis of scholarly activity.
2.1. Economic Analysis
2.1.1. Economic Properties of Academic Knowledge
The economics of science and scholarship is generally not considered as an
established field of research.
"£cwitfm/.stt Ziave nor ac/i/Vvea" a unl/iea" r/ieo/} o/ /AÉ fcWiaWor o/ u/uve'r.itfieM an</
jc/io/arj. £>i.sagre-*m*W.j «/// occur over w/ia/ « formg mai/m/zed' a/id" w/w/ are //if
mow j/gni/ïca/tf co«5frai>i/j in J/K max/miM/iort. 5o, / . . / d7jagr«m«i/.s a/jo jf/7/
occur over vWuu « r/i* mow e$ïa>« orga/uza/io/uj//orm/or u/iiw,i/7i>5 'o /aitf. //i
/o a//oca/« scarce
Academic administrators allocate resources over various academic uses. For an
efficient result, they necessarily have to assess the value of the different activities.
Academic output is then maximized when the allocated resources equalize the benefits
of the various academic activities at the margin.' Since research is an activity aimed
at discovering the unknown, it is extremely difficult to assess the expected returns on
academic efforts and investments. Even the evaluation of new knowledge that has
been actually produced and the measurement of academic performance remain diffi-
cult endeavors.
5. Arthur M. Diamond Jr (1989), Economic Etp/o/utf/oiu o/ //v Bf/iavior o/
Sc/io/arj, Paper Annual Meeting of the North American Economics and Finance Association,
Atlanta, Georgia, p. 24.
6. The academic system is used in this study as a term to describe a i d of institutions, in which
scientific knowledge is produced and transmitted Academic production consists of scientific
research, teaching, academic management and public service The emphasis in this book is on the
organization of academic research and the process of scholarly production.
16 77i* fcwwwMCj o/"S«>nc« <wu/ Sc/io/anA/p: ^n /4na/yn.i
>* mui/ ma** jom* a/i//'ci/»a/io«J o/Turur* aVvr/o;>m*n/.i in
in o/n*r /?Wflj, i/ w* WIJ/I f O invrir our r*Monrc« wije/y, tu/ // j/iouW no/
yórgo//*n /na/ //i*y ar* JUMMJ. Sbm*no>v /n* yfcc/ /na/ //IM* J W U H ar*
a/wu/ jci>nc* J*«HI /o carry /n* i/np/ica/ion /na/ /n*y /nevwWvw ar* ici>n/i/ic. /n
/ac/, /n* on* ar*a of nu/rw/i acriviry in wnicn HT nav* a ^ooni /ogi'ca/ proof/na/ 1/
ij no/ /WJIIW* /o /or«** a>ve"/o/>m*n/j IJ jci>nc*. WV canno/ ftnow f<x/ay »vna/ H>*
tw'M rfiicov*r /omorrow. "'
Assumption 1: Academie output is a public good, loaded with externalities.
Knowledge produced by academic research has the distinctive characteristics of a
public good. Samuelson has pointed at the non-rivalry in the consumption of public
goods and the principle of non-exclusion.' By definition, a public good is a good
that, if it goes to one individual, can be made available without additional cost to the
members of the community. The second independent criterion is that it is also not
feasible or profitable to exclude others from the enjoyment of that good. The
consumption of knowledge by one individual does not affect the amount of
know/edge, avai/abte /or consumption to others. Knowledge generaf/y is characterized'
by a zero marginal cost of serving another person. But under some conditions, it is
feasible to exclude others from knowledge. For commercial reasons, applied research
is often kept secret or patented. In essence, the patent system assigns temporary
private property rights to a piece of knowledge. But the private appropriability ends
when patents expire, which indicates that knowledge has latent public good
properties. The temporary private ownership of knowledge acts as a private incentive
to spur innovation first, but facilitates wide (public) use afterwards.' Basic research
and social science results, however, are genuine public goods, because practically
nobody can be excluded from using them and because the non-rivalry argument also
stands. Basic research is often unpatented because, by its very nature, the practical or
commercial application is not of interest, nor immediately evident. There also exists
no enforceable patent system for e.g. new management techniques or the rent-seeking
theory. They can be used freely. By design, the academic system produces public
scientific knowledge, of which it is a recognized repository.
Academic research as well as instruction are loaded with externalities. An externality
is defined as the economic gain or loss accruing to one or more recipient agents as
the result of an economic action initiated by another agent with the gain or loss not
being reflected in a market price. It is an unpaid, often unintended, side-effect of a
producer's or consumer's output or input on other producers or consumers. A new
theory or a new scientific instrument may create substantial external effects with
respect to other research activities, thus influencing the performance of other
scholars. Instruments developed for academic purposes often move to certain
7. Gordon Tullock (1966), Orjanijd/ion o//mfuiry. p 127.
8. Paul A. Samuelson (1954), 'The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures", RfviVvv of Economic* am/
Sfa/u«« 36, pp. 387-389.
9. Richard R Nelson (1986). /Atmuriofu Si^po/ring frcAnira/ Cfovigr in /m/uirr>'. Research Paper.
Yale University.
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industrial technologies. They create external benefits. The quality of the academic
training of lawyers, managers, politicians, etc. determines their future ability to make
just and efficient decisions, which influences the performance of the organization for
which they work. It can also create substantial external benefits to the rest of the
economy, which cannot easily be traced back to their academic education The same
argument holds for better management and production techniques, which arc the
result of academic research. The quality of engineering studies is an important
determinant of the capacity of a nation to catch up with technological progress.
Medical research and instruction affect the individuals who suffer from particular
diseases. It also creates important external effects, because it is a determining factor
of public health. Although an individual might never be ill himself, public health may
affect the costs of the labor force he employs.
Consider the following example of the public good aspect and the external effects of
academic output. The theory of rent-seeking'" is clearly a public good, because it is
available for anyone who wants to make use of it without diminishing its availability
to others. It may create substantial external benefits A decision not to grant a
monopoly license by a public administrator can be based upon his understanding of
the welfare implications of rent-seeking. This decision-maker might have attended
public choice classes, studied public choice publications, or been told about it.
However, his decision affects many who are not part, and probably not even aware,
of the decision that was taken.
Academic output can create negative externalities as well. Low-quality academic
production can have serious consequences and mounting external costs. Poor teaching
can lower the economic performance of a nation by way of a reduced transfer of
skills or a diminished ability of students to take good decisions. Poor research
productivity obviously retards scientific development, and also technological and
economic progress.
The characteristics of public goods and externalities make it difficult to assess their
value." The non-purchasers of many public goods cannot practically be excluded
from the consumption of the good. Consequently, they have an incentive not to reveal
their true preferences, because they can enjoy the good without having to pay for its
consumption. Only these free-riders know what the public good is worth for them.
There is no price system that discloses their marginal willingness to pay. Further-
more, joint consumption implies that the public good is not divisible in separate units
that can be easily counted, which complicates the measurement of actual
consumption.
10. Rent-seeking is the activity that seeks 10 capture part of the social surplus, e.g. lobbying
government to obtain a monopoly position.
11. Mancur Olson (1973), "Evaluating Performance in the Public Sector', in: Milton Moss (ed),
7V Afrorurrnifnr o/ Economic and Socia/ /Vr/brma/ic?, Studie* in Income and Wealth 38,
NBER, Columbia Univ. Press, New York, pp. 355-384.
18 77»« fcwuwm'ci
Private benefits and costs represent the internal effects of an economic action which
do not escape the economic calculus of the initiating agent. Social benefits and costs
represent both the internal effects and the external effects which escape the price
mechanism. If social benefits exceed the private effects, a positive externality exists.
An individual may produce less than the social optimal amount, because otherwise, he
is adding benefits to society greater than the benefits for which he is being
compensated. Of course, he may not always be aware of the externality, which he
produces. The recipients of these benefits have a free-rider motivation not to pay for
them voluntarily. Again, free-riding behavior may be intentional as well as
unintentional. The external benefits and costs affect the social value of a good. In
theory, it can be calculated who benefits how much or bears which costs from the
external effect, but the chain of effects, as in academic research and education, is
often long and indirect. Therefore, the following assumption is made.
Assumption 2: The economic properties of academic output make it very difficult to
assess its value by means of quantitative indicators alone.
Academic output is a public good, loaded with externalities. This implies that its
economic value is difficult to assess, which in turn affects the administrator's ability
to evaluate scientific output and measure academic performance in an objective way.
When an academic administrator would want to evaluate academic productivity, he
would theoretically have to find out who the marginal consumer is who makes use of
the scientific insights, and then what this knowledge is worth to this marginal
consumer. As pointed out, it is highly likely that he can not find this information.
Moreover, the external effects of research and academic instruction are large,
dispersed, diverse and difficult to capture. It is indeed very hard to measure the
marginal contribution of scientific insights to economic welfare and further scientific
progress.
The customers of the universities and academic research institutes are often ignorant
about the academic product. Exactly therein lies the teaching mission. The same is
true for research. The value of results in basic research is rarely appreciated until
they have been applied. Since the value of research output and the quality of teaching
services are difficult to measure, academic authorities, such as the Prussian Ministry
of Culture, that monitor the production of academic output, have a dearth of the
information needed to act efficiently. Administrations dealing with public goods and
externalities know only their expenditures, and have no objective measure of the
impact on the output volume these expenditures bring about, if any. If they do know
what their organization produces, they would still have quite a problem to find out
what it was worth to its consumers. The output of a research project that has failed to
gain any results, let alone new insights, might prove very useful for other scientists,
indicating which scientific lead they should not follow, although its proper production
is close to nothing.
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Olson argues thai there are no objective indicators for evaluating performance and
efficiency of the public sector, in which he includes Ihe academic system." This
lack of information about the value of output, which is due to the typical function of
the public administration to supply public goods or to control Ihe production of goods
with externalities, makes it difficult to run the public organization efficiently To the
extent that no-one can be excluded from the consumption of the good. Ihe true
preferences for the provision of the public good are difficult to establish. The
condition of jointness of consumption implies that the marginal calculus breaks down
and that measuring of outputs becomes infeasible. By their very nature, public sector
activities involve the use or production of inputs or outputs of which the value is hard
to measure. Given the tenuous relation between intended goals and measured
outcomes, conclusions about policy or even a causal relation cannot be drawn easily.
2.1.2. Standard Economic Theory on Academic Performance
Nevertheless, economic scholars have tried to measure various aspects of academic
performance. Mindful of the constraints and shortcomings of objective indicators, the
following variables are often chosen as measures of teaching and research outcomes:
the enrollment of undergraduates and foreign students, the graduation rates at the
bachelor's, master's and doctoral level, the number of publications and citations and
the number of Nobel Prize winners working in the organization when performing
their prize-winning research. On the input side, the number of full, associate and
assistant professors and the amount spent on maintenance, library activities and
support expenditures are measured.
A count of scholarly publications indicates, for instance, the likelihood of the final
goal, i.e. research that leads to increased knowledge and further scientific and
economic advancement. However, if the number of publications is used as an
indicator of academic performance, scholars are induced to publish the minimum
publishable unit with little added scientific value. To counter this strategy, the admini-
strator could start counting the number of pages of their articles and books. This is a
poor indicator of the scientific and economic value of academic efforts, however, be-
cause some scholars, who have produced only a few small articles, have revolu-
tionized their discipline.
Therefore, some authors believe that citations are a better indication that the work of
a scientist has been important to other scientists. According to Diamond, citations are
a measure, if not of scientific merit, at least of scientific impact." Stigler and
Friedland were one of the first to use citations as a measure of quality in
economics." The advantages and disadvantages of using citations as a measure of
12. Mancur Olson (1973), Eua/ua/in; /Vrfommnc* in //* PuWic S«Tor, p 359.
13. Arthur M. Diamond Jr. (1988a), "The Empirical Progrestiveness of the General Equilibrium
Research Program". Wiwory o//"o/i/ica/ Economy 20, no. 1, pp. 119-135.
14 George J Stigler and Claire Friedland (1975), "The Citation Practices of Doctorates in
Economics', 7OU/TKI/ o//»o/i/ica/ Economy 83, no. 3, pp. 477-507.
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quality have been discussed in the economic literature." If the value of the scientific
output of scholars is measured by means of citation count, it should be noted that,
when successful scholarly work becomes a part of the corpus of science, its paternity
is soon ignored. This absorption of old knowledge in current knowledge would
support the efficient market model of scientific research." Adversely, scientists
sometimes cite a paper, only to add an ambience of class and erudition, rather than
because the cited paper has had any impact on their work. There may also emerge so-
called citation cartels, in which authors cite friends in the profession for no other
merit than their mutual friendship.
Another basic reason to cite is to increase the credibility of one's own work." In
this respect, the works of authorities such as Nobel Prize winners are very
popular." Problems with citation counts clearly arise when the opinion of the author
about the usefulness of the work quoted is lost in the count. Often the real impact is
found to be through intermediaries, i.e. articles that cite articles that cite the original
scientist's work." In general, citation counts do not measure the critical and
innovative aspect of articles. The academic results of the scholars, who focus on
social and policy problems or who are engaged in interdisciplinary research, are often
used by members of another discipline.* Consequently, they are quoted in other
journals than the traditional ones in their own profession, so that some citation counts
tend to overlook them. The contribution of scholars who write survey articles may be
exaggerated, however, if they tend to be more cited than the original work. Self-
citations count as much as citation of others, although they are sometimes excluded
from the count." While five to eight authors on one article is quite common,
citation indices often only use the first name. The citation data used do not always
discriminate between articles of the same author. Then again, productivity measured
by the number of articles bears little relation to the value of these articles.
Administrators should be aware that departmental loyalty is an important source of
cited works, as is journal coaxing. Citation counts do not tell whether the cited author
is on the editorial board of the journal in which he is cited, or whether it is merely
standard practice to quote a scientist as probably the first to write on the subject.
Stiglcr and Friedland also pointed at the decline in citations of non-journal and
foreign-language publications. In that case, citation count analysis is disadvantagous to
15. David N. Laband (1986), "Article Popularity", Economic /ngiwry 24, pp. 173-180.
16. Gary M. Anderson, David M Levy and Robert D. Tollison (1989). "The Half-Life of Dead
Economists", Gi/ia<fia#i./ouma/o/Econom/cr 22. no. I. pp. 174-183.
17. Brian L GofT. William F. Shughart II. Robert D Tollison and Stephen B Pociask (1987),
"The Incentive to Cite". 7ournd/ o//rufimriona/ and 77i«vrric<j/ Economic* 143. p. 467.
18 George J Stigler and Claire Friedland (1979). "The Pattern of Citation Practices in
Economics". Hiifory o/Po/i«c<j/Economy II , no. 1, pp. 1-20.
19. Arthur M. Diamond Jr. (1988a). Em/Mrico/ Pr»£rwjiv*nr$.f, p. 127
20. Paul Davis and Gustav F. Papanek (1984). "Faculty Ratings of Major Economics Departments
by Citations", /<m«7C<in Economic Afcviw 74. no. I. pp. 225-230. and Dennis M. Gerrity and
Richard B. McKenzie (1978). "The Ranking of Southern Economics Departments: New
Criterion and Further Evidence", Sou/Arm Economic Jou/ru/ 45. p. 610.
21. Michael C. Lovdl (1973), "The Production of Economic Literature: An Interpretation",
Jou/iki/ o/Economic Zifrrum/r 11, p. 39.
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foreign scholars, who work in an academic system with a tradition to write books.
There is also a considerable time-lag between the production of a paper and its
publication as an article, let alone the citation of the work. This is particularly hard
on young scholars, whose performance is analysed in this way. An administrator of
science should therefore not use citation counts, when the lag between research
completion and journal publication becomes loo long, which might be the case for
young scholars. Finally, departmental productivity, which is measured by the total
and per capita number of citations, can be substantially altered when a major
publisher moves to another university." Credit is mostly given to the institution at
which a cited author is currently employed. The affiliation of a scholar to more than
one institution makes it even harder to assign credit.
The difficulty of collecting quantitive information on final goals like the production
and transfer of knowledge, leaves the standard economic analysis only with
intermediate indicators of academic performance.'' Without further information,
citation counts do not provide much useful information to the administrator about the
value of the research output. Using the number of citations for administrative
purposes may even induce scholars to start a citation cartel, which adds little to
scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, citations counts can be useful in identifying which
topics are currently under the most intense focus of research." Measurements such
as graduation rates, while clearly imperfect, do hint at the level of the final outcome.
However, they do not objectively measure teaching performance and should not be
used as the basis for science policy. The number of enrollments and graduation rales
can be easily augmented, e.g. by lowering the examination requirements."
University or departmental teaching productivity should nol be assessed by the
number of graduates, but by its ability to graduate those students capable of obtaining
a university degree.
22. David Colander (1989), "Research on the Economics Profession", /ounia/ o/
/Vrjpm/wM 3, no. 4, p. 139.
23. Hogan is an illustrative example of how standard economic analysis is carried out He ranked
Ph.D. programs in economics by using publications by former students as a measure of the
quality of graduate teaching. He computed the number of pages published per Ph.D. graduate
in three journals (AER, JPE. QJE) over a ten year period The first objection would be thai
the number of pages is not a measure for the quality of the article Secondly, it is not clear
whether credit should be given to the institution where the doctoral education was received or
to the institution to which the student went after completing the doctoral dissertation. It is not
at all sure that the article can be considered the output of the department where the author
wrote his doctoral dissertation. Timothy D Hogan (1973), "Rankings of Ph.D. Programs in
Economics and the Relative Publishing Performance of Their Ph.D.'s", Kta/rro fro/iöm/c
•/ouma/ I I . pp. 10-25.
24. Arthur M. Diamond Jr. (1989b). "Most-Cited Papers and Current Research Fronts", G « / T « I /
CO/U«IM 21, no. 2, pp. 3-8
25. More generally, these measurements rely on the assumptions that the examination requirements
at the different institutions are more or less the same, that the student population is
homogeneous and that teaching is the primary determinant of the learning performances of
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2.1.3. New Institutional Economics
Two important conclusions come from the economic analysis so far. First, objective,
quantitative indicators in statistical studies provide some indication about academic
performance, but, for the reasons outlined, they have little value as science policy
targets. Second, administrators of science, who need information about the value of
academic output in order to allocate resources efficiently, have to combine
quantitative and qualitative indicators. A major task of the science manager is to
gather this information with a minimal waste of resources and to assure the objectivity
of the qualitative information. The evaluation of academic performance is a complex
matter involving the use of several indicators of performance and subjective
judgements. The lack of value measures for academic output shirts the analysis from
the subject of academic production to the design of the institutions in which scientists
work and to which they adjust their actions.
The institutional structure affects the productivity of those working in it. As Douglass
North points out. the institutional framework influences the choice options, the human
interaction and the behavior of individuals." Institutional changes in the academic
system are, therefore, likely to affect scholarly performance. Organizational change
can reduce inefficiencies by inducing better performance, which does not always have
to be measured to be observed. The matter of choosing an efficient organizational
form is a type of constrained optimization problem. To each source of an information
problem, there may be a different type of monitoring cost and institutional
arrangement to resolve it. In this study, attention is given simultaneously to property
rights, transaction costs and production costs. Insofar as there is interdependence
among these factors, an appropriate balance has to be found with various possible
trade-offs, e.g. by increasing monitoring costs, production costs may decrease, or, by
improving incentives, monitoring costs may decrease. Despite the lack of accurate
indicators of academic performance, the institutional framework can be subjected to
economic analysis in order to improve the constraints-incentives system for scholars.
Institutions determine the content of property rights, production and transaction costs,
which in turn affect the allocation and the use of resources in specific ways." They
are the research subject of the new institutional economics. Each organizational
structure is said to affect the incentives and constraints that influence economic
behavior. Therefore, institutions are themselves regarded as legitimate objects of
economic analysis. Institutions are particularly important in a complex environment of
costly transactions and asymmetrical information, like the academic world of science
and scholarship.
The new institutional economics attempts to explain the effect of specific institutions
on the activities of economic agents and to point out the institutional requirements for
26. Douglass C. North (1990), /niriru/io/u. /wri/wioiuj/ Ow/ig? a*d Economic P«r/bnikincir,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 4.
27. Eirik Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich (1972), "Property Rights and Economic Theory',
Jou/nd/ of Economic Uferarurr 10, no. 4, pp. 1137-1162.
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productive activity. The meaning of the term 'new institutional economics" is broad,
because the concept may include or exclude some of its subdisciplines. In this
analysis, new institutional economics is used as a comprehensive term covering
transaction cost analysis, property rights approach, and public choice theory of
bureaucracy. The literature on transaction costs'* and property rights'* is used to
find an explanation for how the academic environment and the institutional
innovations of the Althoff system influenced scholarly behavior and productivity.
Public choice theories are used to study the Prussian bureaucracy.
2.2. Historical Analysis
Writing history is constructing a coherent story of some aspect of the human
condition through time. For the economist, history serves an instrumental purpose.
The use of historical data sharpens the analytical tools of economics. To assess the
impact of institutional change on academic performance necessarily requires a long
time horizon. The historical dimension of economics was essential in the research
paradigm of the German Historical School. For Schmollcr,*' the analysis would have
had to start with an accurate description of the academic system in order to
understand its performance. A realistic model would then have to explain the actual
behavior of scholars from the history of the Althoff system. For economic analysis to
have a practical purpose, it should be helpful in formulating economic policies.
Besides the more instrumental purpose of the historical analysis, this study seems to
Fit nicely this modern outline of the Schmoller program. A historical case-study also
has the practical advantage of no longer affecting the research subject." It obviously
has to be well documented. If the case is generally conceived as an example of a
successful science policy, the economist can also learn about the institutional condi-
tions for optimal academic performance, from which he can draw conclusions for
science policy.
28. Transaction cost literature stems from the article by Ronald H. Coase (1937), "The Nature of
the Firm", in: 77U" firm, rt* Mar*« and tfv tatv (1988), University of Chicago Preu,
Chicago, pp. 33-56, and has found its most complete expression in Oliver E. Williamson
(1985), 7V fro/iomic /»u//;u//o/iso/Copi/a/wm. Free Press, New York.
29. Property rights literature stems from another article by R.H Coase (1960), "The Problem of
Social Cost". ./OU/TUJV £>ƒ taw and £ro/iom/rj 3. pp 1-44. and has been further developed by
Armen A. Alchian and H. Demsetz (1972), "Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, /4wrica/i Economic /fcviw 62, pp. 777-795. For a survey, see Eirik 0.
Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich (1974), 7V £ronom/cj o/ Pro/wry /Hgn/i, Ballinger,
Cambridge, Mass..
30 See: Jürgen G. Backhaus (1989a). Gustav Schmoller and the Problems of Today, Wortt/ij
/>a/w 89.009, University of Limburg. 24 pp.
31. Although science and scholarship is not considered an established theoretical field in economics
and confidential information about the present academic organizations and the scholars who
work there is not often available and reliable for analytical purposes, whatever result of such a
study may affect the financial position of an academic institution. In that case, possible errors
concerning science policy implications can have an unwarranted and detrimental effect on
academic performance.
24
The Althoff system is uniquely suited for this line of research. Since the performance
of scholars in the Althoff system is virtually undisputed, the reforms of the Prussian
academic system give evidence for these institutional requirements for productive
academic activity. The case spans a period of 25 years and displays a large array of
institutional innovations, which can be subjected to analytical study.
The Althoff system is also well documented." Althoff s extensive work archives are
stored in the Central State Archives in Merseburg, Germany." His personal
documents are kept in the German State Library in Berlin. The Althoff system has
been thoroughly investigated by German historians of science, in particular Bernhard
vom Brocke from the University of Marburg and a whole team at the former East-
German Academy of Science. Vom Brocke is considered the leading scholar in this
field." Since it is not intended to make a contribution to the history of science, the
analysis relies mainly, but not entirely, on these secondary sources. In 1989, two
conferences were set up to commemorate Althoffs 150th birthday. In June, the
Institute for Theory, History and Organization of Science held a conference in East
32. The Althoff literature is almost exclusively in German. With the exception of some references
(see e.g. John E. Craig (1984), Sc/io/arrnip unJ Mwion fiui7<//'n;, Chicago University Press,
Chicago), only one survey article of the Althoff system is currently available in English:
Bernhard vom Brocke (1991a), "Friedrich Althoff: A Great Figure in Higher Education Policy
in Germany". M i v n o 29, no. 3, pp. 269-293. The papers and proceedings of the Heilbronn
conference will be published in English as well in: Jürgen G. Backhaus (1993), ed., 7fo
Economics o/SciVnc? Po/icv, forthcoming.
33. Department II, Rep. 92.
34. Bernhard vom Brocke published several articles and books on the Althoff system. Bernhard
vom Brocke (1980), "Hochschul- und Wissenschaftspolitik in PreuBen und im Deutschen
Kaiserreich 1882-1907: das 'System Althoff", in: Peter Baumgan (Hrsg.), BiWungipo/mt in
P/rujfrn zur &ir rf« £ahCTrirfa, Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Preufiischen Geschichte e.V., Band
1, Klett-Gotta. Stuttgart, pp. 7-119; (1981a), "PreuBische Bildungspolitik 1700-1930",
-4Wia/u//unj?f/i, 1/15.. pp. 727-746; (1981b), "PreuBische Bildungspolitik von Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz und Wilhelm von Humboldt bis Friedrich Althoff und Carl Heinrich Becker
(1700-1930)", in: W. Bohme (Hrsg), /Vru/fcn - r iw //«•auj/orrfrrung, Karlsruhe (Herrenalber
Texte, 32), pp. 54-99; (1981c), "Der deutsch-amerikanische Professorenaustausch. PreuBische
Wissenschaftspolitik, internationale Wissenschaftsbeziehungen und die Anfinge einer deulschen
auswirtigen Kulturpolilik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg", Zfi/$c/in/i /Ö/- A'a/ri/raui/uujr/i. Institut
fQr Auslandsbeziehungen, Stuttgart, no. 31. pp. 128-182; (1985), "Die Gelehrten'. Auf dem
Weg zu einer vergleichenden Sozialgeschichte europiischer Bildungssysteme und Bildungseliten
im Industriezeitalter", Jü/ir/wc/i </« ifo/if/iisc/i-dfuttcnMi W«orijcte» //uri/uM in 7h>nr,
Societa editrice il Mulino, Bologna, pp. 389-401; (1987). "Friedrich Althoff", in: Wolfgang
Treue und Karl fried Gründer (Hrsg.), BwYiniicn* J>touM&frr Wu.tfiucna/r.i/x>toi* in B*r/in.
Miniifcr, Brtim/c / t a j r iw . Colloquium Verlag. Berlin, pp. 195-214; (1988), 'Von der
Wissenschaftsverwaltung zur Wissenschaftspolitik: Friedrich Althoff (19.2 1839-20.10.1908)"
Brricn/? jur WiwrnicA^/ti^Mc/iicto. VCB Verlagsgesellschaft. Weinheim, no. 11. pp. 1-26;
(1989a). "Vorgeschichte. Gründung und Entwicklung der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft zur
Förderung der Wissenschaften - Der Anteil Friedrich Althoffs". in: I.T.W., fri«/ricA /4Wiojf
8. Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR. Berlin, pp 129-163. He edited (1990)
Spdn/iunfj/rM KM Po/i/ül: unJ GriW/ic7uj/*, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart
(with Rudolf Vierhaus) and (1991b), Wï55c>ut-/id/}^»cnicn/f W W'uicnjcMiAipo///üt im
/nJutrnVzn'/a/lrr. Das "System Althoff" in historischer Perspektive, Verlag August Lax,
Hildcsheim.
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Berlin. One month later, the second conference took place in Heilbronn with an
international audience of historians, sociologists and economists. A third conference
was held in Bad Homburg in May 1990. As a result of these research efforts, the
Althoff system is nowadays very well documented.
Althoff did not write a document in which he explained the general idea or rationale
behind the academic reforms.
"£J i^fcr - JOHTII MiAtr Iwta/i/U - b in u/n/oxjr-na>.$ /?</b/7np«)^owwn aui
fVtfVr /../. /4//no/f Hwr /VaJt/iA^r. tWn 77i«>r«/Jt*r. Dai '
yWirzr-Asi/Wa/i;?r /Vam /irrauj in/jra/iaVi. ""
'Sown'; WjA«*r Afta/vu, tow er (V4Mo$7 a<u fl/W dVr Wmmjc/w/t. aVu
imseTucnqlhpo/i/iJcAeTi Sytf«m zugrwiaV /a#, n/ry^nrfi ryj/wnamcA
The tryptich by Vom Brocke is, therefore, a most useful lead to start the
investigation.
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/ zum
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The expanding academic system was managed by the Prussian central stale
administration in Berlin. It strived for the international recognition of German science
and scholarship. The enterprising and liberal head of the Prussian Ministry of Culture
was Althoff." In the following three chapters, attention is paid to the impact of
Althoff on Prussian science policy, to the state bureaucracy that implemented the
policy measures, and to the measures themselves that changed the academic
institutions in an effort to improve scientific performance.
35 Bemhard vom Brocke (1980), "Hochschul- und Wissenschaftspolrtik in Preuften und im
Deutschen Kaiserreich 1882-1908: Das 'System Althoff", in: Peter Baumgart (Hrsg ),
£i/</uRffjpo/<rti in />r?«0«! zur Z«/ d « ATa<>rr«c/u, Klett-Cona, Stungan, p. 49.
36. Hubert Laitko (1989). 'Alexander von Humboldt und Friedrich Althoff: Zur Tradition
selektiver Wissenschaftssteuerung durch Fördemng von Hochbegabungen", in: I.T.W.,
Fn«fnc/! /«irtoif/Ü9-/9O8, Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR, Berlin, p. 3.
37. Bemhard vom Brocke (1980). Hoc/ucAuV- u/iJ Wijir^ic/ia/ri/xVi/iA:. pp. 15-16.
38. Liberal meaning defending the basic rights of freedom, among which academic freedom,
freedom of speech and freedom of religion.
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3. Prussian Public Administration
in the Second Empire
3.1. Life and Career of Friedrich AllhofT (1839-1908)
Observation 1: Althoff was (he leading public administrator of science in
Germany for a quarter of a century.
3.2. AJthofTs Administration
Obs. 2: AlthofTs "personal regime" is characterized by an autonomous and
autocratic working style, a strong personal administration and independent
professionalism.
Obs. 3: Althoff had excellent contacts with the Imperial Court and obtained
the exceptional right of direct address to the Emperor.
Obs. 4: The international recognition of German science and scholarship
was a major objective of the Althoff system.
3.3. Organizational Structure of the Ministry of Culture
Obs. 5: The Prussian Ministry of Culture was organized as a typical
hierarchical bureaucracy.
Obs. 6: Althoff could rely on a professional staff of experts in his
department.
Obs. 7: Althoff operated beyond the formal limits of the authority invested
in him.
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3.4. External Relations of the Ministry of Culture
3.4.1. Federal and Prussian Authorities
Obs. 8: The Ministry of Culture coordinated the initiatives in the field of
science and education in Prussia.
3.4.2. German Countries and Austria
Obs. 9: Prussia determined the science policy of Germany.
Obs. 10: The Austrian university system had the special mission to
integrate the different peoples of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.
3.4.3. Public Relations and Public Opinion
Obs. 11: Althoff used many media to promote the policy and the
achievements of his department.
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3. Prussian Public Administration
in the Second Empire
3.1. Life and Career of Friedrich AlthofT (1839-1908)
Friedrich Theodor AlthofT was bom on February 19. 1839 in Dinslaken near Wcsel
in the province of Niederrhein. Prussia. He was the son of the Domain Councillor
Friedrich Theodor Althoff and his father's second wife. Julie von Buggenhagen His
father's family included state officials and parsons. On his mother's side, he was of
Pomerian noble descent and related to Prussian Minister of War, Julius Ernst von
Buggenhagen. His father died in I8S2 at the age of 54. Young Althoff was raised by
his mother, who was 37 when she had her only child. His marriage with Marie
Ingenohl in 1864 was stable, but remained childless. Sixty-nine years old. Althoff
died in Berlin-Steglitz on October 20. 1908. Marie Althoff, his wife, outlived him by
seventeen years."
After High School, Althoff went to the University of Bonn to study Law (1856-1861).
He started his career as an interrogating magistrate and lawyer Mia/tu/ra/or n/id
Jfe/êr«rufar) at several Rhenish courts and at the Superior Court of Justice in Berlin
(1864-1866). After Althoff passed the government examination of counsellor
(.<4xjM5or), he practised law in Ehrenbreitstein. During the French-German War, he
was a member of the nursing staff. In September 1870, when the war was over, he
returned to Bonn, where he continued the legal practice for only a short period of
time. During one year, he also occupied himself with scientific legal research in order
to obtain a license as a private lecturer in law.
In 1871, Althoff accepted the offer to become a legal adviser (Juir/rfar u/u/
in the Committee for Religious and School Affairs in Straflburg, previously called the
Civil Commissioner's Office. This position would form the start of his career in the
administration of science. He stayed in the Alsatian public administration for eleven
years until 1882. Althoff was responsible for the infrastructure and the appointment of
the academic staff at the University of Straflburg, which had just reopened its doors.
Being a jurist, he was also asked to write the application and incorporation charter of
this new German University.
Althoff combined his administrative duties with an Extraordinary Professorship of
French and Modern Civil Law at the University of Strafiburg. His only scholarly
39. See: Manfred Nebelin (1990). "Friedrich AlthofT. in: Kurt G A Jeserich and Helmut Neu-
haus (Hrsg) . /Vr*J»i//cfct«»«i <*w druMtrVn Wrwa/funj B/ojfri^UM ZJI/- V>r-
/6*5- /9*5 . Kohlhanuner-Verlag. Stuttgart, pp 426-429.
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achievement in cooperation with other jurists was the comprehensive compilation of
all laws valid in Alsace-Lorraine, including the French regulations that had not been
repealed. The work was done in such an exemplary way that it ended the legal
uncertainty in the region. Althoff was offered a full professorship in 1880, although
he had not finished the doctoral dissertation, which he had agreed upon with professor
Rudolph von Gneist (Berlin) in 1863. Therefore, he refused, despite the substantial
salary increase coming with the promotion *'
1882 meant the real sun for the Althoff system. In that year, Althoff received a call
and appointment from the Prussian Ministry of Culture in Berlin (Afu/num/Vimfnu/n).
His office was located turner <fcn Zjrafrn 4, at the corner with W/7/iWwurra/te. He
started as a referendary (vorrragrmfcr /tar)'" and was asked to administer the
appointments of the academic staff working at all the Prussian universities and
academic institutes." In spite of Althoffs formal position and his official duties, he
soon expanded his activities into all areas of science policy. He occupied himself with
the financial management and institutional reform of the Prussian academic system. In
1897, Allhoff was promoted to Assistant Secretary (A//m5W7a/d//rifcj0r)." By that
time, he had become the leading public official for cultural and scientific affairs. He
was offered positions in the government as Secretary of Culture (1899) and Minister
of Culture (1906). On both occasions, he declined the offer.
In 1907, he was awarded a life-long position in the Upper Chamber and was
nominated Crown Counsellor. Never enobled, Althoff received five Honorary
Doctor's degrees.*' One foreign university. Harvard University, gave Althoff an
Honorary Doctor's degree of Law on June 17, 1906. He was the fourth German to
receive this honor.*' Althoff also became an honorary member of the academies of
Berlin (1900), Göttingen (1901) and Erfurt (1904). He resigned from office in 1907
for reasons of ill health. Earlier requests on account of his health were withdrawn
under pressure of the pleas by Minister of Culture Konrad Studt (1838-1921).
40. In the 1880's, a full professor was paid a salary of 2200 Taler per year ( ± 66,000 DM or
± 38.000 US$ current value): an extraordinary professor earned 1600 Taler ( ± 48,000 DM or
± 27,500 USS).
41. A referendary was an official, charged with specific duties. The term was used as a title.
42. The Prussian academic system was organized and sponsored by the state and managed by the
state administration. Professors were appointed and paid by the Ministry of Culture. Until
Althoff arrived, the appointment of the academic staff had been handled according to the
following standard procedure. The faculty that had a professorship vacant was asked by the
Ministry to suggest candidates in a rank order Most of the time, the advice was followed and
the faculty's candidate appointed, making the approval by the Ministry a mere formality.
43. The term has also been translated as 'Director' [See: John E. Craig (1984)) or "Departmental
Director' |See. Bemhard vom Brocke (1991)].
44. Dr .he . StraBburg in 1882, Dr.med.h.c. Marburg 1890, Dr rer.pol.h.c. Munster in I90S.
Dr.jur.h.c. Harvard in 1906. Dr.Ing.he. Technische Hochschule Berlin-Charlottenburg in
1907.
45. The three previous degrees had been awarded to the jurist K.J.A Minermaier from Heidelberg
(1836). German ambassador to the USA Theodor von Holleben (1838-1913) in 1901 and
prince Heinrich from Prussia (1862-1929) in 1902.
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Observation I: Althoff was the leading public administrator of science in Germany
for a quarter of a century.
From 1882 till 1907, Althoff was the leading public official for academic affairs in
Germany. He incorporated the continuity of the state administration and protected the
academic system from political interferences. Due to his strong, personal
administration and autocratic working style, the Prussian academic system and science
policy were labeled as the 'Althoff system".
3.2. AlthofTs Administration
Althoffs working style was remarkable, to say the least. Along with his motives, it is
worth a closer look. His character and working style are incisively described by his
biographer. Bernhard vom Brocke.** The qualitative characteristics of AlthofT»
administrative style are also well documented. Vom Brocke typifies Althoff as ener-
getic, efficacious, autonomous and autocratic.
He certainly was a hard worker, who regularly worked sixteen hours a day. Even
after his retirement, he kept receiving guests for work meetings about science policy
issues. He invited them to his retreat (the Schierke sanatorium in (he Harz Mountains)
and to his house in Berlin, even the day before he died. Autocratically, he refused to
appoint candidates proposed by faculty when he suspected nepotism or biased
behavior. This inspired much of the controversy over the "almighty" Althoff.
Observation 2: Althoffs "personal regime" is characterized by an autonomous and
autocratic working style, a strong personal administration and independent professio-
nalism.
From 1882 till 1897, Althoff was one of the thirty-three referendaries who worked in
the Ministry of Culture. At the next hierarchical level stood four Assistant Secre-
taries. They were the highest ranked bureaucrats and received their instructions
directly from their superior in the government, namely the Minister of Culture.
Althoff was promoted to this position in 1897.
It should be noted that Althoff was not in the formal position to shape the science
policy of Prussia. A referendary had to execute the instructions received from the
Assistant Secretary. The latter was supposed to implement the measures taken by the
Minister of Culture, while sharing powers with three other Assistant Secretaries.
However, Althoff designed the entire science policy, manipulating his superiors and
interfering in other departments of the Ministry. This autonomous style and autocratic
approach contrasted with his formal position in the hierarchy and was referred to as
Althoffs "personal regime".
46. See: Bernhard vom Brocke (1980), /focAic/m/- urn/ Ww/ucto/hpo/M*, pp. 3J-35 and pp. 43-
47.
32
a i a
«ƒ AVi«j/a. 77HW /i* war //i* r«j / /i«ja* o/" //ia/ jV5/«7n 15 « r/a/n,
//ui/ /•« «vai a ira/^imfln///t^ a/id 1/1 f v^ry tvay a comp«*w /iraa*, « w n « / /o m*
»vat wiz/iou/ any o / /fa?5* fvi7 gua/iritJ w/iic/i a r ;
"D/> /4u/on/a7 m// rf*r ^///k>/f j « n Hm/ aurttó/i, / . . / war 5^ü>i/ _/Ür <iaj au/on/dr
iwna//j war 5^ 1/? VVrj/dna*ni5 _/Ör <//>
«c/i in twona'^r^m Mq/fc aw/a";/i von
ObMrvatton 3: Althoff had excellent contacts with the Imperial Court and obtained
the exceptional right of direct address to the Emperor.
From the end of the nineties, Althoff had acquired the right of direct address to the
Emperor, Wilhelm II ." Normally, such a meeting required the mediation of a
member of government. Althoffs direct contact was quite unusual for a civil servant
and reinforced the "personal regime". In these conversations with the Emperor,
Althoff tried to gain support for his projects. He discussed e.g the "Dahlem" project
with the Emperor. Dahlem was a large estate, just outside Berlin, where Althoff
wanted to set up research institutes. In Dahlem, outstanding scholars would be free of
teaching obligations and could devote their efforts solely to research. Althoffs talks
were successful: the Emperor preserved 100 hectares of the estate for state research
institutes.
Althoff was never part of the official suite, but he had excellent contacts with the
Imperial Court. The Emperor's public support of international exchange
professorships considerably helped Althoffs international science policy. The
Empress agreed to preside over the organizations concerned with the progress of
medicine which Althoff had set up." He was also asked to take care of the
education of the Crown Prince."
47. Nicholas Murray Butler (1940) Hemt* 7V flury » o n . /fcco//«rio»u a/irf /te/T«Ti'o/u, Charles
Scnbner's Sons, New York, vol 2. p 71. Nicolas Butler (1862-1947) was President of
Columbia University, New York, (19011945) and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize
48. Ralph-JOrgen Lischke, (1989). "Friedrich Althoff und die preunisch-deutsche
Wissenschaftspolitik, in: I.T.W.. Frirt/ric* /4/rt<# /&W-/S08. Akademie der Wissenschaften
der DDR. Berlin, p. 19
49. Wilhelm II (1859-1941). Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia (1888-1918).
50. For example, the "Empress Auguste Victoria Institute for the Battle Agaist Infant Mortality in
Germany", founded in 1906 in Berlin and the "Empress Friedrich Institute for Postgraduate
Education in Medicine'
51. Althoff was also a friend of Georg Hinzpeter (1827-1907), who had been the tutor of the
ruling Emperor Wilhelm II.
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The Court's support protected Althoff and his career against undue attacks from
politicians, professors, university administrators and rival bureaucrats. John Craig has
argued that Althoff seriously considered leaving the Ministry of Culture only once,
when he came under attack in late 1901 during the Spahn controversy." That he
chose to remain in office was largely due to the tributes he received from men
prominent in academic and political circles. Of these tributes, the one that most
impressed Althoff, was a Christmas card from the Emperor on which a brief
inscription was written:
*7ft* worst/ruitt a/r nor J/I* OHM <U H>/UCA rn* WOJ/M mM>/*. ""
It should be noted that Althoff resigned or threatened to resign on two other
occassions in order to find support for his policies." Althoff was in touch with many
politicians and members of Parliament. He never associated himself with a particular
political party or movement. Influential politicians became his confidential advisers.
Among them, captain-of-industry and ma^crnat Henry Boltinger (1848-1920).
Observation 4: The international recognition of German science and scholarship was
a major objective of the Althoff system.
At the turn of the century, the spirit of the time was pervaded by feelings of national
pride. Competition between the nations included science as well, because scientific
progress was considered an important factor in achieving technical superiority and
economic prosperity. The international recognition of German science and scholarship
(WW/ge7/ung rfeWicA«r MfasevucAq/}) was a major goal of the Prussian state and a
driving force of Althoffs administration.
Whether and how this aim was realized, is studied in the next chapters. But when
Althoff received his Honorary Doctor's degree. Harvard's President Charles W. Eliot
(1834-1906) paid tribute in his speech to Althoff, acknowledging specifically his
efforts for the international recognition of German science and scholarship.
52. Althoff had created a confessional chair for a catholic scholar at the University of Straflburg
This decision infuriated the Protestant scientific community.
53. John E. Craig (1984), Sc/w/arj/iip a/u/ Afa/io/i flu/Win*, p. 159.
54. Althoff threatened to resign three times, hoping to resolve or end some serious dispute!. In
1891, he resigned officially for reasons of overwork. In fact, his resignation was due to a
dragging school reform and unresolved disputes with the Minister of Finance. Althoff received
a call to the University of Bonn as a full professor, but the appoinment never came about. The
Minister of Culture urged him to stay in Berlin and continue. In 1895. Althoff« threats forced
the Minister of Finance to provide funds necessary for the construction of a second Slate
Hospital for Pediatrics in Breslau. As mentioned by Craig, Althoff was heavily critized for the
Spahn case. He thought of clearing up the incident by resigning from office The StraAburg
faculty rejected the appointment of the 26-year old Spahn, not because he was too young or
unqualified, but because he occupied a confessional chair. It created a big row throughout the
German (Protestant) scientific community The Emperor, however, backed Althoff and refused
his resignation.
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3.3. Organizational Structure of the Ministry of Culture
The Prussian state had a long tradition of organizing public education and sponsoring
artistic and scientific activity. The stale's interest in the education of its citizens was
legally embedded in the >4//jemeinei La/k/rw/w /Or rfie AV*I//3I.JCA«I &aa/«n, which
was promulgated in 1794.
in
e/rrenrer w«fcn." (2. Teil, 12. Titel, 5 1 und 2)
The tradition begins with the first King of Prussia. Friedrich I (1657-1713). In 1694,
he founded the Friedrich-University in Halle as well as the "Academy of Arts for the
Promotion of Architecture. Sculpture and Painting" in Berlin. Eight years later, the
King created the 5oc/>KJ/ <frr SrienriVn, which was called later the Royal Prussian
Academy of Science." In 1717. his son and successor, Friedrich WilheJm J (J688-
1740), introduced compulsory school attendance for children. To put this policy into
effect, the King opened approximately 2.000 schools during his reign. While Prussia
took the lead, the measure was soon followed by Saxony in 1724. Other countries
followed much later.'* At the Universities of Halle and Frankfurt am Oder,
Friedrich Wilhelm created the first chairs for economics and public administration.
The Charité-Hospital, that was built in 1726, made Berlin a leading European center
for medical education.
The public administration of the academic system started in 1808, when the Prussian
Ministry of the Interior set up a small department for Culture and Public Education
(Sflfcf/0/i /Or <ten KWri« U/K/ ö$?m//'c/!en i/merric/i/). This bureau would form the
basis for the Ministry of Religious. Educational and Medical Affairs, that became an
independent administration in 1817 (Af/'n/jrerium <fcr g«.sr/jc7i«n, l/nwrn'c/tfj- und
). The Ministry was referred to as the Ministry of Culture
or ironically as the Ministry of the Mind (Af/nm«rrium rf«
). The start of the public administration virtually coincided with the foundation
of the University of Berlin by Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835)." The basic idea
of a research university was adopted by the whole system of German language
universities. Scholarly research was considered an essential part of the function of
professors."
SS. Bernhard vom Brocke ( I98U) , 'PreuBische Bildungspolitik 1700-1930', ^Mumrf/unjrn 1 /15 . ,
p. 728.
56 Austria in 1774. Bivaria in 1802. Baden in 1803. Scotland in 1872. France in 1882 and the
Soviet-Union in 1930.
57 The University of Berlin was founded in 1810 during the reign (1797-1840) of Friedrich
Wilhelm III (1770-1840).
58. Joseph Ben-David (1971). 7 V 5ri>nrur'f Aofr IJI Soctm. University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, p. 108.
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The new Prussian Ministry consisted of three departments: (1) the Department of
Religious Affairs. (2) the Department of Education and (3) the Department of
Medicine. The second department was split into two bureaus: (he Department for
Science. Arts and Higher Education, which was called l/wrrric/i/.s<i/>fri/ung / (Ul).
and the Department for Elementary Education (U2). The Department of Higher
Education was divided into four subdepartments in 1909. The Ministry of Culture was
the largest state administration in terms of the share of the national budget/* Like
the rest of the Prussian state bureaucracy, the organizational structure was a
pyramidal hierarchy.
Observation 5: The Prussian Ministry of Culture was organized as a typical
hierarchical bureaucracy.
The organizational structure of the Prussian Ministry of Culture shows the typical
pyramidal form of bureaucracy. The formal head was the King of Prussia.*" He was
a constitutional monarch and the head of government, whose authority was restricted
by the rules of the parliamentary system. The government consisted of several
Ministers, among whom was the Minister of Culture, and was led by a Prime
Minister." A Minister was assisted by a Secretary. They were the political superiors
of the bureaucrats working in the public administration.
At the top of each department stood an Assistant Secretary, who was the highest
ranked civil servant. The four departments in the Ministry of Culture were directed
by four Assistant Secretaries, who each had their own responsibility " Issues
overlapping the authority of two or more departments went back up the hierarchy to
the Minister, who was ultimately responsible. The Assistant Secretaries worked with
a staff of referendaries, who were assigned to more specified duties." Thirty-three
referendaries worked in the Ministry of Culture and their number hardly changed
during Althoff s career. The number of lower clerks, however, rose from 43 to 82.
The Ministry in Berlin set up twelve provincial committees for secondary education,
which were presided by the Governors (Ofcrprdsufcn/). In thirty-five districts, local
school departments were in charge of primary education, while school inspectors
informed Berlin about the actual situation of the educational system. From a modern
perspective, it was a relatively small bureaucracy.
The Department for Science, Arts and Higher Education was responsible for the
public administration and management of all Prussian universities, academic institutes,
libraries, museums and schools. Prussia had ten universities (Berlin, Greifswald,
59 See observation 14.
60. After the unification of the German states in 1871. the King of Prussia was also Emperor of
Germany.
61. Other ministerial responsibilities were Public Finance, Agriculture, Justice, Commerce and
Trade, Internal Affairs and War.
62. From 1897 till 1907, AlthofT was Assistant Secretary of the Department for Science. Arts and
Higher Education (Ul) .
63. As a referendary in Ul (1882-1897). Althoff was responsible for the appointment of the
academic staff at Prussian universities and academic institutes.
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Marburg, Kfinigsberg, Kiel, Hallc, Göttingen, Breslau, Bonn and Munster) and five
technical colleges with university status (Berlin-Charlottenburg. Aachen, Hannover,
Danzig and Breslau). Until 1879, the latter had been part of the Ministry of
Commerce, which stayed involved in the new business schools of Köln, Frankfurt and
Berlin created between 1901 and 1918. The business schools were partly financed by
local authorities and chambers of commerce."
Ul was also responsible for independent research institutes that were not afflliated to
a university or academy of science." Its responsibilities included eight scientific
institutes in Berlin, including the Academy of Science," four Royal Prussian Acade-
mies of Art (Berlin, Königsberg, Cassel and Düsseldorf) and the art schools. The
Department also managed eleven museums, among which was the Ethnographic
Museum in Berlin. It ran nine pedagogic seminars (Berlin, Königsberg, Danzig,
Posen, Breslau, Magdeburg. Munster. Cassel, Koblenz) and the Berlin Gymnastic
Teachers Institute The reorganization of the Charité-Hospital in Berlin was also
carried out by Althoffs department. A new task was the Information Bureau for
Higher Education in Germany and Abroad. Finally, the department was regularly
asked by other Prussian authorities to form expert commitees on different issues.
Observation 6: Althoff could rely on a professional staff of experts in his
department.
Althoff always operated from within the Prussian state bureaucracy. In his
department, he could rely on a team of loyal staff members, many of whom he had
attracted to the department himself. Some of them, like Arnold Sachse (1857-1933)
and Otto Naumann (1852-1925), came from Strafiburg, where Althoff had noted their
qualities. Althoff had a team of hard-working, professional administrators. Prussian
discipline made civil servants work hard, Althoff being a key example. Most of the
referendaries, who worked in his department were academics and held a doctoral
degree. Naumann, Ernst Eilsberger (1858-1947) and Friedrich Schmidt-Ott (1860-
1956) e.g. were jurists. Above all, Althoff attracted good managers to the public
administration."
64. Manfred Rasch (1990), "Thesen zur preuftischen Wissenschaftspolitik gegen Ende des
Wilhelminischen Zeitalters". Bfric/i/r ;ur Wmf/uc/uj/J^«c/iit/i/i?. VCB Verlagsgesellschan
12. Weinheim. p. 249, ftn. 4.
65. For example: the Biological Institute and North Sea Museum on Helgoland, the Royal
Experimental Institute for the Quality and Drainage of Water, the Institute for Infectious
Diseases led by Robert Koch, the Royal Institute for Experimental Therapy Frankfurt directed
by Paul Ehrlich and the Royal Institute for Hygiene in Posen.
66. The Royal Library, the Royal Observatory, the new Royal Astronomical Calculation Institute,
the new Royal Botanic Garden in Dahlem. the Geodesic Institute near Potsdam, the new Royal
Meteorological Institute, the new Royal Aeronautical Observatory in Lindenberg, the Astro-
physical Observatory near Potsdam.
67. After the death of Althoff. some staff members assumed management positions in the private
sector. In their work with Althoff, they had acquired genuine international experience and
organizational skills. Eilsberger and Schmidt-On received offers from large chemical
enterprises. The former went to Solvay-Werke AG in Bernburg to become president. After a
ftiW/c /4<£fun«rniricwi in fA* Strom/ £mp<rf 37
The referendaries were assigned specific duties. Alihoff was responsible for
universities and academic personnel (1882-1897). After his promotion, he was
succeeded by the economist Ludwig Eister (1853-1935). In spite of Eister, Alihoff
stayed in charge of the professorial appointments in Prussia, which was the core
policy of the system.** The independent research institutes, the academies, the libra-
ries, exchange professorships and examination procedures were Ihe responsibility of
Schmidt-Ott and Eilsberger. The historian Wilhelm Wehrenpfennig (I829-I900) was
in charge of the technical colleges. Naumann succeeded him in 1899. He was also
responsible for the budget and academic infrastructure (buildings, etc.). The art
schools were administered by Max Jordan until 1896. Then, the archeologist Richard
Schone (1840-1922) look over. Together with the historian of art Wilhelm von Bode
(1845-1929), he was repsonsible for the Prussian musea. The Prussian high school
system was managed by Adolph Matthias (1847-1917) until 1900. His successor Karl
Reinhardt (1849-1923) later became an important school reformer. The business
schools were administered in cooperation with the Ministry of Commerce and Trade.
The First personal assistant (rYi(/5<jrfc«7rr) of Althoff was Sachse," He w u
succeeded by the brilliant Schmidt-Ott. Then came Alfred Tilmann and Eilsberger.
Althoffs last assistant was Ernst von Hülsen.
Althoff was on friendly terms with his predecessor Hermann Lucanus (1831-1908).
He had worked for almost thirty years until 1890 in the Ministry of Culture. Lucanus
had been an Assistant Secretary and Secretary of Culture at the end of his career.
Althoff paid regular visits to discuss policy issues with Lucanus, who had acquired a
large expertise in the academic affairs.
Althoff could rely on a staff of hard-working experts, who prepared his policy
measures. Taking this into consideration, the term "Althoff system" may seem to give
too much credit to a single man in the Prussian bureaucracy. But as Max Klatt
asserted:
?<r/bnn«iV, zwar o/f wn a/ufcrai A/d/i/iem
a/tan durc/i /4/fAo#s mac/wo/Zei £ingr«/e7i
Observation 7: Althoff operated beyond the formal limits of the authority invested in
him.
67. ...
one-year mandate as Minister of Culture (1917-1918), the latter was appointed preiidert of
Leverkusen's Bayer and member of the board of directors of IG Farben A C
68 See observation 26.
69. Sachse wrote a biography of Althoff: Arnold Sacfase (1928), Frfetfrtc/i /t/rttf#u/id »ri/i HWt,
Berlin, ISO pp.
70. Quoted in: Bernhard vom Brooke (1980). HOCAJCAW- u/irf Wjjf/ucAqftjpo/ifl*. p. 43.
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In 1882, Althoff started as one of thirty-three referendaries. His main duties included
the appointment of academic staff. In 1897, Althoff rose to the position of Assistant
Secretary, of whom there were four. It has been noted that Althoff was not in the
formal position to shape the science policy of Prussia. A referendary had to execute
the orders from and render account to the Assistant Secretary, who himself received
instructions from the Minister of Culture. Hierarchically, the Assistant Secretaries
were each others equals. So were the referendaries.
Even as a referendary, Althoff was the leading public official for academic affairs and
took measures in all areas of science policy. He set out the entire science policy,
manipulating his superiors and equals and interfering in other departments. He
violated the typical tenets of hierarchical organizations such as top-down decision
making, pyramidal span of control and non-interference in equal hierarchical levels.
Althoff manipulated all the Ministers of Culture, who just followed his orders."
Konrad Studt. who was the most loyal in executing Althoffs academic reforms, once
made his remaining in office dependent on Althoffs stay. Althoff interfered in the
otJier dept/t/nc/iM or" f/ie Mmisfry or" Cufrure as weff. Since he was appointed Chair-
man of the Scientific Deputation of Medicine in 1900, Althoff was responsible for
medical science. In practice, this meant that the department for medicine received its
instructions from Althoff. He was asked by the Empress and the Women's Movement
to reorganize the education of girls." However, the department U2 was in charge of
the schools for girls. For Althoff to carry out the reorganization, meant operating
seyond the limits of his authority and interfering directly in another department. As a
referendary, Althoff launched academic reforms in areas for which other referendaries
were responsible. For example, the establishment of new research institutes and
libraries, the budget and the creation of an innovative financing system.
3.4. External Relations of the Ministry of Culture
3.4.1. Federal and Prussian Authorities
Observation 8: The Ministry of Culture coordinated the initiatives in the field of
science and education in Prussia.
After the German unification in 1871, scientific and educational affairs remained
entirely the full responsibility of the member states, that had insisted on their cultural
independence. Although the German Empire was involved in culture and science,
there was no central authority or federal Ministry of Culture. Due to the dominant
position of Prussia, however, there was a considerable influence on the direction of
the science policy of the other German countries. The Prussian Ministry of Culture
functioned as a leading coordinator in science policy issues.
71. Gusuv von Gofller (1881-1891). Robert Graf von Zedlitz-Trötzschler (189I-I892). Robert
Bosse (1892-1899), Konrid Studt (1899-1907). Ludwig Holle (1907-1909).
72. As a fin»! result in 1908. German women were also allowed to study at Prussian universities.
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Nevertheless, the federal government took some initiatives in science and education
The Chancellory of the Empire or a federal Ministry had to cooperate with the state
in which the project was set up. A fine example is the Seminar for Eastern Languages
at the University of Berlin, which was administered by the Prussian Ministry of
Culture and financed by the federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Established in 1887,
il was of particular importance for the language training of German diplomats In a
reconciliaiory gesture towards the new German territories, the German Empire had
reopened the University of Strafiburg in Alsace-Lorraine in 1872." AlthofTs
personal commitment in its foundation established a permanent influence of the
Prussian Ministry in the Alsatian university.
Other Prussian authorities were involved in educational matters as well. The Prussian
Parliament and the Ministry of Finance determined the budget and the annual expen-
ditures of the Ministry of Culture. The Ministry of Commerce and Trade co-financed
the business schools and the agricultural, sylviculture! and veterinary institutes. New
examination procedures for lawyers required the advice of the Ministry of Justice. All
activities were coordinated by the Ministry of Culture. Only the military education
system was administered independently by the Ministry of War.
Private initiatives were also centrally coordinated. Large municipalities and Chambers
of Commerce e.g. could set up research institutes or even a university. Frankfurt
a.M. was the first privately endowed university in Prussia. Although it was a private
initiative, it was carefully planned by Althoff, Prussia's leading public official, and
Frankfurt's mayor, Franz Adickes (1846-1915). Private funds from industry and
banks played a singularly important role in the creation of independent state research
institutes in Dahlem. The project reached its conclusion after Althoff s death with the
creation of the £aKer-Wi/AWm-G«e//jcA<iy}, later called the
3.4.2. German Countries and Austria
Observation 9: Prussia determined the science policy of Germany.
After the unification, the Second German Empire (1871-1918) included seven
states." Prussia was the largest state. It covered two thirds of the territory of the
Empire and was the home of sixty percent of the German population." Due to its
dominant position, Prussia had always had a considerable influence on the other coun-
tries. In the area of science policy, however, the states were completely sovereign. In
the Althoff era, all major academic innovations were introduced by Prussia. The
73. ffWc/uuniversitlt Strafiburg.
74. Bernhard vom Brocke (1989a), "Vorgeschichte, Grundung und Entwicklung der Kaiser-
Wilhdm-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften - Der Anteil Friedrich Althofft", in:
I.T.W., fri«lndi /4/rtq^;«5S>-/908. Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR. Berlin, pp. 129-
163
75 Bayern, Baden, Mecklenburg, PreuAen, Sachsen, ThOringen, Württemberg.
76. The population in Prussia grew from 26 million in 1882 to 37 million in 1907, while the
German population increased from 41 million (1882) to 63 million (1907).
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scientific progress in the Allhoff system forced the other countries to follow Prussia
and to adopt part of Althoffs policy.
Nevertheless, there remained considerable competition between the German states.
The Universities of Heidelberg (/tafc/i) and München (fiayirn) were famous
institutions, that competed with Berlin and Göttingen for professors and for
reputation. But, there was also cooperation. Althoff was in close contact with his
colleagues in the other states, like e.g. Franz Bóhm (186I-1915) in Baden. The latter
was probably not as influential, but certainly as inventive as Althoff." In 1898,
Althoff organized a conference on university affairs for German and Austrian
officials. The meeting was intended to exchange experiences and to surmount the
negative aspects of cultural sovereignty." At the conference, mostly administrative
problems were discussed. Although the agreements only had an informal character,
policy became better coordinated. Reacting against the cooperation of the state
administrators, the universities organized a special /fofaorrn/cofl/i/Y/u and a lectures'
conference, known as the professorial union.
Observation 10; The Austrian university system had the special mission to integrate
(he different peoples of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.
In Austria, it was believed that higher education would surmount conflicts and
promote the integration of the nations in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire." The
Austrian university system consisted of two parts: the German and the non-German
speaking universities. The influence of German scholarship increased the conflict
between these two groups, especially when the German speaking universities realized
that, compared with the universities in Germany, they were behind in development.
Germany was considered to be the ideal model, which increased the political pressure
on the Ministry of Culture in Vienna.
A chair in Vienna was considered as the peak of the academic career in Austria.
Höflechner argues that scholars themselves did no longer consider the University of
Vienna their ultimate goal because they had to perform too many different tasks: at
the Academy of Science, in special institutes or as consultants."" Disappointed about
the lack of time that was left over to pursue research, they began to turn down calls
from Vienna and went to Germany. This seemed an incredible reaction to the officials
in the Austrian Ministry of Culture. When Austrian professors became civil servants
in 1898, they were deprived of their income from lecture fees, which was not
compensated by the average salary increase. Especially at the University of Vienna,
77. Bohm convinced the Grand Duke of Baden to support e.g. the Institute for Experimental
Cancer Research to allow the Heidelberg Director of the Surgical Clinic, Vinzenz Czemy
(1842-1916), to continue his path-breaking cancer research.
78. This had been painfully illustrated by the unsuccessful attempt to reform the requirements and
procedures for a doctor's degree in Germany. Also see observation 19.
79. The Emperor of Austria, Franz Joseph 1 (1830-1916), had become King of Hungary in 1867
80. Walter Höflechner (1989), 7V /mpact o/ rV J^uilm and Orman (/niurrtuy /fclnuitu/rarioiu
on rt* /Ittffria» t/nivrniry Syxrrm Brtwiwi /S75 and / 9 / < Paper Althoff Conference,
Heilbronn, p. 9.
41
the very high numbers of students had meant very high incomes. Another incentive
for professors coming from smaller universities in Germany and Austria to accept an
appointment to Vienna was now lacking. Compensation required substantial extra
payments, which were not given very often. The Ministry of Culture could only
sustain salary increases with the agreement of the Ministry of Finance.
3.4.3. Pubik Relations and Public Opinion
Observation 11: Althoff used many media to promote the policy and the
achievements of his department.
Althoff was the commissioner spokesman of the government in Parliament
(/fegiV/KflgjAommMjar). He took the floor 150 times to present and defend the policy
of the Ministry of Culture. All his speeches were thoroughly prepared, but the most
famous became his address on February 23. 1905 about the history of academic
freedom.
Althoff launched several press campaigns to create the support of public opinion. The
monthly "International Report on Higher Education" was the most suitable medium to
spread an idea among academics. It was distributed freely to every professor in
Germany, Austria and Switzerland." In order to reach a broader audience, Althoff
used the daily /4//j«mWn« Z<"i7üri£, which was published by August Scherl (1849
1921).° The weekly cultural and scientific addendum of the /4//£«mWn« Z /^fun^ was
an influential magazine. Therefore, Althoff carefully introduced his plans in this
newspaper. Later, this press medium was replaced by Althoffs own weekly
Afu/m U/K/ 7>c7i/ii/c.
81. Hoc/ucAu/micArtc/i/«i. AfonaMOterjirA/ fl/w <£u £?*<vitf« WixAicWwrj^n i f» //i- u/*/
,-liu/a/kfrj was published from 1893 till 1917 by Paul von Salvisberg (1855-1925) in MQnchen.
In Woc/ucAW- usirf Wtfwudui/fcrpo/i/ik, Bemhard vom Brooke mentions on page 73 an edition
of 13,400 copies. 5000 were delivered to paying subscribers
82. Althoff bad rescued the newspaper financially. The Koppel Foundation provided 200,000
marks and Booinger an additional 100.000 marks.
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4. Growth and Institutional Reform
of the Academic System
4.1. Humboldtian Principle
Observation 12: The traditional university system was no longer able to
cope with the growing demand for its services.
4.2. University of Struftburg, the Embryonic AlthofT System
Obs. 13: Althoff was an experienced manager of science when he assumed
a position in the Prussian Ministry of Culture.
4.3. Growth of the Academic System
Obs. 14: The academic system, taking the form of a large bureaucracy,
expanded rapidly in the Althoff era.
Obs. 15: Althoff bureaucratized the academic system, which he ran as an
integrated system of all academic institutes.
4.4. AlthofTs Institutional Reforms and Innovations
4.4.1. Independent Research Institutes
Obs. 16: Research institutes were created that were independent of the
traditional universities, in order to allow scholars to devote their efforts
solely to research.
4.4.2. Seminar Research Method
Obs. 17: The seminar method was a new form of interactive education and
research.
4.4.3. Professional Library System
Obs. 18: The reform of the German scientific library system was twofold:
expansion and structural reorganization.
4.4.4. University Regulations
Obs. 19: Althoff made the university regulations and degree requirements
more consistent and less discriminating.
4.4.5. Academic Compensation
Obs. 20: The academic staff earned a basic salary according to a wage
scale system for the Prussian bureaucracy, that was supplemented by
lecture fees.
Obs. 21: Top scholars earned top wages and researchers of genius obtained
their own research institute.
Obs. 22: Marks of honor were an important compensation instrument in
the Althoff system.
4.4.6. International Science Policy
Obs. 23: The Ministry of Culture conducted an active international science
policy in order to obtain international recognition of German science and
scholarship.
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4. Growth and Institutional Reform
of the Academic System
4.1. Humboldtian Principle
Although the universities were financed by the Prussian state, they had remained
autonomous organizations that ran their affairs independently. They had their own
administration, regulations and some financial resources. In spite of the financial
navel-string, the Ministry of Culture only had an administrative function. It did not
interfere with scientific and internal matters. Academic freedom was respected and
guaranteed by the constitution.
Observation 12: The traditional university system was no longer able to cope with
the growing demand for its services.
The universities had worked for decades according to Humboldt's principle of "unity
of research and teaching"" and had held a monopoly position in science and scholar-
ship. In the last third of the nineteenth century, however, scientific progress coincided
with the second Industrial Revolution and science itself became increasingly more
specialized and differentiated." Scientific progress could only come from a further
division of labor among scholars. The industrial and social demand for new
knowledge and the internal development of science brought the universities into a
position of increasing research efforts on a scale that they could hardly maintain.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, most fields had become too complex to be
handled by a single professor who would teach an entire discipline, including his
discoveries. A lot of research became of interest only to other active scholars and
required growing investments and cooperation.
The double mission of the prevailing system was also endangered by the increasing
teaching load. Demographic reasons and the democratization process in higher
education reduced its research resources. The increasing inability to meet the demands
of education, professional training and scientific research combined with growing
research costs called for expansion as well as structural change. While Althoff
maintained the Humboldtian idea of the research mission of a university, he started a
gradual reform of the academic system.
83. Eintar wn fbrocfcunj unrf Z^irr The second principle is academic freedom.
84. Specialization refers to the more narrow and intensified study of a subject By differentiation is
meant that new disciplines emerged or emancipated.
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4.2. University of Straftburg: the Embryonic Althoff System
Many features of the Althoff system were introduced at the University of StraAburg
between 1872 and 1882. In his twofold position as an Alsatian public official and
StraAburg professor, Althoff learned how to deal with the complexity of
administration and academia. The StraAburg experiment is therefore considered the
starting point of his reforms in Prussia.
Observation 13: Althoff was an experienced manager of science when he assumed a
position in the Prussian Ministry of Culture.
In StraAburg, Althoff was responsible for the procurement of the university
buildings." He ran a tight schedule, but managed to get the doors open on time. In
Berlin, he drew on this experience for rebuilding the Charité-Hospital and moving the
underhoused University of Berlin out of the center of the city. With practical
solutions, he had proven himself to be a realistic administrator; by gaining (he
collaboration of the local authorities and the mayor Otto Back (1834-1917), he proved
himself a stimulating manager. Althoff was also in touch with the representatives of
the local Protestant Seminary, the fcote Zj£re <fr AfAfcc/'/i?, and the municipal
hospital to discuss the future relationship of their institutions to the university.
Althoff had gained the respect of his superiors, the Alsatian Governor
OforprOri<fcm), Eduard von Möller (1814-1880), and the experienced Commissioner
for the Foundation of the University of StraAburg, Franz Roggenbach (1825-1907).
As a Minister of Education in Baden (1861-1865), the latter had been responsible for
a reform of the educational system. It was his goal to create an outstanding
university. Althoff became the curator of the university when Roggenbach declined
the offer.
Althoff also got involved in the selection of the forty-four full professors and thirteen
part-time professors, which was a valuable experience for his future role in Berlin.
With the help of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), a brilliant staff of young scholars was
appointed.** Among them the historian Julius Weizsacker (1829-1889), the classical
philologist Wilhelm Studemund (1843-1889). the economists Gustav Schmoller (1838-
1917) and Wilhelm Lexis (1837-1914), the jurists Karl Binding (1841-1920), Heinrich
Brunner (1840-1915). Heinrich Geffcken (1830-1896) and Rudolph Sohm (1841-
1917), an expert in canon law. In medicine, the physicians Adolf Gusserow (1836-
1906), Ernst Leydcn (1832-1910) and Wilhelm Waldeyer (1836-1921) were attracted.
The famous chemist Adolf Bacyer (1835-1917) also came to StraAburg. Some of them
became loyal advisers to Althoff, especially Gustav Schmoller. Wilhelm Lexis and
Wilhelm Studemund. Over the years, Althoff would build an extensive network of
academic consultants.
fLV Being a jurist, Althoff was also asked to write the foundation charter and the regulations of the
university.
86. The faculty members had an average age of 39 years as compared with 62 yean in Berlin.
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The University of StraBburg grew rapidly. New chain were created in anthropology,
paleontology, ethnography and history of arts. The Law department was split into two
separate faculties: Law and Economics. Out of the Faculty of Philosophy grew an
autonomous Faculty for Natural Sciences. StraBburg introduced a new interactive
learning and research method in so-called seminars that had their own working
rooms, libraries and laboratories. These seminars were directed by a senior scholar.
The university possessed Germany's most modern library. After the German
bombardment of the municipal library with its valuable collection of manuscripts,
Karl Barack, the director of a private library in Swabia, immediately dedicated
himself to organizing a replacement. When the library officially opened on August 9,
1871. it already possessed a total of 120.000 volumes. A decade later, the library had
acquired over half a million volumes and was the largest university library in the
world, a rank retained until 1920, when the honor passed to the library of Harvard
University."
To attract prominent scholars to StraBburg, the Alsatian professors were paid a salary
above the national average." Althoff also settled a pension scheme for the widows
and orphans of unsalaried lecturers and introduced superannuation on full pay. The
idea of filling the same academic chair by a French and German professor, as a way
of integrating Alsace-Lorraine into the German Empire, failed upon the revival of
nationalist emotions.
StraBburg was a learning school for Althoff. Some of the innovations introduced in
StraBburg were implemented later in whole Prussia. More important, Althoff had
acquired the skills to organize the administration of an academic system and had
understood the vital function of human resources in science and scholarship.
43 . Growth of the Academic System
The growth of the academic system was impressive. The number of academic
institutes, hospitals not included, rose from three hundred twenty in 1882 to four
hundred seventy-six in 1907.
Observation 14: The academic system, taking the form of a large bureaucracy,
expanded rapidly in the Althoff era.
In 1871, Prussia counted nine universities." The University of StraBburg opened in
1872, at the event of which Althoff was involved both as a bureaucrat and as a
professor. In 1902, the University of Munster was founded. The first academic year
of the University of Frankfurt started in 1914, but had been prepared by Althoff. The
87. John E. Craig (1984), SchotaT-j/iip and A/anon Sui/<tin;, p. 60.
88. In 1875. the average yearly salaries were in GActingen 4000 marks, in Berlin 4800 marks and
in StraBburg 7500 marks.
89 Berlin, Bonn, Breslau. Greifswald. Gottingen, Kid. Königsberg. Marburg and Halle.
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Academy of Posen and the Colonial Institute in Hamburg became universities in 1903
and 1908. A new type of university were the academies for practical medicine in
Frankfurt (1904). Koln (1904) and DQsseldorf (1907). At the universities, chairs were
created in new fields and new courses were put on the curriculum like e.g.
anthropology (Strafiburg), pediatrics (Berlin), library sciences (Göttingen) and
hygiene.
From 1868 till 1910, eleven technical colleges were founded in Germany, four of
which were in Prussia. The colleges in Aachen (1870), Berlin-Charlottenburg (1879).
Danzig (1904) and Breslau (1910) were completely new institutes. In 1899, the
technical colleges broke the monopoly of the traditional universities to confer doctoral
degrees. The Prussian state also set up business schools in Köln (1901), Frankfurt
(1902). Berlin (1906) and Königsberg (1915).
Between 1872 and 1911, the number of students that enrolled at German institutes for
higher education more than tripled (from 20,000 to 68.000), which doubled their
share in the entire population. At the universities, German professors had to teach
13.2 students on average in 1872-73. In the academic year 1910-11, the number had
increased to 26.3 students per professor.* The total number of academic staff,
including the extra-ordinary professors and the (private) lecturers, rose from 1,633 in
1873 to 4.463 in 1910. Over the same period, the number of full professors increased
from 853 to 1,263." The expansion was most spectacular in the natural sciences in
Prussia, where the number of students grew from 987 to 7,285, professors from 154
to 241, extra-ordinary professors from 76 to 177 and private lecturers from 75 to
2 6 2 "
Budgetary expenditures for research and education rose accordingly. The Prussian
Ministry of Culture was the largest department in terms of its share of the national
budget," and in comparison with other German-speaking countries. In Austria,
public expenditures for academic purposes almost quadrupled from 7.6 million
crowns in 1875 to 27.7 million crowns in 1914 in nominal terms. The Prussian
budget increased from 7 million marks in 1875 to 43.6 million marks in 1913."
Adjusted for inflation, it rose between two and a half to three times. Average
expenditures over a decade rose from 18.8 million marks over the last decade of the
nineteenth century to 35.9 million in 1900-1910. Bayern allocated 4.3 to 6.3 million
90 Bemhard votn Brocke (I98U), />m<0ui-Ar 8iMun£j/>o/iH*, p. 736.
91. Bernhard vom Brocke and Rudolf Vierhaus (1990), Foncnanj i/n 5pün**uij.r/<rW von
unJ OwMjcAd/t. Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft. Stuttgart, p. 18.
92 Bernhard vom Brocke (1989a). ^«ci / ^Wxitfi in <frr A^VC. pp 129-163
93. In 1899. the Prussian Ministry of Culture absorbed 28.2 % of total public expenditures.
Second and third largest were the Ministry of Finance (22.2 %) and the Ministry of Justice
(21.7 %). Figures in: O. Schwan and G. Strutz (1900). / > r 5r<U2ttA<uuft<2/r u«J </«• F i n a w »
Berlin. Band II. Buch I. p. XXV. Quoted in : Bernhard vom Brocke (1980),
u/ki Wüjrnjcna/tjpo/iriJk. p. 22.
94 Bernhard vom Brocke and Rudolf Vierhaus (1990). Fondmnjr im .Spannunfs/Mrf. p. 24.
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marks to its academic system. In Sachsen public expenditures amounted to 3.2
respectively 4.2 million marks, in Baden they rose from 2.7 to 3.7 million marks.**
It should be noted that the official figures do not reveal the off-budget expenditures
and the private financial resources, which the Althoff system lapped so successfully.
It has been documented that e.g. private donations quadrupled from 4.8 million marks
in 1886-1896 to 18.6 million marks in the following decade." These figures do not
even include the subsidies of local communities. Moreover, the budget figures do not
indicate what the universities spent from their own resources.
Observation 15: Althoff bureaucratized the academic system, which he ran as an
integrated system of all academic institutes
; in Srra/töurg tvar, fau *r mir
n;ip, au/"
In the Althoff era, the Prussian academic system expanded and gradually developed
into a large organization. It should be noted that Althoff understood the
bureaucratization of the academic system in the Weberian sense, i.e. an institutional
response for the rational use of resources and the legal use of power.** As some of
the other reforms, bureaucratic management seemed bound to get in conflict with
academic freedom. Attempts for a more rational use of resources led the Ministry to
concentrate certain activities in the different disciplines in one particular university."
This university would coordinate scholarly activities in Prussia in a field in which il
had strong historical roots or in which the leading scholars belonged to its
faculty."" This 5cAu>erpu/u(?l>i7</u/ig was originally an idea of Roggenbach.
95. Frank R. Pfetsch (1974), Zur EnrwidUu/ij? <fcr Wiwiucfaghpoi/ri* in /Vu/jcMa/rf /750- /9 /<
Duncker & Humblot. Berlin, p 52.
96. Otto Schwarz (1911), "Stiftungen", in: HandHtflrwiur/i <fcr SraattwiurAir/ia/frn (3rd edition),
vol. 7. Jena, p 1017.
97. Lujo Brentano (1917), E/jOittr fr i iwninjfn , Erich Reis» Verlag. Berlin, p. 115.
98. For a discussion of the controversy between Althoff and Max Weber (1864-1920), MC
chapter 9.
99. Berlin became prominent in archaeology, history and art The Universities of Bonn, Kiel and
Breslau specialized in respectively Dutch, Skandinavian and Slavic linguistics and literature.
Marburg took the lead in archival sciences and complementary historical sciences, German
dialectography and, together with Frankfurt, experimental therapy and hygiene. Halle-
Wittenberg became a center for evangelic theology and Gottingen one for mathematics and
physics.
100. See: Renau Tobies (1991). 'Wissenschaftliche Schwerpunktbildung: der Ausbau Goningens
rum Zentrum der Mathematik und Naturwissemchaften", in Bernhard vom Brocke (Hrsg),
Wit.f«;ucta/rj;f.ffAicftrf unrf Wlwuc/iu/frpo/i/iA bn //KfturrifZfto/rrr, Verlag August Lax,
Hildesheim, pp. 87-108. The University of Gottingen became the center for mathematics and
physics because the famous physicists Georg Lichtenberg (1742-1799) and Wilhelm Weber
(1804-1891) and the chemist Friedrich Wohler (1800-1882) had built a tradition in the natural
sciences. With Carl Friedrich GauA (1777-1855), pure and applied mathematics had prospered
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Institutional reforms, like the independent research institutes, the new types of
university and the conformity of degree requirements, were implemented precisely to
break the protectionist structures of the prevailing system that was no longer able to
fulfil the function for which it was designed."" That the measures were taken by a
bureaucracy does not necessarily imply that they had a bureaucratizing effect. It is
reasonable to say, however, that Berlin took its administrative responsibilities more
seriously and pursued a more active science policy, in which universities and research
institutes were no longer considered as autonomous entities but as parts of an
academic landscape. By taking the integrated system view, Althoff was in a position
inject competition in the academic labor market.
The expansion of the academic staff had gradually replaced the old principle of
solidarity and equality among scholars by a hierarchy of full professors and institute
directors assisted by researchers of lower rank. Althoff observed that the university
procedures had not consistently led to the appointment of the most suitable candidates
to Prussian chairs."" So, to fill vacant positions, the Ministry started looking for
suitable candidates itself years in advance and attracted top scholars to Prussian
academic institutes. From the lower to the top levels of the academic hierarchy,
Berlin appointed excellent scholars. When they were not the faculty's candidate, this
clashed with the old cooptation right, which probably inspired most of the controversy
about the bureaucratization of the universities.
Vom Brocke points out that
"/At <fcvWo/>m«tf o/ rne university .ryjrem Zuring tni'j peno/ into a /arge-jca/e
jcien/i/?c «tfe/prijf H>ar not a rypicfl/ Pruwia/i procew. On/y in Prussia, i/ *VOJ
carried" our in a .ryMematt'c am/ dy/uvmc manner, con//t>//«f cen/ra//y and aWven on
ivy means of a «ate fcureancra/ic system, wirn rn« aim o/ ra/iona/iza/ion. For rn«
otner German j/a/«, it jerv«/ èorn ai a mode/ and a pace-serrer."""
100. ...
in Goningen. The tradition was continued by Gustave Dirichlet (1805-1859) and Bernhard
Riemann (1826-1866). In the Althoff era. the research of GauB and Weber on geomagnetism
was continued by Martin Brendel (1862-1939), professor of theoretical astronomy and geodesy,
and Emil Weichert (1861-1928), professor of geophysics and geomagnetism. They shared the
chair of Ernst Schering (1833-1897). Carl Runge (1856-1927), the first Prussian professor of
applied mathematics, and Ludwig Prandtl (1875-1953), professor of applied mechanics, were
engaged in aviation research for the Afaror/i(frc'uJf-5n«ftrn;riW/jc/i<^r.
101. See observation 12.
102. See observation 26.
103. Bemhard vom Brocke (1989b), fhwi Sdrncr /4dm//uirrarion ro a Po/fcy of Sci^ urr /4n
^praiMf # fnVrfric* /4/rtqf (2//9//S-?9 -/0/20//9O8). Paper Althoff Conference. Heilbronn.
Germany, p. 28.
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4.4. AlthofTs Institutional Reforms and Innovations
4.4.1. Independent Research Institutes
Teaching privileges and research professorships were only partial solutions to the
fundamental problem of providing talented scholars with time and means to do
research. Top scholars spent a lot of time on lectures, examinations and management
duties with little time left for scientific research, while young scientists, who had
more time, had less opportunity and Financial means A further increase in the
number of academic staff would reduce the teaching load per faculty member and
improve the research capacity of the traditional university system. However, a major
institutional innovation was introduced, which substantially upgraded Prussia's
research performance: the independent research institutes.
Althoff created several independent research institutes, in which scholars could devote
their time and effort solely to research. The innovative aspect lay in the fact that these
institutes were no longer affiliated with traditional universities.'"* The institute
director did not have to render account to any academic authority, he was solely
responsible for the management and performance of his institute. Another innovation
was the multi-source financing system. Institutes were financed mostly in a joint-
venture of the state, industry, banks, private funds, municipalities and chambers of
Some institutes had been founded before Althoff. Prussia had been the first German
state to establish independent institutes. However, the goal of the earlier institutes was
not so much to do research as to serve some practical ends."* They were involved
e.g. in the verification and stamping of weights and measures or the control of
patents. The Wryj/Jfca/»jc/i-7>c/M«c/!£ /tac/uanjto// (PTR) was the first major public
research laboratory that was not connected with an academy, a university or a
technical college. It was founded by the astronomist Wilhelm Foerster (1832-1921),
the physicist Hermann Helmholtz (1821-1894) and the industrialist Werner Siemens
104. After the Prussian example, the creation of independent research institutes became an
international process. Well-known are the Pasteur Institute in Paris (founded in 1888), the
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research in New York (1901), the Carnegie Institute for
Fundamental and Scientific Research in Washington (1902) and the Carlsberg Society in
Copenhagen. Still affiliated to an academy were the Institute for Radium Research of the
Viennese Academy (1908) and the Nobel Institute for Physical Chemistry in Stockholm (1905)
Althoff was well informed about these international developments, which gave further impulse*
to his own plans.
105. See observation 32.
106. In 1847, the Royal Meteorological Institute was set up in Berlin after a proposal of Alexander
von Humboldt (1769-1859). The initiative was followed by the Geodesic Institute (1869). the
Astronomic Institute (1874) and the Astrophysical Observatory in Potsdam (1874). The latter
was created by Wilhelm Foerster for weather report purposes. The German Ministry of the
Interior set up several institutes for purely practical purposes like the Gauging-Committee
(1868). the Imperial Health Office (1876). the Imperial Patent Office and the Biological
Institute (1905). The Archaeological Institute with branches in Rome and Athens was taken
over by the federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Prussian state
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(1816-1892) in 1887."" The mission of the PTR was to pursue basic and applied
research for the benefit of German industry. At the institute. Max Planck (1858-1947)
did his famous research on quantum theory. The empirical results obtained at the PTR
led to his well-known radiation-formula, which he also tested at the PTR. The 1911
Nobel Prize Winner for Physics, Wilhelm Wien (1864-1928) also worked here. As a
result, it gained an international reputation as a center for empirical and fundamental
research in physics.""
Observution 16: Research institutes were created that were independent of the
traditional universities, in order to allow scholars to devote their efforts solely to
research.
In the nineties, Althoff was involved in the creation of some famous institutes for
medical and biological research. In 1891, the Royal Institute for Infectious Diseases
was founded in association with the Charite."" Its first director was Robert Koch
(1843-1910), who taught at the University of Berlin from 1885. Koch had made his
path-breaking bacteriological discoveries at the Imperial Health Office, not at the
university, in the early eighties. Famous scholars would come to work at the institute,
among them Paul Ehrlich (1854-1915). The institute was also a model for the
Imperial Japanese Institute,"" which was directed by Koch's student, Shibasaburo
Kitasato (1853-1931).'"
In 1891, the Biological Observatory was opened in Plön. It was financed by wealthy
citizens and the city of Plön, a local scientific fraternity and the Prussian state.'"
The observatory was complemented by the Biological Institute and the North Sea
Museum on Helgoland. They were both set up in 1892 with the financial help of
citizens of Breslau. The Helgoland institute studied problems related to fishery and
fish biology. Friedrich Heincke (1852-1929) was its first director. The Ministry of
Culture also took over the Zoological Institute in Napels, which had been founded by
Anton Dohrn (1840-1909) in 1872.
In 1896, Paul Ehrlich opened the Institute for Serum Research and Therapy in Berlin-
Stcglitz.'" Three years later, it was transferred to Frankfurt a.M. with a new name:
Institute for Experimental Therapy. Its task was to study immunity and develop
serums. Ehrlich had worked at the Koch Institute on diphteria, but felt constrained by
his tutor. Althoff got him his own institute, a joint-venture of a large private fund for
107. Siemens donated the building site, worth half a million marks. He granted an additional
300,000 marks for the construction of the buildings.
108. Similar institutes, modeled after the PTR. were created in Russia in 1893. England 1900, USA
1901. France 1902. Japan 1917.
109. Mm>/ic/v.s /rurirur /fr /Vtoicufra/iMif frrn.
110. The Imperial Japanese Institute was founded in 1892.
111. Kitasato discovered the pestbacillus with Koch in 1890. He developed the tetanus serum with
Emil Behring (1854-1917).
112. The institute became very famous for the research carried out by August Thienemann (1882-
1960). Otto Zacharias (1846-1916) took the initiative for an observatory.
113.
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chemotherapeutical research.'" the city of Frankfurt, the firm Cusella and the
Hoechst corporation, which was represented by August Laubenheimer (1848-1904).
Emil Behring (1854-1917) had also worked at Koch's institute. He continued the
research on diphteria, but also investigated tuberculosis. Behring became the first
director of the Institute for Experimental Therapy and Hygiene in Marburg (1899)
The institute was financed by the Hoechst corporation, which, in return, was allowed
to put the serums into production, while the state set the prices. Ehrlich and Behring
carried out Nobel Prize winning research at their institutes.
The Göttingen Association for the Advancement of Applied Physics and
Mathematics,'" founded in February 1898, was an initiative of Henry Böttinger and
Felix Klein (1849-1925)."* In ten yean time, the association created five
institutes.'" and financed five new chairs, among which Ludwig Prandtl's
professorship in aeronautics.'" It was a self-administered, privately funded
organization. The board consisted of scholars, but also contained representatives of
the state and the industry.'" The Ministry of Culture looked after the academic
freedom of the scholars from commercial pressure and industrial interests.
The independent research institutes challenged the Humboldtian principle. Teaching
and research were no longer necessarily parts of the same task. However, the top
scholars who directed these institutes often combined it with a professorship, so that
in practice the Humboldtian idea was still largely intact. Nevertheless, the institutes,
in which scholars with a proven research record carried out their own program, were
administratively and financially independent from the rest of the academic system.
The independent research institutes and the Dahlem project paved the way for the
famous Kö/^ r-W/MWm-G«W/.sc/u3/T that was founded in 1917. Dahlem was already in
a far stage of development when Althoff died.'" It would become a park in which
researchers of genius would be offered non-lecturing research institutes for
fundamental research.'" It was not meant to replace, but to complete the efforts of
114.
IIS.
116. Klein is well-known for his contributions in the field of uniformization theory.
117. Institutes in applied mathematics, applied mechanics, applied electricity, geophysics and
inorganic chemistry.
118 Prandtl (1857-1953) led the Wofor/u/Jjc/i//f-Sfudif/i;«W/irAa/J of the Göfrfnjw Vw/n/gu/ i j ,
where he did research on hydro- and aerodynamics and aviation.
119. Althoff. who had pushed the creation of the Association, was an honorary member.
120. Althoff had brought up the matter to the Emperor, who reserved 100 hectare» in Dahlem for
state research institutes. In 1905. the first independent research institute in Dahlem was foun-
ded: the Imperial Biological Institute for Pedology and Forestry. Soon, the famous chemists
Emil Fischer (1852-1919), Walther Nernst (1864-1941) and Wilhelm Ostwald (1853-1932)
began asking for a Chemical Research Institute.
121. Especially, but not exclusively, in natural sciences (physics, radioactivity, electron research,
serum research, inorganic chemistry, biochemistry, biology, brain research, comparative
anatomy and comparative physiology). AlthofTs plan for a central Institute for Research on
German History was realized in 1917. The Afaiw-lW//iWm-//iMmtf JO/- </fu/jc/ir
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the universities. The professors at the Afa«*r-W/AW/n institutes had no administrative
tasks nor any teaching or examination duties. Althoff also had plans to move the
University of Berlin and the Royal Library to Dahlem.'^
4.4.2. Seminar Research Method
Observation 17: The seminar method was a new form of interactive education and
research.
From Straft burg came a new form of postgraduate education and research: the
seminars. Althoff created several of them at every Prussian university. A seminar had
its own working rooms, library or laboratory and was led by a senior scholar, who
carried out his seminar research program. The students participated in this program.
It served a triple goal: (I) the participants acquired problem-sol ving skills by carrying
out their own research projects while learning from the results of other research,(2)
the diversity of the students allowed a multi-disciplinary research approach, (3)
promising academic scholars were taught the methods of research by working with an
experienced researcher. This interactive method of learning was quite unorthodox as
compared with the traditional &r ca/>iedra lecturing.
In the Althoff era, nine seminars for economics and political science were created at
Prussian universities. Gustav von Schmoller, the leading economist of the Young
Historical School, accepted the call to the University of Berlin only on the condition
of having his own seminar, which did not yet exist in Berlin. Most seminars were
established in the fields of geography, Romanic and English philology, philosophy
and psychology, which was a fairly new discipline.
4.4.3. Professional Library System
Althoff was impressed by the university library of Straflburg. The rest of the Prussian
and German libraries, however, which were run voluntarily by professors after
working hours, were in a poor state. To upgrade the system, Althoff consulted the
General Director of the Royal Library August Wilmanns (1833-1917) and other
experts like Otto Hartwig (1830-1903), Karl Dziatzko (1842-1903) and Wilhelm
Erman (1850-1932), who were the Directors of the libraries of Halle. Göttingen and
Berlin.
Observation 18: The reform of the German scientific library system was twofold:
expansion and structural reorganization.
121. ...
replaced earlier efforts of the Prussian Historical Institute in Rome (1888) and the Historical
Institute for Art in Firenze (1897).
122. Bemhard vom Brocke and Rudolf Vierhaus (1990). Fori f tan; i/n 5/WMiMg^Wrf, p. 121.
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Better housing was an urgent problem The Royal Prussian Library and all the
university libraries, except for Breslau, got new buildings. A simple measure was to
supply more books and scientific journals on the library shelves. Althoff knew, of
course, that mere expansion would not lead to a better use of the libraries. Therefore,
the growth in the volume of books and journals was accompanied by a new uniform
cataloguing system in Prussia.'" Schilfert argues that
7 / <A> «nrtcAfufc/Kfe 7ior <frr /4/rfco/fjcA™ SiMiorAffcsrr/bnn <ft> LAIMSIJ <fcr z«An
t/niv?r3{rdri6i!>/i0rA?&fn out i/i/rr Aso/irru/ij u/irf <&u Zuftt/nntirt/tigrn
'**
The dual system of university libraries and specialized seminar and institute libraries
became better integrated by an innovative system of inlerlibrary-loans (1893).
More innovative was AlthofTs professionalization of libraries. To give future
librarians a formal and relevant training, a professor was appointed to (he first chair
in library sciences in Göttingen in 1886. Next, genuine career opportunities were
opened for librarians. The reforms of 1893 gave them the same career prospects as
university professors.'"
4.4.4. University Regulations
University regulations and degree requirements were often fragmented, inconsistent
and discriminating. The fact that examination requirements were unregulated would
not have caused state action if the different faculties would have held more or less
equal standards for equal degrees. However, the Ministry was forced to take action
by the justified foreign criticism of German doctoral procedures.
Observation 19: Althoff made the university regulations and degree requirements
more consistent and less discriminating.
In 1897, the Ministry of Culture determined the requirements for a Prussian Law
degree in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice. The process was repeated in 1901
for medicine. With the approval of the Office of the Chancellor, standards were
spelled which a practising physician had to meet.
Crucial in the process of rationalizing the degree requirements was the foreign
criticism on German doctoral procedures. On some German universities, candidates
could earn their doctor's degrees in afaeriria and without producing any research
123. The Pr*i^ucA* /umibiown of 1899/1908
124. Sabine Schilfert (1989), 'Friedrich Althoff und die wissenschaftlich-technischen
Hochschulbibliotheken - Eine Studie zum Arheitsstil Althoffs', in: I.T.W., FrJAfrfcft ii/r/ugf
/«J9-/9O8, Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR. p. 103
125. For example, the mathematician Dr. Heinrich Simon (1858-1930), who had devoted himself to
a library for technical sciences, became the director of all Prussian technical libraries, having
the rank and title of professor.
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document. This led to serious abuses, in which degrees were simply sold for money.
In order to maintain international respect for German scholarship and protect the
brand name of the German doctor's title, reforms could no longer be postponed. In
1887, Althoff regulated e.g. the doctoral requirements at the Göttingen Law
Department. They now included oral exams and a printed dissertation. As a result,
many students went to universities outside Prussia.
In spite of many efforts, Althoff was unable to push forward a consistent policy on
the federal level. Without doubt, the 'cultural objections' of the non-Prussian
universities were intertwined with financial reasons since the registration fees for
doctor's degrees were very high. Later reform attempts, which were initiated by the
academic authorities themselves instead of by the state, all failed, which leads vom
Brocke to conclude:
"£s uwrtfr nur vviofcr f/n/na/ dot 615 /iiu/e- n/f/w wu/?r/«£f«
In Germany, there was another debate going on about the right of the technical
colleges to confer doctoral degrees in engineering.'" A positive conclusion would
imply the scientific equality of technical colleges and universities and break the
latter's monopoly. Kahlow has argued that the debate was won by the technical
colleges on scientific grounds.'** The state classification of materials, which was
based on solidity studies of a high theoretical level, also helped their cause
significantly. It should be mentioned that chemistry was taught at universities and
technical colleges and it was clear that the latter were not behind in development. So,
the technical colleges obtained the right to confer the doctor's degree in 1899.
Althoff was also responsible for a school reform. The Prussian system of secondary
education consisted of three types: the 0fcerre-a/.rc/iw/e\ the /fevj/gymnas/M/n and the
Gymnosiu/n.'" Only graduates from the Gym/wjiwnj were allowed to go to a
university, although the different schools offered the same type of education at a
comparable level, emphasizing, however, different disciplines. Due to the monopoly
of the Gym/uuium. the students of the other two school types were only allowed to
126 Bemhard vom Brocke (1980). WOCAJCAU/- IUK/ WwfwcAa/tipo/i/i*. p. 63.
127. Dr.-/njj. or rfocror nrrum /«7i/i/ajrum (a doctor's degree in engineering).
128. Andre» Kahlow (1989), "Der Techmkerstreit im lemen Drittel des 19. Jahrhunderts", in:
I.T.W., FriftfrirA /4/rtojf /S.?^/SOS. Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR. Berlin, p. 120.
In particular, Carl Culmann's graphic statistics (1866-1875). Gustav Zeuner's mechanical
thermodynamics (1860). Franz Grashofs study of mechanical machines (187S) and Franz
Reuleaux's theoretical cinematics (1875) gave evidence to the claim that mechanical technology
was, in fact, an applied science.
129. Traditional education at the (Tym/uuium concentrated on the study of the classical languages
Latin and Greek. Modem languages like French and English were also taught. The study of
English was carried through in 1901 at the request of the Emperor. In 1859, the
Rfo/jfvmnojium was created, which also included classes in Latin, but emphasized the study of
modern languages and natural sciences. The 0ferrrfti/;rAu/?. founded in 1882. provided a
comparable general education, but Latin was no longer on the student's curriculum.
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study at technical colleges or at commercial and artistic institutes. At the school
conference of June 4 - 6. 1900, Althoff changed the system. All German high school
graduates now had equal opportunities for formal admittance to a university.'"
4.4.5. Academic Compensation
Observation 20: lite academic staff earned a basic salary according to a wage scale
system for the Prussian bureaucracy, that was supplemented by lecture fees.
Prussian academic scholars were civil servants, hired by the Ministry of Culture. Al
in the rest of the public administration, they were paid a salary, which was
determined by an official wage scale. The system set the initial basic salary and
attributed pay increases according to seniority and years in office.
Lecture fees counted for a substantial part of total income of university staff. For
example. Max Planck earned a salary of 6,000 marks in 1906 as a professor in
Berlin. The average salary of a professor was 4,000 marks. Planck made an
additional 4,000 to 5,000 marks in lecture fees.'" Althoff introduced a marginal tax
of fifty percent on lecture fee earnings rising above 3,000 marks.'" The proceeds
were deposited in a reserve fund that was set up, in the First place, to attract top
scholars to Prussian universities and, in the second place, (o aid the unsalaried
lecturers. Althoff made other serious efforts to improve the Financial position of the
lecturers. In 1889, he extended the idea of the Straflburg pension fund for the widows
and orphans of unsalaried lecturers to all of Prussia. When Althoff retired, he set up
the Wilhelm Relief Fund to help scholars and their families with Financial
problems.'" Henry Böttinger donated 100,000 marks.'"
Observation 21: Top scholars earned top wages and researchers of genius obtained
their own research institute.
Although the Althoff system introduced the bureaucratic wage scale system,
considerable flexibility was built into the compensation system in order to attract top
scholars. The Ministry of Culture could pay very high wages to top scholars with an
international reputation.'" In Austria, on the contrary, each agreement on salaries
which did not conform with the norm of the salary system, was dependent on the
approval of the Ministry of Finance. The Austrian Ministry of Culture did not have
130. Bemhard vom Brocke (1981a), /V«<flücte BiWu/i£ipo/mjt, p. 735.
131 Walther Höflechner (1989), ^lurruui l/n/wji/y Syw/n, p. 10, ftn 46.
132. in Berlin, the first 4,500 marks was exempted from the tax Althoff was only partly successful
in restricting the excessive private clinical practices of some physicians
133. WifliWm-S/i/*u/i£./ilr GWrtn*.
134. Bemhard vom Brocke and Rudolf Vierhaus (1990), Fonc/iun; /m Sposuiu/igj/WJ, p. 103.
135. With the 1900 average salary of a full professor somewhere around 4,000 marks, a true lop
scholar like Wilamowitz-Moellendorf earned a yearly salary of 15,000.
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any financial discretion, which would have allowed it to improve a compensation
offer and move rapidly on the academic market.
Part of the attraction for top scholars to work at Prussian academic institutes were the
outstanding research facilities they were offered."* Getting their own research
institute was part of the compensation package. As the director of an institute, they
could carry out a research program of their own interest. They managed their own
research institute, allocating resources to scientific instruments and assisting
personnel.
Observation 22: Marks of honor were an important compensation instrument in the
Althoff system.
The value of marks of honor should not be underestimated in the Imperial era. It
represented a form of social recognition, opening doors for its holders that remained
closed otherwise. Althoff did not have (he authority to grant marks of honor. So, he
had to induce others to reward scholars with distinction marks.'" Althoff success-
fully applied the same technique to private money-providers of public research
projects.'"
4.4.6. International Science Policy
Observation 23: The Ministry of Culture conducted an active international science
policy in order to obtain international recognition of German science and scholarship.
The educational stands of the Prussian Ministry of Culture at the World Exhibitions
of Chicago (1893), Paris (1900) and St. Louis (1904) were so successful that they are
considered the start of Germany's international science policy. At the exhibitions,
information was exchanged about ongoing research and teaching practices in Prussia
and abroad.'"
136. See observation 16.
137. For example. Felix Klein was honored with the /tarrr /4</fcronrfrn 4. M a w in 1889 and the
Ro/rr /tttfrrortfrn J. X 7 a w mi/ SrMri/r in 1892. He also became a secret adviser to the
government (GWu-iwr fcgfcrunjjro/A). Wilhelm Foerster received the ATrorwiorcfc 2. K7<UK
in 1886.
138. See observation 33.
139. In 1893, Althoff asked Felix Klein, visting Chicago, to survey the participation of American
women in higher education. Two years later, the Chicago professor Heinhch Maschke (1853-
1908) sent the first American female student to study mathematics with Klein in Goningen
After that, the University of Goningen started receiving female students on a regular basis
from the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia. They pushed the situation of Prussian
women, who were admitted to Prussian universities in 1908.
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The relation with foreign countries took its most prominent form in the international
exchange professorships between Germany and the United States.'" They were a
major innovation. There are no records showing any systematic exchanges before
Althoffs time, although there are many examples of invited lecturers and visiting
professors."' Peter Senn argues that, if the German universities wanted the full
benefits of intellectual relations with American institutes, another system than the
prevailing haphazard professorial traffic had to be set up.
Although the original idea probably stems from members of the Germanistic Society
in the United States, Althoff was largely involved in bringing the venture to a formal
conclusion. He institutionalized the exchange with Harvard, in spite of the opposition
from the Berlin professors, who viewed it as an implicit recognition of academic
equality with their American colleagues. Althoff succeeded by gaining (he support of
the Emperor and Adolf Harnack (1851-1930) and arranged the financing of the
professorships by the Koppel Foundation.'" After efforts of Althoff and Nicholas
Murray Butler, a second exchange program followed with Columbia University.
These exchange professorships were under the auspices of the Emperor of Germany
and the President of the United States, indicating the importance of the international
science policy.
In 1904, the Academic Information Bureau was founded at the University of
Berlin,'" while its counterpart opened at Columbia University in New York.'** A
network of cultural institutes was established at Harvard (1900), Columbia (1911) and
the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia (1912). They were called the German
Houses. International cooperation also led to the foundation of the German School of
Medicine in Shanghai (1907) and the German-Chinese University in Tsingtao (1909).
Althoff believed that international science policy could make constructive
contributions to world peace and understanding between nations. To promote
scientific and human cooperation, Althoff founded the International Journal for
Science, Culture and Technology,'*' in which prominent scientists from the United
States, England, France and Italy published.
140. For an extensive report, see: Peter Senn (1989), VWv/r M /4Wio/f » frta/ricA /4Wio# //>
£/i£/u/i. WOK- /UU te/a/rd .', Paper Althoff Conference, Heilbronn, 66 pp.
141. A true professorial exchange is when two professors from two universities take each other's
place for a specified period of time.
142. The Koppri-Sn/htfij zur för<fcru/i£ <frr geijrigrii Brzi>/iu/i£?n D?u»cWa/k/.i zum /luj/and? was
endowed with a capital of 1 million marks by the banker Leopold Koppel (18S4-1933)
143. The Academic Information Bureau (Akademische Auskunftstelle) informed foreign students a-
bout studying in Germany and German students about academic programs abroad Althoff used
it to get an idea about the international position of Germany in research and education.
144 In 1903, a German Museum was created at Harvard Its counterpart, the America Institute in
Berlin, was founded in 1910 and directed by Hugo Münsterberg (1863-I916).
145. /ntemario/uifc Wocte/ur/iri/T /fir Wiurnjcfei/r. KW/ur unrf 7«7im* The journal replaced the
weekly addendum of the German newspaper, the /4//;r»i?ifif Zf/riuii, in which Althoff
previously had spread his ideas on international science policy.
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5. Methods and Means of the Althoff System
5.1. Academic Information
5.1.1. Academic Statistics
Observation 24: The Althoff system marks the start of statistical studies,
that would underlie the modern administration of science in Germany.
5.1.2. Network of Confidential Agents
Obs. 25: An extensive, informal network of confidential agents provided
Althoff with qualitative academic information as well as additional financial
resources.
5.2. Academic Appointments
5.2.1. Selection Procedure
Obs. 26: When Althoff appointed a member of the academic staff, he
combined expert knowledge on the scientific situation of a discipline with
accurate scholarly appraisals of the academic performance of the candidate.
Obs. 27: Althoff respected the traditional academic rights as long as they
were not used for the protection of vested interests.
Obs. 28: The autocratic 'personal regime" of Althoff was not absolute.
5.2.2. Researchers of Genius
Obs. 29: Althoff not only appointed suitable candidates to existing chain,
he also created new positions with excellent research facilities in order to
attract top scholars.
5.2.3. Minorities
Obs. 30: Althoff gave scholars who belonged to a minority group equal
opportunities to an academic career.
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5.3. Academic Freedom
Ob». 31: The Ministry of Culture protected academic freedom as
guaranteed by the constitution.
5.4. Financial Resources
Obi. 32: Althoff built a multi-source financing system for the academic
system.
5.4.1. Prussian Ministry of Finance
5.4.2. Local Authorities, Chambers of Commerce and Academies
5.4.3. Industry and Banking
5.4.4. Private Foundations
5.4.5. Incentives to Finance Academic Research
Obs. 33: Orders, ennoblement and licences were specific incentives to
attract private money for academic research.
5. Methods and Means of the Althoff System
Around the turn of the century, the Prussian Ministry of Culture w u the driving
force behind several important academic innovations such as the seminar structure,
the independent research institutes and a modern library system. To pursue this
innovative science policy, the Althoff system used some very specific methods. It
operated a complete network to obtain information about academic activities and it
also looked for discretionary financial means, other than the traditional state
subsidies.
5.1. Academic Information
5.1.1. Academic Statistics
Observation 24: The Althoff system marks the start of statistical studies, that would
underlie the modern administration of science in Germany.
Every administration needs reliable data on the factors that affect the effectiveness of
its department. The official information about academic teaching and research was
published in annual university chronicles and reports of research institutes and
hospitals. Althoff studied them with great care, as he did the statistical records of the
Ministry of Culture, which revealed among other things the number of students
attending lectures. To obtain additional and more accurate data, he ordered several
statistical studies.'" It marked the start of a modern, rational administration of
science.
5.1.2. Network of Confidential Agents
Observation 25: An extensive, informal network of confidential agents provided
Althoff with qualitative academic information as well as additional financial
resources.
The most characteristic feature of the Althoff system was the large, informal network
of confidential agents that extended in the entire German society.'" AlthofFs
146. Studies about the statistical evolution of student numbers and public expenditures were carried
out by the economists Johannes Conrad (1839-1915) and Wilhelm Lexis (1837-1914) in 1884,
1889 and 1891. S/a/ixfU drr pr«#<jdi«i La/wtoiM/wrM/d/m was written by the same authors.
BiW;o£rap/u> <fcr tfruttrte/i (M/ww/d/M (1904 and 1905) by the librarians Wilhelm Erman
(1850-1932) and Ewald Horn (1845-1923) offered a useful survey of the German academic
system.
147. It led Altboff into the Ministry of Finance, where he wat in dote contact with (he refendary in
charge of the budget for the Ministry of Culture.
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confidential consultants were often highly qualified individuals, who worked in the
government, the state bureaucracy, parliament, political parties, industry and the
press. Part of this informal network was revealed after AlthofTs death, when 136
high-ranked German officials signed a list for the creation of a Friedrich Althoff
Fund.'**
The main network was inside the academic community. It was designed to obtain
qualitative information about academic issues in order to supplement the quantitative
and official data. Since the official channels did not always provide Althoff with
sufficient unbiased information, he had confidential consultations with leading
scholars in every discipline and from every German university. The academic agents
were asked to give their reasoned opinion on a number of issues. They informed
Althoff e.g. about the state-of-the-art in their discipline as well as where promising
scientific progress was made. They were asked to express their professional opinion
about specific institutional reforms or to evaluate the academic performance of a
potential chairholder.
g fcr von
Wi5jevucna/fr/>0/jri& /tam aVwi System
K W H
war g/eJcAze/fig Vorai«.r«zung _/Ör «n* von
.s- una" /Vrsona/po/i'fi'Jt. Di> Qua/irdr ze*i£/e j/'cn a*an'n,
^nn^r a/i fi^ra/^r n/nzuzog, IMMW «n q^i»n« Onr _/iïr
5acn7icA* Wfl/wcA^ na/Tf, rfurcnawj awcn von JJCA ai« oitr/v wura"^  una"
e^-ag« >var/Ür iTir facA èwona'^rj mJHg j« . ^Mo/fAa/re
von Verrrau^nj/ewen a/i _/«fer t/n/verji'rd/, in j></em Facn, fin
Consider e.g. the role of Wilhelm Foerster."" At the request of Althoff, he wrote a
confidential report in 1885 on the problems of the cosmic sciences in general, and of
the Geodesic Institute in particular.'" After hearing other scholars, among whom
Robert Helmert (1843-1917),'" Althoff agreed that a new charter would be drawn
up for the Geodesic Institute that would focus its activities on research. It became a
148. Among the signatories were the Chancellor of the Empire, five ministers, seventeen members
of parliament, three mayors, one cardinal, twenty-five leading bureaucrats, six university
curators, forty-nine professors, nine bankers and captains-of-industry, several publishers, heads
of schools, libraries and archives.
149. Ralph-Jürgen Lischke (1989), FWrrfric* /»WK>#, p. 20.
130. Wilhelm Foerster (1832-1921) introduced the metric system in Germany On 1869). was
involved in the Paris Meter Treaty (May 20, 1875), founded four stations on the German north
and east coast (between 1874 and 1877) as well as the Astronomic Society (1863), the
Astronomic Computing Institute (1874) and the Astrophysical Observatory in Potsdam (1874).
151. Klaus-Harro Tiemann (1989). "Das Zusammenwirken von WJ. Foerster und F T Althoff auf
dem Gebiet der Geo- und Kosmoswissenschaften". in: I.T.W., FriedricA /1/rtofl^
Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR. Berlin, pp. 57-70.
152. The first professor of geodesy at the University of Berlin.
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leading institute in the field. According to the initial plan of Althoff. the Seminar for
Foreign Languages in Berlin had to be complemented by a Geographical-Technical
Seminar, in which, among other subjects, climatology would be studied. The
feasibility of this project was assessed in Foerster's valuable confidential report of
1894.'" It should also be mentioned that Foerster was a friend of Adolf von Scholz
(1833-1924). the Prussian Minister of Finance (1882-1890). Foerster acted as a
liaison between Althoff and the Finance Minister.
The following list, which is not exhaustive, illustrates the extent of the academic
network.'" In Berlin, Althoff frequently consulted professor Theodor Mommsen
(1807-1903), the world-famous classicist, as well as the respected historian of ancient
philosophy Eduard Zeiler (1814-1908) Rudolf Virchow (1821 1902), Bernhard WeiB
(1827-1918) and Friedrich Paulsen (1846 1908) also gave advice to Althoff In the
economic sciences, Althoff sought the opinion of the economists Gustav Schmoller,
leader of the Young Historical School, and his scholarly opponent Adolph Wagner
(1835-1917), as well as the economist Wilhelm Lexis from the University of
Göttingen. Other loyal consultants were the influential theologian Adolf Harnack, the
physician Robert Koch, the chemist Emil Fischer (1852-1919) and the astro-scientist
Wilhelm Foerster.
In Göttingen, Althoff was in close contact with Felix Klein and the hellenist Ulrich
von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (1848-1931). At the University of Marburg, he
consulted the physicians Eduard Külz (1845-1895) and Emil Behring as well as the
jurist Ludwig Enneccerus (1843-1928). From Halle came confidential information
from the psychologist Eduard Hitzig (1838-1907). Althoff kept a special relation to
the University of StraBburg, where he asked the classical philologist, Wilhelm
Studemund (1843-1889) for his opinions. The chemist Wilhelm Ostwald (1853-1932),
the economist Lujo Brentano (1844-1931) and the philosopher Wihelm Dilthey (1833-
1911) were also network members that worked at the Alsatian university. Other
confidential agents were the economist Johannes Conrad, the psychologist Hugo
Münsterberg and the historian Karl Lamprecht (1856-1915).
Consider the extent of the academic network e.g. in a discipline like chemistry.
Althoff was in contact with the leading scholars of the time: Adolf Baeyer (1835-
1917), Emil Fischer, August Hofmann (1818-1892), August Kekulé von StradoniU
(1829-1896), Wilhelm Ostwald and Otto Wallach (1847-1931). Zirnstein showed in
great detail how the informal academic network functioned in the field of
biology.'" Althoff had many important advisers among the leading biologists in
153.
rrn £m/r/r/w/ij? 5i> mir/i au/ Gru/irf w i w Miff?i/u#if«n fl/w <//> an/ rf/>jrm GrWrt? ofrwu/-
frikfcn ÜMj/flnJf au/j?<rfardrrr to/wi
154 See also: Bernhard vom Brocke (1980). M w / u c W - unJ Winriurfei/fr/Mftri*, pp. 70-82
1SS. Gottfried Zirnstein (1991), "Friedrich Althoffs Wirken fur die Biologie in der Zeit des
Umbrochs der biologischen Disziplinen in Deutschland. der Emeuerung ihrer Forschung und
Lehre an den Universitlten und des Rufes nach auAeruniversitiren Forschungsslitten, 1882 bis
1908", in: Bernhard vom Brocke (Hrsg.), WuxCTisc/w/frgric/HV/w unrf Wi««uc/ia/7.tpo//7i* im
/n</i<irn«Z?tf<2/r«r, Verlag August Lax. Hildesheim. pp. 3SS-37S.
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Germany. Different opinions and heterogenous scientific approaches prevailed."*
Zirnstein found that when the chair of physiology at the University of Berlin became
vacant after the death of professor Emil Du Bois-Reymond (1818-1896). Althoff got
in contact with almost every significant physiologist living in Germany.
The Althoff network included many foreigners as well. The most active correspondent
was the Viennese jurist, professor Emil Schrutka-Edler von Rechtenstamm f 1852-
1918). Wende I found documents of academic agents in St. Petersburg, Libau, Dorpat.
Lemberg, Czcmowitz, Innsbruck, Krakau, Graz, Wien, Praha, Budapest and
universities throughout the United States.'"
The confidential network sometimes caused tensions with the official interlocutors
who fell they were being bypassed. In February 1894, Ernst von Meier (1832-1911),
the curator of the University of Gottingen, resigned because he was tired of the
"informal curators" Klein and Lexis.'" A few months later, he was succeeded by
Ernst Höpfner (1836-1915)."*
Nevertheless, effective measures and good decisions depended on high quality, often
confidential information on many academic and scientific issues. As Boschan points
out:
wev/ê/i, a"aj3 er J/'C/I aw/" Jar Sorg/Sl/r/gtft nac/i a//evi
ji> er ma/ ?v?/i/uW/ a/urW/e/j tónwe, i'w
zu Jf//ifm W«/>r.""°
Althoff was mainly concerned with the appointment and employment of an excellent
academic staff, as well with money-raising to create an environment that would
induce scholars to perform well. The carefully crafted network was useful with regard
to both aspects.
156. Zirnstein studied the correspondence between Althoff and the mycologist Oskar Brefeld (1839-
1925), the physiologist and marine biologist Victor Hensen (1835-1934), the zoologists Oscar
Hertwig (1849-1922) and Richard Henwig (1850-1937), the zoologist Karl Möbius (1825-
1908), the evolutionary physiologist Wilhelm Roux (1853-1933). the botanists Adolf Engler
(1844-1930). Johannes Reinke (1846-1931) and Simon Schwendener (1829-1919) and many
researchers in medicine as well, among whom, of course, Emil Behring and Paul Ehrlich.
157. Günther Wendel (1991), "Aktivitaten Althoffs zum Wegennetz europaischen Geistes. Die
Einbeziehung ost- und sudeuropaischer Universitaten in das System Althoff", in Bemhard vom
Brooke (Hrsg). Wwjrarr/>u/rj£«rMc/i/r und W«f/ui-/i<j/?v>o/irit wi /n</ujfri««/<j/frr. Verlag
August Lax, Hildesheim, pp. 123-154.
158. Renata Tobies (1989). "Zum Verhaltnis von Felix Klein und Friedrich AlthofT, in: I.T.W.,
FnrJriiA /4///iojf. Akademie der Wissenschaften in Berlin, p. 37.
159. Höpfner came from the Ministry of Culture, where he had worked as a referendary. He fully
supported the plans of transforming Göningen into a center tor applied mathematics and phy-
sics and fostered the cooperation of science and industry.
160. Barbel Boschan (1989). "Die Entwicklung der Philosophischen Fikultit der Berliner Unversitit
im Zeitraum 1870-1900'. in: I.T.W.. fnfdnfA /i/cftojf /&?9-/$O8, Akademie der
Wissenschaften der DDR. Berlin, p. 72.
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5.2. Academie Appointments
The control of academic appointments was another key feature of AlthofTs science
policy, aimed at occupying Prussian chairs with the finest of scholars. As mentioned
earlier, it inspired much of the controversy on the bureaucratization of the academic
system.
Sri7
7raa7ri0nj/i/ti> dVj p
7>i7 «A/rr Wirtwi^ aVm AfoiwroM ju/n /rgu/arrn W/n/rrgrwnd « w r
While the results of AlthofTs methods were mostly beyond dispute, criticism came al
the centralized control and the confidential methods of (he Althoff system. Althoff
held true scholarship and erudition in high esteem, but had often been exposed to the
opposite. He had developed a sharp and patronizing attitude towards a large part of
the academics, which may explain some of the criticism as well. Nevertheless,
Althoff was given due credit for having selected, attracted and promoted the career of
prominent scholars, who often were personally indebted to Althoff for their scientific
development.
5.2.1. Selection Procedures
The faculty that had a vacant or new chair. First looked for candidates itself and then
sent a list to the Ministry of Culture. In most cases, the administration in Berlin
respected the cooptation right and appointed the candidate whom the faculty
preferred. However, faculty proposals often reflected fear of scientific competition,
family involvement, group interests and sheer vanity containing large salary claims.
Althoff had observed that the procedure had not consistently led to the appointment of
the most suitable candidates to German chairs. Once in the ministry, he started
countering bad appointments and excessive financial claims. A too frequent change of
job by some professors was countered by a contractual agreement to stay in the same
position for three to five years in order to assure a minimal continuity of
teaching.'"
Althoff developed a system to improve the selection method of candidates. The major
problem was to get better information about the performance of scholars. Without
prejudice, he carefully evaluated the scientific production, the academic reputation,
the teaching qualities and the character of candidates. Not all of this information was
available through the official channels or in publication lists. All of the factors were
observed by other scholars, who were not necessarily working at the same unversity.
161. Hubert Laitko (1989), /fcmfe>/<fr W /ti//u#, p. 12.
162. This clause was called the
68 7n« Econom/cj <ƒ Sri«i« a/irf Srno/arjAip.- ^n /4na/vj;j
Thii led to the most important role of the confidential network of academie agents: to
provide Althoff with qualitative, recent and better information about the performance
of scholars.
" / • • / <fo
/ . . / m// jfin^r /Vrjona/-, fle"/T(/S/ng.j- u/u/ fie*5O&fang5po/(/f£ i<frn/i/ïa>/T. l/m i/cA wi
>*aJbi//<ÏMvorjcn/<Jge\ a /vr awc/i /fir </»> Vor^r^ifu/i^ w/uf OtoroviVru/ig
an
//i rf^n rrjf^n ./a/i/rn jn'/i^r r<3//^ i*i> «n vv^irv^nvvw^^j Syj/wi von
, von A««^n FacnJfc*nn*/7i ai(/", von t/fn^n «r ji'cn a«/ 'v r^ftorg^n^n
'. /m pfrj0n//c/i#n Cwprdcn oJrr irnny^/icA, n<i/ür//cn ZM/nmf f«nra«/icA, in
Observation 26. When Althoff appointed a member of the academic staff, he
combined expert knowledge on the scientific situation of a discipline with accurate
scholarly appraisals of the academic performance of the candidate.
Althoff made thousands of appointments, for which he did not rely automatically on
the opinion of the local faculty. He listened to the judgements of experts, who were
recognized top scholars in their discipline. Their opinions had to assure the objectivity
of the appointment decision, which might be distorted by personal sympathies of
faculty members. In turn, Althoff increased the objectivity of these subjective
opinions by valuing independent, critical, fast and converging judgements, pointing
out a candidate's abilities and weaknesses. Althoff also used comprehensive surveys
on the scientific situation of a discipline, including a state-of-the-art assessment and
an indication of promising progress and promising scholars.'" Combining all this
information, he could accurately assess candidates.
Obtaining the expert information on the growing academic system was systematized in
a network. It should be noted that the system only worked because the central
receiver in the network (AlthofO knew how to operate it and skillfully processed the
information.
Consider e.g. the appointment of David Hubert and Ludwig Plate. In 1891. professor
Felix Klein favored Arthur Schönflies (1853-1928) as his associate professor in
Gottingen.'" But. in a letter to Althoff. he pointed out the qualities of a younger.
163. Gflnther Wendel (1991). /4trivir<Vrn /4//A<i/fs. p. 124-125.
164. Althoff prepared appointment decisions years in advance Most helpful in the long-term
strategy were the confidential reports on the scientific and scholarly situation of a entire
discipline. Felix Klein, for example, wrote a report about mathematics: /liruW/? Afar/i^marijcV
Ld;r. The professors Kayser from Marburg, von Koenen from Gottingen and Beyrich from
Berlin investigated the "Quality of the Private Lecturers and Extraordinary Professors in the
Field of Geology and Paleontology at Prussian Universities" Other reports, e.g. Wilhelm
Foerster's. have been mentioned earlier.
165 Hubert Uitko (1989), HwnfcVdr u*j ^/rto#. p 10.
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even more brilliant scholar: David Hubert (1862-1943). Klein argued thai Hubert, a
true genius, would probably be stifled under his wings because he had all the
capacities to become a full professor himself. Two years later, AlthofT filled the chair
of mathematics in Königsberg with Hubert, at the occassion of which he asked him to
suggest some names for the associate professorship that was vacant as well. For the
promotion of the Marburg lecturer in Zoology, Ludwig Plate (1862-1937), Althoff
consulted the leading scholars Carl Chun (1852-1914, Breslau). Franz Eilhard
Schultze (1840-1921. Berlin). Ernst Enters (1835-1911. Góttingen). Carl Ludwig
(1816-1895. Bonn) and Karl Möbius (1825-1908. Berlin)"*
Observation 27: Althoff respected the traditional academic rights as long as as they
were not used for the protection of vested interests.
Personal sympathies could distort the information from the confidential academic
agents as well, especially in appointment decisions. To generate knowledge that was
as objective as possible, Althoff always contacted many different advisers. Their
letters were secret and had to be returned fast, so that their opinions could not be
influenced. Althoff checked their accuracy and speed of response. The letters had to
include a statement about the position of the candidate in the academic community,
his scientific development, his performance level, his character and his financial and
personal situation.
When the independent judgements of the confidential experts unanimously pointed at
one scholar, it was highly likely that he was the most suitable candidate. In turn,
Althoff was suspicious if the faculty of a particular university suggested a candidate,
whom members of the scientific community in that discipline would not even
consider. By taking the approach of an integrated system, Althoff was in a position to
interject competition from another candidate if a particular faculty unduly protected its
own candidate or some vested interests. Differences of opinion between the experts
did occur, of course, which sometimes required further investigations by Althoff and
his staff. The confidential academic agents had one clear incentive to provide accurate
information: abuse of trust implied exclusion from the network.
Althoff strongly defended academic freedom,'" but also believed that universities
were public institutes. Therefore, the government had to oversee their administration.
In defending this policy, Althoff used an argument advanced long before by Wilhelm
von Humboldt: state control reduced the likelihood that the development of
individuals, faculties and institutions would be retarded by vested interests.'** While
Althoff, looking for unanimous consent among scholars and cooperation instead of
opposition from the academic establishment, fully respected the traditional academic
rights, he did not yield to pressure out of fear for competition among faculty nor to
vested interests.
166. Gottfried Zirnstein (1991). ^/rtofli WirtoiJSr <«* fltofojk, p. 355.
167. See observation 31.
168 John E. Craig (1984), ftftofardiip W Afarion-Sui&ftn;, p. 93.
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Compared with previous administrators, Althoff made less use of the prerogative to
appoint a professor in spite of the faculty's will.'** The influence of the Althoff
system allowed the minimal use of this prerogative by promoting the most suitable
candidate in the faculties through the agents, the resulting proposal being of course
already in favor of Althoffs candidate.
The cases of Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf and Victor Meyer are good
illustrations of AlthofTs practices. In December 1895, Hermann Diels (1848-1922)
had informed Althoff that the Berlin professors Ernst Curtius (1814-1896), Adolf
Kirchoff (1826-1906) and Johannes Vahlcn (1850-1911) would oppose the intended
appointment of Wilamowitz at their faculty.'™ The reason was one to infuriate
Althoff: fear of competition. When Curtius died eight months later, the vacant
professorship was announced in such terms that only one scholar was capable of
meeting the high requirements of the candidate profile: Wilamowitz. As a result, the
Berlin faculty proposed his appointment to the Ministry of Culture on August 3,
1896 '"
In 1884, the faculty of Göttingcn preferred that Victor Meyer (1848-1897) from
Zurich would succeed Hans Hübner (1837-1884), professor of chemistry, who had
died. Other candidates on the faculty's list were Emil Fischer, Otto Wallach (1847-
1931) and Ferdinand Tiemann (1848-1899). In order to make the right decision,
Althoff also consulted Germany's leading researchers August Kekulé, Adolf von
Baeyer and August Wilhelm von Hofmann (1818-1892). All three preferred the Swiss
candidate as well. At the same time, they pointed out the capacities of the other three
scholars, whom they considered of high quality.'" As a result, the initial proposal
from the faculty of Göttingen was accepted.
Observation 28: The autocratic "personal regime" of Althoff was not absolute.
The appointments of certain scholars show that Althoff swiftly had to operate within
the limits imposed by other authorities. In spite of his autocratic style, Althoffs
authority was constrained by the demands of the Court and public opinion and the
rights of faculties as well.
The stiff resistance of the Berlin Faculty of History e.g. impeded the appointment of
Karl Lamprecht (1856-1915) as the successor of Heinrich Treitschke (1834-1896).
169. Althoff overruled 16.5 % of all faculty proposals, which was much less frequently than the
preceding Assistant Secretary (27.9 %). See: Bernhard vom Brocke (1980). HocfcicW- U/K/
Wiij<nj(7iu/}ipo/irii, p. 90.
170. Barhei Boschan (1989). /•Mowyrturto' Aatu/fcï/ in grrfte. pp 71-85.
171 William M. Calder (1991). "Die Rolle Friedrich Althoffs bei den Benifungen von Ulrich von
Wilimowitz-MoellendorT. in: Bernhard vom Brocke (Hrsg), l*ïjj?ascA<a^j|«c/uc/i/f uw/
W.swuWi4/fa/><Wiri* im /ndu«ri«Wr<j/rrr, Verlag August Lax. Hildesheim, pp 251-266.
172. Hartmut Scholz (1989), "Friedrich Althoffs Einfluft auf die Entwicklung der Chemie in
Deutschland Ende des 19 Jihrhunderts". in: I.T.W., Frürfricft /4/r/u>^/&J9-/908. Akademie
der Wissenschaften der DDR. Berlin pp. 86-100.
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At the Emperor's request, a surgeon, who had successfully treated the Crown Prince,
was appointed at the University of Halle in 1890. Althoff strongly preferred another
candidate, but faculty put the blame on him. In 1900, professor Philipp Zorn (1850-
1928) had to be transferred from Königsberg to Bonn at the demand of the Emperor
in order to lecture the Crown Prince in constitutional law. The faculty in Bonn was
discontent with this choice and. again, blamed Althoff.
In 1901. Althoff appointed Martin Spahn (1875-1945). 26 years old at the time, as
professor of history and philosophy in Straflburg. The decision to set up a
confessional chair and appoint a Catholic scholar made the Protestant community so
furious that Althoff seriously feared for his own position.
5.2.2. Researchers of Genius
AlthofTs human resource management was focused on the researchers of genius. He
was convinced that the development of their talents was an important factor of
scientific progress. Indeed, the Althoff system promoted and attracted many top
scholars, providing them with excellent research facilities and minimal teaching
duties. Althoff furthered the career of top researchers like Emil Behring, Robert
Koch, Paul Ehrlich, Heinrich Hertz (1857-1894), Emil Fischer, Gustav Schmoller,
Johannes HaJler (1865-1947), Ludwig Prandtl, Jacobus van 't Hoff (1852-1911) and
Max Planck. He also supported great scholars and academic managers like Adolf
Harnack, Felix Klein and Wilhelm Foerster.
Observation 29: Althoff not only appointed suitable candidates to existing chairs, he
also created new positions with excellent research facilities in order to attract lop
scholars.
Althoff tried to lighten the teaching burden of Prussia's top scholars by granting them
teaching privileges and research professorships. He lowered e.g. the teaching duties
of Heinrich Hertz in Bonn (1889) and appointed professors to assist Behring in
Marburg (1895) and Fischer in Berlin (1903). Althoff created the first research
professorship at the Academy of Berlin. This new position, combined with an
honorary professorship at the university, convinced the brilliant Dutch professor
Jacobus van 't Hoff to come to Berlin.'" Van 't Hoff had declined a previous offer
to become full professor, because the teaching load would not have allowed him to
carry on with his research program.
173. Van 't Hoff earned a yearly salary of 10,000 marks at the Academy and had no teaching
obligations at the university. After van 't Hoffs death in 1913 and due to the mediation of
Walther Nemst (1864-1941), Alfred Einstein (1879-1955) got the academy professorship,
which was then financed by the Koppd Fund. Einstein earned 12,000 marks a year. See:
Bemhard vom Brocke and Rudolf Vierhaus (1990). f orsc /wi ; «n S/xj/inu/ijfj/Wd, p. 86.
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The fundamental solution of the Althoff system was the creation of independent
research institutes directed by lop scholars.'" The institutes were built around a
scholar and set up in a way that satisfied the specific needs of the research program.
In the traditional system, the positions were determined by the teaching programs and
were filled with candidates who differed least from the ideal profile, whereas the
research institutes were modeled after the research program and the scholar.'"
To a certain extent, the emphasis on the talents of genius neglected the hard-working,
yet less brilliant professors, who were engaged primarily in teaching and management
activities. In Göttingen, the conflict between teaching and research was solved by
having the top scholars give advanced seminars, while the repetitive element of
education was left to the less research-minded professors.
5.2.3. Minorities
Academic performance and international recognition are two key words of the Althoff
system. A third major principle was Allhoffs policy of equal opportunity. He opened
academic jobs for members of previously excluded minority groups like Catholics,
Jews, Social-Democrats and atheists. He also upgraded the secondary education for
girls, so that by 1908 German women were allowed to study at Prussian universities.
Observation 30: Althoff gave scholars who belonged to a minority group equal
opportunities to an academic career.
The Social Democratic Party (SDP) was viewed by the Prussian authorities as a
revolutionary and subversive party. Therefore membership was incompatible with an
academic position because Prussian professors were state officials."* However, the
dissemination and discussion of socialist ideas at Prussian universities, called
socialism-of-the-chair, was allowed by the Ministry of Culture. Althoff protected
social thinkers like Werner Sombart (1863-1941), Ignaz Jastrow (1856-1932) and
Heinrich Herkner (1863-1932), but was not able to protect active members of the
SDP. Academic freedom was explicitly academic and did not extend to political
behavior.
Private lecturers (/>riva/<fozfi/en) were neither employed nor salaried by the Ministry
of Culture. They were not civil servants, but were given the right to teach by the
local university authorities.'" It was an important safeguard for academic freedom,
because a professor, who was dismissed, could always become an unsalaried lecturer.
174. See observations 16 and 21.
175. The GAttingen Association also created personal ordinary professorships, i.e. chairs linked to a
particular scholar. When this chairholder died, the position was liquidated or had to be
reestablished. These positions were created for Emil Wiechen (1861-1928) in 1904 and for
Ludwig Prandtl (1857-1953) and Hermann Theodor Simon (1870-1918) in 1907.
176. Membership of the SDP implied serious sanctions, mostly dismissal.
177. The unsalaried lecturer had to live from lecture fees and private wealth, or was supported by
his spouse and family.
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However, in 1898. a bill was passed thai allowed sanctions against private lecturers
who were members of the SDP."* The first victim was the Berlin physicist, Leo
Arons (1860-1919). Arons spelled out how Althoff supported him and how he
managed to delay the approval of the fox ,-iro/u for at least another three years"*
When the law passed eventually, Althoff improved the legal and financial situation of
the private lecturers, arguing that if they had to comply with the same rules and were
given the same disciplinary sanctions as the rest of the stale bureaucrats, the other
regulations had to apply as well'" Professor Hans Delbrtck (1848-1929). who fell
victim to a political trial set up by the Ministry of the Interior.'" also acknowledged
Althoff s personal support and his struggle for academic freedom.
Catholics and Jews rarely became full professor at a Prussian university,"*
especially at Königsberg and Halle, which had been founded as Protestant
universities.'" Althoff considered it a shame how Catholics. Jews and other
minorities were treated. He believed the ATu/runbvnp/ was political shortsightedness
which he would not tolerate. So, Althoff took corrective action. Despite Protestant
majorities in the faculties, he appointed suitable Catholic and Jewish scholars.'**
Althoff J merit with respect to equal opportunity of minorities was widely acknow-
ledged.
178. O J « Z i w r / f i d/> D/H/pZ/ndrMfrnd/m/j.w rfrr />rivar<fojr««t, better known as the
179. The / « / I r o r u would never he used again afterwards.
180. O J « Z 6?mr0ï <ƒ/> Di>ntfvrrj?r/i«i <frr /i/r/tfrirA/rr/icVn fl«im/rii (1852)
181 Delhrück had sharply criticized the German nationalist party in Pusen and the Germanization
policy in the region of Nordschleswig.
182. In 1880, there were only 59 Catholic (or 14.86 %) and 11 Jewish (or 2.77 * ) full professors
in Prussia of a total number of 397. By 1896, their number had increased to 79 (or 16 84 %)
and 17 (or 3.63 %) of a total of 469 chairs. An estimated 60% of the population was
Protestant, while 35% was Catholic About I % of the Prussian population practiced Judaism,
but 10 % of the student population was Jewish. Jewish scholars represented 15.5% of all
private lecturers, which was no longer reflected in their share of full and associate
professorships See: Bernhard vom Brocke (1980), Woduc/iu/- u/tf Hfrwucftd/bpo/M*. p 85
183. In Strafiburg as well, there were only two Catholic professors, as compared with 19 in the
secular faculties of Bonn and 14 in the secular faculties in Breslau. Founded by the Empire and
administered by the Alsatian authorities, the StraBburg faculties had obtained a sort of uncon-
ditional right of proposal and presentation Conscious of their relative independence from state
control, they had exercised the right in a biased manner and without any regard for the
conditions of the region. See: John E. Craig (1984), Sc7io/a/-j/i/p a/u/ /Va/ion-flu/W/nj?, p 150.
184. Althoff appointed e.g. the Jewish professors Harry Bresslau (1848-1926) in StraAburg and
Hermann Minkowski (1864-1909) in Göningen Eugen Goldscheid (I8SO-I93O). who made
famous discoveries in nuclear physics, plasmaphysics and electronics, was appointed as the
third observator at the Berlin Observatory. He was 45 years old. when he obtained his first job
with income security. The Jewish Nobel Prize winner in Medicine, Paul Ehrlich, gratefully
acknowledged that Althoff advanced his career and personal development. Althoff also
supported many Catholic scholars, who were often appointed at the Wilhelm-Univmity of
Munster in Westfalen. In 1893. Franz Hitze obtained a chair in Catholic sociology. In 1903,
Althoff appointed the Thomistic philosopher Clemens Baumker (1853-1924) as the successor of
the famous Protestant and New-Kantian professor Wilhelm Windelband (I848-I9I5) at the
University of StraAburg.
74 77K £comwrucj o/Scie/ice onJ Sc/u>/arj>u/>. i4n /4/uj/yjM o/ /A*
zw a*aVn/?/i»n, iw /c/i* /rUAer aVu ga/ize A/im'tfeyium _/bnn/?. £V ve-Wii/iaVrr* mf/ir an
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Discnmation baied on creed, beliefs and sex was gradually removed. In the archives
of Columbia University, Senn discovered that Althoff agreed that creed should not
influence the choice of exchange professors."* With the support of his informal
network,'" Althoff succeeded in appointing Schopenhauerian philosophers despite
their atheistic convictions which clashed with the state's tradition as the defender of
the Christian religion."* In 1908, German women were allowed to study at
universities. Althoff had prepared this measure in three steps: by a mission of Felix
Klein to the United Stales, by allowing American women to study in Germany and by
a reform of secondary education for girls.
5.3. Academic Freedom
Observation 31: The Ministry of Culture protected academic freedom as guaranteed
by the constitution.
Academic freedom was guaranteed by the constitution of 1850."* Many scholars
pointed out that academic freedom was not endangered by the bureaucratic
organization of the academic system."" On the contrary, the Ministry of Culture
effectively protected academic freedom and minority groups against oligarchic
faculties, academic interest groups, political parties and government.
Of course, the state financed the academic system and the Althoff administration
controlled academic appointments. This could always lead to conflicts with other
academic authorities. Academic freedom came under serious pressure when the state
dismissed Leo Arons (1860-1919). Nevertheless, Arons lost his job for his political
activities, not for his academic publications or teaching.
Effective protection of academic freedom also means that alternative views can be
advanced freely and that fear from competition is restrained. Althoffs equal
opportunity policy protected academic freedom in a sense that minority groups often
185 Quoted from a 1928 speech of the Catholic MP Carl Bachem in: Bernhard vom Brocke (1980).
HocArrfa/- U/K/ Wïj«/ucA<j/fyxrfi/i*, p. 87.
186 Pe«er Senn (1989), WV/r u /</rto^.», p. 25.
187. Althoffs most prominenl confidential agents in (he field of philosophy were Wilhelm Dilthey
(1833-1911). Benno Erdmann (1851-1921). Friedrich Paulsen (1846-1908), Hans Vaihinger
(1852-1933) and Eduard Zeiler (I8I4-I908).
188. In 1889. Paul Deussen (1845-1919) became full professor at the Faculty of Philosophy in Kiel
with Zeller's support. Deussen had been sanctioned before for being a scholar and defendant of
the atheist theories of Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860)
189 Article 20: "Di* WÏMwrtotfr W LWi/r rinrfjhri."
190 See: Bernhard vom Brocke (1980). Hoo/ucAW- unrf Ww«c/uj/»jpo/i /tt , pp 7-119
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hold minority views. The Ministry of Culture also followed the parity principle,
which was aimed at creating an open-minded academic community. In Breslau. the
leftist economist and social scientist Werner Sombart was appointed along with a
conservative co-professor. Julius Wolf.'" According to the same principle, the
liberal theologian Adolf Harnack had to work with an orthodox exegete, Adolph
Schlatter in Berlin.
While Althoff believed that the public administration had a responsibility in
countering vested interests retarding the performance of public institutions such as the
universities, he was equally convinced of the importance of the autonomy of
universities for the maintenance of academic freedom. Academic freedom, academic
self-management and public administration were considered a healthful combination
for an academic system to function well and to rule out abuses.
In 1901, Assistant Secretary (.SrAftonjra/) Karl von Kelle (1859-1935) was the first
delegate of the Austrian Ministry of Culture, who participated at the conference on
university affairs for German and Austnan officials, organized by Althoff. Kelle was
astonished about the degree of autonomy given to the universities by the German
administrations,'** whereas Austrian universities and scholars were used by the
administration in Vienna for internal political purposes. As long as university rights
such as the cooptation right were not abused to protect vested interests, there was
considerable room for scholarly initiatives in Germany.
5.4. Financial Resources
When Althoff started his reforms, the academic system was almost fully financed by
the Prussian state. Although public expenditures in real terms more than doubled
between 1882 and 1907,'" the continuous expansion of the academic system and the
changing organization of research necessitated new ways of financing. The equipment
for new lines of research, especially in the natural sciences, was very expensive.'**
Building on his confidential network, Althoff set up an innovative multi-source
financing system, in which the Prussian slate, local authorities, academies, industry,
banking and private sponsors participated.
191. Srrq/Jvo/riJu/- or punishment professorship.
192. Walter Höflechner (1991), "Zum EinfluR des deutschen Hochschulwesens auf österreich in den
Jahren 1875-1914', in: Bernhard vom Brocke (Hrsg.), tWjj«uc/w/frj«cWcA« u/irf
VWu«ucto#jpo/Jrt* im //K/urrn>zrua//fr, Verlag August Lax, Hildesheim, p. 156
193. See observation 14.
194. The chemical institute of Emil Fischer e.g. was very expensive. The buildings cost 1,380,000
marks, the research instruments 121,000 marks and the yearly budget amounted to 78,1)0
marks. The average budget of an institute fur physics at a university was 14,500 marks; a
chemical institute had to operate on 37,000 marks. The total budget of all 21 German teminart
of history together was 29,000 marks. See: Bernhard vom Brocke and Rudolf Viernaus (1990),
forcduui; on Spo/wu/ijj/irM. p. 86.
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Observation 32: Althof f built a multi-source financing system for the academic
tystem.
5.4.1. Prussian Ministry of Finance
Althoff visited the Ministers of Finance. Adolf Scholz (1833-1924) and later Johannes
Miquel (1828-1901), even at their holiday resorts to ask for additional funds. Miquel
admitted that Althoff was extremely well prepared for the budget talks. Gustav
Schmoller, who was on friendly terms with Miquel and Althoff, played an important
intermediary role in the process.'"
With creativity and opportunism, Althoff looked for additional financial means. He
used the boycott of the Charité-Hospital by ihe Health Insurance Funds and the Social
Democrats to obtain more state funds for the reorganization of the famous hospital. In
1887, he convinced a wealthy, retired extraordinary professor in medecine. Otto
KArner, to renounce his pension in exchange for the unsalaried title of honorary
professor. With this money, Althoff financed a new chair in ear-, nose and throat-
diseases at the University of Marburg behind the back of Ihe Minister of Finance."*
In comparison with Austria, the Prussian Ministry of Culture could react rapidly and
effectively in negotiations with future chairholders about working conditions and
financial compensation.
In order to finance new academic disciplines and to help Germany gain and retain
international recognition, the Ministry of Culture renounced the monopoly it had held
so far in the almost exclusively government-supported academic system.'" The
novel course adopted by Althoff was a multi-source financing of science and
scholarship.
195 Nicholas Balabkins (1989). From Sr/vnol/rr ro /Wrta^- Grarmje o / a Mrw Environmrw/br
Trdr/ii/iy and rtMrtjrrA in 5frdJi/>ur^[. /872-/S82. Paper Althoff Conference, Heilbronn.
16 pp. As mentioned earlier. Wilhelm Foerster was AlthofTs liaison to the previous Minister
of Finance, Adolf von Scholz.
196. Bemhard vom Brocke (1981a). /VruSürtu- Bitóunjjj/jo/i/i*. p. 742
197. Examples are the University of Strafiburg reopened by the German Empire, the University of
Frankfurt founded by the city of Frankfurt and the local chamber of commerce, the JCourr-
by the stale and industry.
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5.4.2. Local Authorities, Chambers of Commerce and Academies
Local authorities were invited to participate in the foundation of research institutes
and universities. They set up academies for practical medicine, business schools and
academies for local public administration."* The business schools were co-financed
by local authorities and chambers of commerce.'** The first privately endowed
university of Germany in Frankfurt, that utilized the financial capacity of that local
community, was thoroughly prepared by Althoff and Frankfurt's mayor, Franz
Adickes (1846-1915).™
Althoff created the first research professorships with the financial help of the Prussian
academy of science. This practice was rather unusual, since academies used to be
scientific clubs without a specific research task or any significant administrative staff.
The academy professorship of Jacobus van 't Hoff, which was later occupied by
Albert Einstein, has already been mentioned. Another example is Von der
Gabelentz."'
198. Academies for local public administration were set up by the cities of Leipzig (1898), Köln
(1901), Frankfurt a.M. (1901), Berlin (1906), Mannheim (1908) and Miinchen (1910)
199. The Berlin Business School was financed entirely by the local chamber of commerce, which
was the oldest in Germany. The Business School of Frankfurt was founded at the initiative of
the local chamber of commerce, the steel industrialist Wilhelm Menon (1848-1916) and mayor
Franz Adickes, in close cooperation with Althoff. The school prepared the foundation of the
private university of Frankfurt. Most of the financial means were raised by wealthy citizens of
Frankfurt (Wilhelm Menon, Georg Speyer (1835-1902). Jacob SchifT (1847-1920). Mathilde
von Rothschild).
200. At the start in 1914, the University of Frankfurt a.M. had a working capital of 15 million
marks.
201. The Leipzig professor Hans Georg von der Gabelenu (1840-1893) was a scholar of
international reputation. Althoff offered him a chair in east asian languages in Berlin, although
initially there was only budgetary room for an extraordinary professorship. When the
negotiations with the Ministry of Finance about budgetary increases for wage purposes failed,
Althoff turned to the academy members Theodor Mommsen (1817-1903) and Johannes Schmidt
(1843-1901). The Prussian academy of science agreed to pay von der Gabelenu a salary on the
condition he came to Berlin on a permanent basis. Von der Gabelentz accepted Althoffi offer
and became an unsalaried ordinary professor of sinology at the university and a salaried
member of the academy. See also: Barbel Boschan (1989). PM/ojop/i«c/i* fafadra/ m fl?r//n,
pp. 71-85.
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5.4.3. Industry and Banking
Scientific developments and the growing demand for knowledge had led to an
innovative institutional response: independent research institutes. Their survival
necessitated innovations in the financing of research as well. The research institutes
brought about joint financing schemes, which resulted in a closer co-operation of
public administration, industry and banks. Althoff was an excellent fund-raiser.**
The Dahlem project, worked out in the Araij*r-W/7/ie7m-G«W/jc/u2/r after his death,
reinforced the innovative alliance of science, state and industry that was brought into
being by Althoff.
Two early examples of mixed public-industrial financing were the Institute for Sugar
Research, which was a chemical laboratory set up by the Society of the Sugar Beet
Industry in 1866, and the Institute for Industrial Fermentation, which had been
founded by the Society of Alcohol Producers in 1874 and which served as a
experimental station for distillation. In both cases, the state provided buildings and
grounds, the industry financed the research infrastructure of the institute.*"
However, they were not fully independent, but affiliated to the Agricultural Univer-
sity of Poppelsdorf-Bonn.
The first independent organization was the PTR (1887). The financial means largely
came from private resources, in particular from Werner Siemens (1816-1892). The
budget was administered by the Ministry of Culture. In Frankfurt, Paul Ehrlich's
institute was financed by the city, the Speyer Bank and two chemical firms, Cassela
and Hoechst. Emil Behring worked with the Hoechst corporation as well, which was
represented by August Laubenheimer (1848-1904). The captain-of-industry, Henry
Böttinger (1848-1920) and the large enterprises of Bayer and Krupp financed the
Göttingen Association.*** Multiple financial sources were tapped to set up most
institutes.
5.4.4. Private Foundations
Before 1900, there was only one large private foundation."" It financed the
scientific publications of academy members in Berlin. After the turn of the century,
there was a proliferation of private foundations and money-raising organizations for
scientific purposes. Rasch asserts that the Prussian Ministry of Culture tried to
prevent these resources from ending up in unsubstantial funds by putting these
202. For example, in four months time. Althoff persuaded German sponsors to grant a total of
1.5 million marks for the Empress Friedrich Institute for Postgraduate Education in Medicine
in Berlin, which opened its doors in March 1906.
203. Bernhard vom Brocke and Rudolf Vierhaus (1990), ForjrAu/i; im Spannunj.t/rM. p. 90.
204. Friedrich Bayer (1851-1920). manager of the famous paint factories. became interested in the
financing of academic research by way of his father-in-law Henry Böttinger.
205. The Hrnmwin u/irf £/wr. jr/xwr/w /frcbminn. Wrn/zW Sri/run; was created in 1894 with an
endowed capital of l.S million marks.
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initiatives under central administration.** This danger was present e.g. in the state
of Baden, where the famous professor Vinccnz Czerny (1842-1916) could hardly raise
the money to set up his Institute for Experimental Cancer Research in Heidelberg.
The Prussian approach led to the foundation of the AfarseT-VVi/AWm-GMW/jcAqtf in
1911.»'
Private financing was a perfect way of advancing science without putting a burden on
the state budget. After 1900. the number of private foundations increased rapidly.*"
A large foundation for the advancement of scientific research was the Gottingen
Association mentioned earlier, which concentrated its efforts on applied mathematics
and physics."* The Koppel Foundation "for the Promotion of Cultural and
Scientific Relations Between Germany and the United States but also with Other
Culturally Important Countries, Particularly France* was a one million mark fund, set
up by the Jewish banker and industrialist. Leopold Koppel (1854-1933) in 1905.
Among other projects, it financed the weekly 'International Journal for Science, Cul-
ture and Technology*, the German Medical School in Shanghai, the German-Chinese
College in Tsingtao and part of the international professorial exchanges.
Some fund raising organizations were the StraRburg Scientific Society (1906), the
Rhine Society for Scientific Research in Bonn (1907) and the Organization 'Chemical
State Institute*, that raised one million marks in 1908 toward the creation of a
chemical institute in Berlin. The Friedrich Althoff Foundation gathered 200,000
marks for all kinds of scientific purposes. It was established after Althoffs death, but
206. Manfred Rasch (1990), 77IMMI zur AM(0focton tW««uctoi/fa/x>/m*. p. 241.
207. In 1911, the ftuCT-Wi/AWm-GHr/iscfci/r disposed of 15 million marks, which came from
private sponsors, industrialists, hankers and (he state.
208. Private foundations were established for specific purposes, e.g. by Joseph Florimond, Duke of
Loubat for a chair of American studies at the University of Berlin (1900, 300.000 marks).
Gustav Mevissen for the Business School in Köln (1901, I million marks). Wilhelm Merton
for the Business School of Frankfurt (1901. 2.1 million marks), Georg and Franziska Speyer
and Lucius Meister for chairs at the Business School of Frankfurt (1901. I million and
500.000 marks), Carl Christian Jügel for an auditorium and professorships of philosophy in
Frankfurt (1903. 2 million marks). Otto and Ida Braunsfels (for a pediatrie hospital in Frank-
furt. 1904, 150,000 marks). Edmund Siemers for an auditorium in Hamburg (1907), Henry
Bottinger (for a house for foreign students in Berlin, 1908), Eugen Tornow (for a chair in
natural sciences, Frankfurt, 1908), Heinrich Lanz (for the Business School of Mannheim,
1909), James Speyer (America Institute in Berlin, 1910). Jacob H. Schiff (chairs of social
economics and Semitic philology in Frankfurt. 1910), Arthur von Weinberg (chair of physics
in Frankfurt, 1910), Hans Meyer (chair of colonial geography at the University of Berlin,
1910). the Rothschild family (preparation of the University of Frankfurt, 1913) and profeuor
Cuny (financial aid for the research of lecturers at the University of Berlin, 1914, 200,000
marks according to his last will). Other funds were created among others by Theodor Stern
(for general medical purposes, 1901, 700,000 marks) and Rudolf Virchow (for general
scientific purposes. 1903. 200.000 marks).
209. Other large foundations were the 1 8 million marks Jubilee Fund of the German Industry
created in 1899 for the advancement of technical sciences, the Hamburg Scientific Foundation
of 1907 with a capital of 4 million marks and the Robert Bosch Foundation for the Technical
College of Stuttgart, set up in 1910 (1 million marks).
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was more important as a forum where the founders of the
jc/w/r would meet.
The directors administered the institutes, while the public administration acted as the
legal and effective safeguard of academic freedom against the commercial pressure
from the private sponsors. Sponsors could not determine the academic policy of the
institute they were financing, but, along with state officials and professors, they were
represented on the board to check potential waste of money.
5.4.5. Incentives lo Finance Academic Research
Kahlow correctly points out that the technical colleges - with university status since
1899 - and the applied research institutes have stimulated the initial interest of
industry and private sponsors to take part in the promotion of science and the
financing of the academic system. In this respect, Althoff furthered the development
of basic research by supporting the technical and applied sciences.""
Observation 33: Orders, ennoblement and licences were specific incentives to attract
private money for academic research
Althoff used several incentives to tap private resources for public purposes. Two
specific instruments were the conferment of orders and ennoblement in exchange for
financial support. Since Althoff did not have the authority to confer orders or ennoble
persons, he had to persuade others to do so.
Consider the examples of August Scherl and Henry Böttinger. In exchange for the
Red Eagle, a prestigious Prussian mark of honor, the publisher August Scherl (1849-
1921) made a contribution of 100,000 marks, which solved the deficit for the
construction of the Marburg Polyclinic.*" The invitation to donate 100.000 marks
for a house for foreign students in Göttingen was phrased in such terms that Henry
Böttinger felt honored to be chosen as sponsor. Later, Althoff arranged a heritable
noble title for Henry Böttinger. Ennoblement was a crucial step in social climbing and
was an important incentive for members of minorities.
Licences were an important incentive for corporations to grant financial support. At
his Institute for Experimental Therapy and Hygiene in Marburg, Emil Behring
continued research on diphtena and looked for serums for tuberculosis. The institute
210. Andreas Kahlow (1989). "Der Technikerstreit im lemen Drittel des 19. Jahrhunderts". in:
I.T.W.. FrifrfrirA /4/rtoJf/«.<«>-ƒ«05. Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR. p. 126.
211. Althoff used tactical means to finance the Marburg clinic. He promised his colleague Franz
Bohm in Baden not to issue a call to Berlin (Prussia) for a famous professor, who was working
at the University of Heidelberg (Baden). In return, the state of Baden had to grant the
'Z&hringer Lion" to August Scherl. At that time, the German Emperor could not grant a mark
of honor that was less prestigious than the Baden Lion. So. the Emperor granted Scherl the
"Red Eagle*, which was a much more prestigious mark of honor than he initially had wanted
to give.
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was financed by the Hoechsl corporation. In return. Hoechst obtained the licence to
mass produce the serum. This was clearly in the interest of Hoechst, but also of
public health because the Prussian state set the price of the anti-diphteria serum.
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6. Scholarly Behavior and Academic Institutions
6.1. Scientific Community
Assumption 3: The scientific community is an informal social organization
that coordinates the activities of scholars.
Ass. 4: The auditing procedures of the scientific community consist of the
continuing and alternating process of verification and dissemination of
academic output.
6.1.1. Verification
Proposition 1: The auditing and disciplinary procedures of the scientific
community exert such pressure on the scholars that it brings about a high
level of quality and accuracy in academic output.
Prop. 2: The scientific community generates and stores information about
the value of academic output.
6.1.2. Dissemination
Prop. 3: Dissemination of scientific knowledge is a necessary condition for
the audit of academic output by the scientific community.
Prop. 4: Well-organized libraries may improve academic performance by
lowering the search costs of scholars and by facilitating the dissemination
of scientific knowledge.
Hypothesis 1: The Althoff system stimulated academic performance by
keeping the scientific community open and by improving the dissemination
of knowledge.
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6.2. Transaction Costs of Academie Production
Prop. S: The transactional characteristics of academic production reveal a
need for a specific academic governance structure.
Ass. S: Transaction costs consist of the costs of information gathering,
contracting and monitoring.
Prop. 6: Monitoring academic production by using the market entails
substantial transaction costs.
Prop. 7: The voluntary auditing procedures of the scientific community
may lower the monitoring costs of academic production.
Hyp. 2: The Althoff system created a transaction-specific governance
structure for academic production.
6.3. Property Rights
6.3.1. Externalities
Hyp. 3: The hierarchical Althoff system captured more free externalities of
academic production than the decentralized academic system.
6.3.2. Principal-Agent Relations
6.3.3. Academic Organization
Prop. 8: The faculty system is patterned after the needs of the educational
system and of individual research activity.
Prop. 9: Research institutes are patterned after the needs of academic team
production.
Prop. 10: The ultimate control of the academic output of an institute
remains with the scientific community although team production clearly
offers internal monitoring advantages.
Hyp. 4: Althoff s independent research institutes and seminars stimulated
formal academic team production.
Prop. 11: The evaluation of academic output as an instrument of control
should be the rule, evaluation of input behavior the exception.
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6. Scholarly Behavior and Academic Institutions
The Althoff system is basically a set of institutional reforms and specific management
methods that were aimed at improving the performance of the Prussian and German
academic system. But how exactly did these reforms and methods influence academic
performance? The economic analysis builds on a model of the behavior and
interaction of scholars and tries to show how changes in incentives and constraints,
which are determined by the academic institutional setting, affect their performance.
f .1. Scientific Community
In his seminal work. Gordon Tullock provides a simple micro-economic model of
scholarly behavior.*" Two basic motives for doing academic research enter the
utility function of scholars: curiosity and personal income or wealth.'" Scholars
may engage in scientific activity as a hobby, i.e. motivated by pure curiosity, or they
may pursue research simply for their living, which is an induced type of curiosity. A
distinction is also made between basic research, which is primarily motivated by
general curiosity, and applied research, which is motivated mainly by a desire to
obtain practical objectives and applications. The curiosity of scholars is subject to
social guidance. The information inputs from other scholars are important in shaping
the problems which they investigate. Scholars read each other's articles (even of those
who lived long ago), and this influences their work. In turn, they are interested in the
approval of other scholars and consciously shape their research into projects which
satisfy the curiosity of other researchers as well as their own. If the system works
well, scholarly resources are allocated efficiently because information about the
benefits of employing resources in alternative uses is generated and persons are
motivated to take account of this information.
Assumption 3: The scientific community is an informal social organization that
coordinates the activities of scholars.
The social guidance of scholars takes place in the scientific community.*" It is an
informal system of voluntary cooperation, in which the individual scholar freely seeks
his own ends, but which leads him also to serve the ends of the others. Basically, it
212. Gordon Tullock (1966), 77v Orgamzorion o//n^uiry. Duke University Press, Durham N.C..
213. Although various other considerations may motivate scholars, Tullock argues that the motive of
pure and induced curiosity to obtain general and practical information is more intense among
scientists than among the rest of the population
214. It should be noted that the term jcifn/i/ir com/nu/ii/y is used to describe the scientific
^y specialized by fields.
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coordinates (he activity of scholars. Tullock argues that the extraordinary level of
reliability of academic output, the extreme precautions to insure accuracy and the
restraints from faking scientific results lie in the organization of the scientific
community.
"771* pu/pcif / . . / «5 fo /'nv£j/i£<ue rA* na/ure o/rnij JCÏ>W(/ÏC com/nww/y a«/ 10
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Assumption 4: The auditing procedures of the scientific community consist of the
continuing and alternating process of verification and dissemination of academic
output.
6.1.1. Verification
When a scholar believes he has developed a new scientific theory, he normally
verifies his research results by searching for new evidence which may contradict or
verify his theory. The process of checking a theory consists of collecting new
data.'" When the theory clashes with the new evidence gathered, it is ruled out by
the technique of falsification. But, being assured of the accuracy of the theory, he
typically publishes his results in a book or article."* After the initial dissemination,
the verification process by other scholars starts. Two techniques are used, repetition
and discussion,"* which, in turn, promote the dissemination of scientific
215. Gordon Tullock (1966). Orjanizar/o/i o//m/ufry, p. 8.
216. //>i</rm. p. 160
217. In the development of a new technology, a scholar typically runs various tests of the
instrument, in which the new technology is used. He also collects new empirical data to verify
his research results.
218. Dissemination of a new technology takes place when a new good using the technology, is
manufactured and marketed.
219. Scholars repeat research to detect and prevent false discoveries, which may be caused by
deliberate fraud, subconscious bias and pure accident The risk of detection is correlated with
the alleged importance of the discovery Therefore, research results that claim to have a
significant impact on scientific progress, are more likely to be repeated Some scholars may
completely repeat research experiments or the reasoning of a new theory, e.g. for teaching
purposes or when the use of 11 has failed to work. By doing so, they may notice errors and
report them. Repetition rules out most scientific falsities. Therefore, scholars have more
confidence in working with results that have been repeatedly tested, because it decreases the
probability of untruthfulness. In turn, they are sceptical about non-repeated experiments, which
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knowledge. Repetition rules out most of the scientific falsities that may be caused by
deliberate fraud, subconscious bias or pure accident. Since the risk of detection is cor-
related with the importance of the discovery, major impediments to scientific progress
are more likely to be detected by other scholars.
Proposition 1: The auditing and disciplinary procedures of the scientific community
exert such pressure on the scholars that it brings about a high level of quality and
accuracy in academic output.
By their very nature, the pure-curiosity scholars are only interested in the truth.
Therefore, they are likely to make considerable efforts to rule out most of the
inaccuracies in their work. The induced-curiosity scholars, however, may well
produce anything that their non-expert employers buy."° This would create a
serious problem for the institutes that employ this type of researchers, and would be
an impediment to scientific progress. However, all scholars are subject to (he strong
social control of the scientific community, which forces them to work accurately and
to search for the truth.
Tullock has argued that the accuracy and quality of academic production is simply the
outcome of the social environment in which scientists operate. The scientific
community counts among its members applied researchers and pure-curiosity
scholars. The former may waste valuable time and effort in trying to develop practical
applications of inaccurate or wrong theories, while the latter cannot make the desired
scientific progress. When the use of the original results fails, it reduces their research
productivity. Therefore, they are likely to report and protest this failure. Applied
researchers, however, are particularly likely to emphasize truth and protest false
discoveries. Subject to economic pressures, they have an incentive in developing their
products with a minimum waste of time. Consequently, a large part of the scientific
community is likely to be highly impatient with errors. Also basic researchers find
their academic output, personal income and promotion chances reduced, when they
have engaged in research that started from the wrong premises. To the extent that the
discovery of the falsity in itself is a major scientific achievement, they are likely to
report the disproof carefully. Because scholars make use of new inventions in
numerous and unpredictable ways, the chances that fraudulent or inaccurate research
is detected, would appear to be high.
The scientific community not only uses effective auditing procedures, it has an even
severer disciplinary system. While the discovery of important phenomena normally
greatly improves a scholar's prospects in terms of personal income, academic
promotion and access to research facilities, the failure of research results is likely to
219. ...
they probably repeat themselves when they want to set up new promising lines of research in
their own discipline. In addition to repetition, there is formal and informal discussion of
scientific issues. This may have considerable clarifying and stimulating effect! leading to new
discoveries, but it may also be pure waste of academic time and resources.
220. Their personal income being an increasing function of the amou/tf of research output
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have a pronounced negative effect on his career. When academic fraud is detected,
the scholar may well find his reputation demolished. He can expect to lose his
position, to be unable to get another academic job in his field and to find that the
learned journals are no longer interested in publishing his scholarly articles. The
scholar, whose income is correlated to his results, might get tempted to come up with
results by fakery. However, the probable long run effects of such fakery would be
detrimental to his career. Therefore, induced-curiosity scholars are held to fairly high
standards.
These standards are also implemented by mutual indoctrination of the moral principles
of science. The main reliance is not on indoctrination, but on a system, namely
membership of the scientific community, which makes it unprofitable to violate the
principle tenets of scientific honesty.
jcirnrtsr conjioVrin^ jom? proMtm */Km\j f Aar AM conc/unoru w/W nor on/y
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Nevertheless, scholars make mistakes and sometimes they are prejudiced. Because
they present their work for a large and highly qualified audience, which has an almost
exclusive interest in the truth, scholars are likely to obey the standards of the informal
organization, of which they want to become recognized members. Other human
motives like vanity, political ideology or devotion to own ideas, do account for
temporary deviations. But the auditing and disciplinary procedures of the scientific
community are likely to result in the correction of these errors by other scholars.
Proposition 2: The scientific community generates and stores information about the
value of academic output.
When the use of a scientific idea has failed to give the expected outcome, researchers
will explicitly verify the original insight, taking a closer look at the original reasoning
and methods or trying to regenerate the original data. But most of the time, they
verify original insights in an implicit way, simply by using them in their own
research. Applied researchers e.g. do not want to waste time and effort with verifying
the theoretical basis of their research. They just want to make applications that work
and use the available paradigms. But by using several theories to develop new
applications, they actually test and verify the validity of these theories all the time.
This constant use of scientific results by other scholars increases the probability of the
truthfulness of the original results. By their own activity, scholars constantly verify
the scientific ideas of other scholars. From this, it follows that the evaluation of
scientific output is an essential part of the academic activity. The knowledge is stored
in the minds of the scholars that compose the scientific community.
221. Gordon Tullock (1966), Orj;a>ii;<j/itW! o/V/i^uiry, p. 163.
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While original ideas are explicitly checked for their accuracy, a lot of verification
takes place as a free by-product of scientific activity. Applied research plays an essen-
tial role in the evaluation of academic output For that reason, applied researchers
have to be recognized members of the scientific community. Sometimes a tree of
knowledge is drawn which is used to prove that basic research is more important than
applied. However, since almost any discovery has another as its root, this kind of
argument, justifying one type of research over another, is really weak.
6.1.2. Dissemination
Proposition 3: Dissemination of scientific knowledge is a necessary condition for the
effective audit of academic output by the scientific community.
The verification process is integrated with the dissemination of the scientific
knowledge. Research output must be disseminated to other scholars, before they can
repeat or apply it, which then leads to further dissemination. The first step is usually
the publication and the reading of the article. The second step consists in filing the
information so that it can be found by other scholars. Each research project may set
off several lines of research until the original work is disproved. Therefore,
dissemination of scientific knowledge is a necessary, but insufficient condition for
verification. When a scholar is assured that he has made a significant discovery, he
usually publishes it in a learned journal or presents a paper at a conference. A more
specific method for the dissemination of applied research is the patented production of
a product which incorporates the newly discovered technology.
The volume or availability of publications should not make it impossible for a scholar
to cover his field or at least a large part of it. When the situation occurs that articles
are not read, it substantially affects the nature of the scientific process just described.
It makes it more conceivable e.g. that errors remain unnoticed because the work is
not repeated or applied. Scholars may get away more easily with fraud for a while.
When a scholar's career prospects are primarily determined by the number of articles
he produces, another significant effect is that the average article may not actually
increase human knowledge."*
Proposition 4: Well-organized libraries may improve academic performance by
lowering the search costs of scholars and by facilitating the dissemination of scientific
knowledge.
222. Therefore, there should be some minimum requirements for publication. In this respect, the
quality of editorial work is essential for a discipline. There is a clear incentive for editors to
seriously evaluate research output, because the prestige of the journal and the reputation of the
editors are largely determined by the opinion of the professional community, which evaluates
the journal mostly on its contents. To maintain several journals is a necessary safeguard for
original ideas and important contributions, which are turned down by mistake by one journal.
The fact that each journal considers an article separately is of the utmost importance from the
standpoint of giving new ideas an opportunity.
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Most of the information a scholar possesses is the result of formal education and self-
education."' The latter is the principal factor in the work of a scholar.** In this
respect, libraries function as storages of accumulated facts that provide a partial
solution to the limited capacity of the human mind. In helping to make information
available, they satisfy a necessary condition for the scientific auditing system,*" but
also help scholars to form new theories and invent new instruments.
The greater the speed with which a scholar can find what is already known about a
subject and the greater the security he can feel that he has actually found everything,
the better the system works. By consulting previous work of other scholars, he can
save time and use it to study a new problem. The library system has its limitations
though. The improvement of filing systems depends on the amount of resources to be
invested. There is also the difficulty of predicting the information wanted by future
scholars.
A scholar continues his search of the literature until he finds some information or
until he has exhausted the available material and returns to direct research. Because
the classification of knowledge influences his search efforts and results, cataloguing is
an important part and objective of scientific activity, which affects the performance of
scholars. All unnecessary information must be excluded so that the scholar has a
manageable job of self-education by depending on a reliable filing system. Normally,
the initial exclusion process has already taken place at the publication level. The
cataloguing system utilizes a further stage of exclusion because fields of knowledge
may be rather arbitrarily defined, using mostly historical subject categories and terms.
Crossfiling must exist to allow, for example, engineers to find information in the
traditional sciences. Improving the library and cataloguing system is likely to reduce
the search costs of academic production.
Hypothesis 1: The Althoff system stimulated academic performance by keeping the
scientific community open and by improving the dissemination of knowledge.
The vital role of the scientific community lies in the production, verification and
dissemination of scientific knowledge, in which applied researchers play a crucial
part. Althoff took structural measures that improved the working of the scientific
community. By granting the technical colleges the right to confer doctoral degrees,
engineers became emancipated members of the academic community. By combining
the findings of different traditional disciplines, they made essential contributions to
the verification of scientific knowledge. In this respect, many of the independent
223. As well as the result of accident
224. Productive scholars are likely to have a large part of their knowledge as the result of self-
education, because formally taught knowledge is rapidly out of date. The self-education
process turns on three sources: learned journals, scientific publications and conferences. The
learned journals disseminate new theories and serve as a file. Books often put information,
which has been available for some time, in a broader framework. In spite of the more social
character of certain meetings, a good deal of genuine professional discussion goes on at
scientific conferences.
225. Cfr. proposition 3.
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research institutes, especially the Göttingen Association for the Promotion of (he
Practical Use of Mathematics and Physics, played a similar role. To function well,
the scientific community has to remain critical and open for new ideas. The inter-
national professorial exchanges were just one way to obtain this goal "* Along with
a principle of moral justice. Althoff gave scholars of minority groups such as Jews,
Catholics. Social Democrats and Schopenhauerians equal opportunities for an
academic career.^' These minorities often held minority views, which encouraged
their opponents to remain extremely critical and accurate about their own theories.
The appointment of co-professors who held opposing view-points was another
measure to acquire some heterogeneity in the homogeneous (Protestant) faculties.
Althoff consistently improved the dissemination of scientific knowledge, which is a
necessary precondition for effective verification. In spite of much resistance. Althoff
introduced e.g. the requirement that a doctoral examination included a printed version
of the dissertation."* The German Economic Policy Association"" published the
discussion papers so that the information from the scholarly debate was not lost. Un a
larger scale, Althoff pushed the modernization of the library system in Prussia in two
ways He expanded the system and reorganized it Allhoff created e.g. an academic
education and career for librarians Scarce resources necessitated a policy of ,ScA>w-
punfc/£>iWu/],g for the library system as well. Therefore, an inter-library loan system
was established. This necessitated a uniform cataloguing system for Germany, which,
in turn, lowered the search time of scholars.
6.2. Transaction Costs of Academic Production
The Althoff system improved the informal organization of science and scholarship.
But how did the formal framework influence the academic performance of Prussian
scholars? Was the bureaucratic and centralized academic system an efficient response
to the needs of academic production?
The emergence of firms and bureaucracies has been explained by a kind of market
failure, namely transaction costs."" Consider the following example. In theory,
employers could go to the market and negotiate a contract over every single task.
However, it might cost too much to contract out each task whenever it has to be
performed. Then, employers rationally forgo the use of the (labor) market. By
making long-term deals with employees, they save on the transaction costs of search-
ing a qualified candidate every time and drawing up a labor contract for each specific
task. All long-term contracts are bundled in a hierarchical organization, where
employees are paid to perform their job as their superiors and employers instruct
them. It has been argued that bounded rationality and opportunism are the main
226. See observation 23.
227. See observation 30.
228. See observation 19.
229. Vt/wiJilrSocui/potott.
230. Ronald Coase (1937). 7V Alumrr o/tfv flm.
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sources of transaction costs."' Bounded rationality means that economic agents
have limited resources to gather information and limited ability to process it. Insofar
as it is costly for other agents to know and assess the behavior of these agents, self-
interest drives them to act opportunisticly.*" Transaction costs are then associated
with the containment of opportunism. The degree to which resources are vulnerable to
opportunism depends to a large extent on the transaction cost of monitoring.
Proposition 5: The transactional characteristics of academic production reveal a need
for a specific academic governance structure.
Three dimensions can be distinguished when describing transactions: the frequency
with which they take place, the degree of idiosyncracy involved in the investments
that are made for the transactions and the degree of uncertainty about the outcome of
the transactions. They apply to transactions of all kinds. The more transactions are
recurrent, entail idiosyncratic investments and are executed under great uncertainty,
the more need for a transaction-specific governance structure there is for transactions
to take place at all.'" Many academic institutes employ scholars on a long-term
basis. Their production entails very specific investments in both human and physical
capital. By its very nature, research is carried out under great uncertainty about its
outcome. To be efficient, the academic system should try to match its organizational
form with these transactional attributes. Otherwise, transactions costs are likely to
become prohibitive. Institutions are particularly important in an environment of costly
transactions and asymmetrical information.-" In general, the transaction cost
approach argues that efficiency can be improved by establishing an organization that
saves on the costs of using the markets."'
Assumption 5: Transaction costs consist of the costs of information gathering,
contracting and monitoring.
The distinction between transaction costs and production costs can be particularly hard
to make. Following Crocker,"* it has become customary in the literature on
transactions cost to distinguish between the costs of contracting, the costs of
231. Oliver E. Williamson (1985), 77ur Economic //ijmurion.5 o/GapiMtom.
232. Opportunism is more than the propensity to mislead and distort. Due lo the different inter-
pretation of limited or asymmetrical information, honest disagreements can also occur.
233. Oliver E. Williamson (1979) . "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, Jounui/ o/taw and Economic* 22, no. I, p. 259.
234. Institutions are unnecessary in a world of complete and costless information. Without
information, negotiating and policing costs, coordination could be perfectly decentralized,
because shirking and free-riding would be detected immediately.
235. The transaction costs of using the market are assumed to be larger than the costs of control
losses and principal-agent conflicts in the organization.
236. Thomas D. Crocker (1971), "Externalities. Property Rights and Transaction Costs: An
Empirical Study*, /ourna/ o/Ldw and Economic! 14, p. 451.
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monitonng and the costs of infonnation gathering."' These categories also
represent the cost categories suggested by Coase and Williamson
Proposition é: Monitoring academic production by using the market entails
substantial transaction costs
Academic administrators have great difficulty in monitoring academic production,
since the productivity of scholars is not easily inferred on the basis of quantifiable
variables."* When the value of output is hard to assess, monitoring input can be an
efficient way to measure productivity and to meter rewards. However, research input
is often unproductive or intangible For instance, it is hard to determine whether a
scholar who is looking through the window of his office, is actually thinking very
hard or simply enjoying the view. Moreover, a lot of productive scientific labor is
performed outside both working hours and the location stipulated in the academic
labor contract. Looking at the input side, it is often quite uncertain whether a certain
research approach really is the most suitable method and whether the problem under
investigation can be solved at all. It is also quite possible that a project leads to the
solution of a completely different problem. For the administrator of science,
monitoring input behavior reveals little information about the academic productivity of
the scholars he employs.
To assess the performance of his academic staff, the academic manager is bound to
evaluate the value of the output. Following assumption 2, it is also hard to gather this
type of information. The evaluation of academic output would require the help of true
experts, because it takes a scholar to judge the quality of another scholar's work.
Hiring these experts would entail high costs. A formal assessment of the performance
of a scholar would have to include the verification of his work, which would imply
the duplication of large parts of the original work, and an assessment of the scientific
relevance of his academic output. Following a human capital approach, the expert is
likely to be paid almost as much as the scholar who is monitored, while he duplicates,
much of the latter's efforts."'
Transaction cost theory would argue that an organization has to be set up to
economize on the high monitoring costs, which would improve the efficiency of the
academic activity undertaken. Since academic productivity is costly to evaluate, the
task of the science administrator is to devise a governance structure that saves on
monitoring costs. The emergence of academic institutions is best understood by taking
into account these transaction costs."*
237. JQrgen G. Backhaus (1989b), 'A Transaction^ Approach to Explaining Historical Contract
Structure', //tfrrnaruwu/ /frvtov <ƒ law anrf £awiomi« 9, pp. 223-226.
238. Cfr assumption 2.
239. Assuming that the ability to assess the genuine value of research output is determined by the
scientific proficiency of the evaluating scholar.
240. Private or public.
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Proposition 7: The voluntary auditing procedures of the scientific community may
lower the monitoring costs of academic production.
The evaluation of academic performance by the employing authorities on the basis of
objective and observable variables is inherently difficult. As a result, it is hard to
monitor academic production and sanction malperformance. However, the severe
auditing procedures of the scientific community reduce the probability of low-quality
production."' In determining the merits of scholars, administrators only play a
subordinate role. Ultimate control is not even in the hands of their university
colleagues. It is exercised by the scholars in the same discipline. Although their
judgement is not always right, the consensus of the scholars is fairly decisive.
Scholars are not infinitely capable, but their verification procedures are among the
strictest known.
o/ <7iW//W jritnr»» 15 nof a/twyj rigA/, few no fertW
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Proposition 6 pointed out that the monitoring costs of academic knowledge production
are quite substantial. If (he scientific community functions well in the way described
by (he model, (he necessary control of scholars takes place in (he scientific
community. Following Tullock, this mechanism guarantees the production of true and
accurate information. However, if scholars are capable of withdrawing themselves
from the control of the scientific community, active monitoring is of vital importance
for an efficient academic organization. Administrators can take effective measures to
prevent the isolation of scholars from the scientific community. By stimulating the
working of the scientific community and assuring that scholars are exposed to the
scientific community, they can lower the monitoring costs of academic production. If
the scholars can effectively protect themselves from having their research verified, the
administration faces serious monitoring problems.
Due to the verification and use of scientific ideas, scholars also constantly evaluate
other scholars in the course of their own academic activity. This knowledge, which is
stored in the minds of the scholars, is a free by-product of scientific activity. But the
question is how to obtain this confidential information.
Hypothesis 2: The Althoff system created a transaction-specific governance structure
for academic production.
The academic system in Prussia was a typical bureaucracy, run by a public
administration. The Althoff system pushed the bureaucratization process."' The
efficiency losses of bureaucracies are so considerable that transaction cost analysis
explains this type of organization in terms of the more subsUntial costs of using the
241. Cfr. proposition 1.
242. Gordon Tullock (1966). OjramianV»! of7n<piin>. p. 161.
243. See observations 5. 14 »nd 15
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market.'** From this, it is inferred thai the specific governance structure in the
Althoff era saved on the substantial monitoring costs of academic production. The
Althoff system certainly tried to adapt the institutional design of the academic system
to the changing nature of academic production. The growing academic system,
however, entailed ever larger production and transaction costs. Althoff worked out a
twofold method to economize on monitoring costs, while keeping enough pressure on
academic scholars to perform well: (1) improving the functioning of the scientific
community, and (2) gathering the valuable information that is stored in the
community and that is indispensable to evaluate scholarly performance.
The first element has already been discussed in hypothesis I. If the scientific
community is able to play its vital role, it makes enormous academic monitoring
efforts. For the second aspect, Althoff built an extensive academic information
network."' This method did require some degree of centralization because the
central receiver had to span almost the entire scientific community, whose members
typically work at different institutions.'** The Prussian bureaucracy used this
network to monitor its academic employees. It was better equipped than the decentra-
lized universities, that did not have a similar extensive and qualitative network.
Althoff gave top scholars their own independent research institutes thai were not
controlled by the bureaucratic authorities."' This underscores our rationale because
the costs of monitoring researchers of true genius are low.
Hypothesis 2 states that Althoff managed to solve the information-monitoring
problem, that is typical for academic management. But how did the Althoff system
use the information from the scientific community to stimulate academic
performance? And which institutional incentives and constraints affected scholarly
behavior? Property rights analysis studies the influence of institutional structures on
economic choice and behavior.
6.3. Property Rights
Property rights shape the institutions, in which they are specified, and determine the
content of incentives and constraints, which, in turn, are the underlying determinants
of performance."* The Coase theorem says that, if property rights are established
in a world without transaction costs, they lead to efficient production outcomes. In the
real world, however, transaction costs may lower or exceed the benefits of exercising
and establishing these rights. Coase's point is that a more complete specification of
244. With the attenuation of property rights in bureaucracy, a principal-agent problem may arise.
Then, incentives have to be created that motivate the academic agents to act in the principal's
interest.
245. See observation 25.
246. Monitoring by a central party also has considerable economies of scale.
247. See observation 16.
248. The owner of a property right has the right to use the good he owns (IUIU), to appropriate
returns from it (unu/hicruf) and to change its form or substance (otajiu).
o/Sci>nce-
property righu diminishei uncertainty and tends to promote an efficient allocation and
use of resource»."*
Which investments should be undertaken follows from the answers to the question of
what system of property rights brings about the desired allocation of resources.""
The property rights structure of the institutions determines the costs and benefits that
affect choice. The holder of a property right can claim the net benefits of the right
and thus has an incentive not to waste resources. So, a rational economic agent is
likely to take into account the true costs that affect the value of his property right.
This system is likely to yield an efficient allocation of resources because individuals
are motivated to take into account the costs and benefits of their actions. However, if
they can shift away the responsibility for their actions due to attenuated property
rights, opportunism may lead to an inefficient use of resources. Economic
performance is determined by the efficient distribution of property rights, i.e. the
institutional environment in which economic agents operate.
Given the nature of academic output."' it is not easy to establish and exercise
academic property rights. Transaction cost analysis already indicated that scholars,
who invest in expert knowledge and idiosyncratic human capital, have to be offered
certain guarantees.
n « a /orm o/ insurance w/ien rne" COJK ana" uncertain//'» q/"
a/? /iign. 77i* gr«i/fr rfo 5peda/;za//'on /../, /Ae more vve/g/u musr i e
/>u/ on rWiafr/r /'/u/iru/iom /Aa/ a//ow ina7viaW/.r fo engogf in comp/ex con/racrmj
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The property rights structure determines whether enough incentive is given for the
optimal formation of human capital and whether guarantees are built in for the later
use of human capital, which determines its value. The institutional governance
structure should also protect scholars from opportunistic behavior.
6.3.1. Externalities
The emergence of property rights and institutions has been explained by a kind of
market failure, namely externalities. The establishment of property rights has the
benefit of internalizing many spill-over effects."'' Demsetz has argued that a
primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater
internalization of externalities."* A lack of property rights precludes this. An
249. Ronald H Coase (1960). 7V ProM«n o/Soda/ Cow.
250 Louis De Alessi (1969), 'Implications of Property Rights for Government Investment
Choices", ^mrrican Economic /frvww 59, pp. 13-24.
231. Cfr. assumption 1 and proposition S.
252. Douglass C. North (1990), /vri/urioru. /nwfrurioiui/ 0uifl;r and Economic /Vr/brmasic«,
p. 34.
253. Ofrrif />artf>itf. property rights ire only established when the net henefits of the internaluz»tkin
are larger than the transaction costs involved.
254. Harold Demsea (1967), "Toward a Theory of Property Rights". /Immaw Economic
57. pp. 347-359.
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appropriate institutional environment may internalize the external benefits of academic
research, which otherwise would remain largely uncaplured by the academic
producers. The emergence of such an academic framework can be understood by
taking into account externalities.
m*u>i a/Zocarivf /ünrrion qfproperty riff A» to lA* infrrna/iM/uvi
a»/ Aarm/W e^ Srcrj, fA*n /Ar emergence o//jrt^vrrv rigA/j ran fce
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Hypothesis 3: The hierarchical Althoff system captured more free externalities of
academic production than the decentralized academic system.
In the Althoff era, the German academic system was growing rapidly To capture
some of the spill-over effects, the fragmented university landscape was administered
as one academic jyj/em by the Prussian bureaucracy. This policy captured the side-
effects of academic research on the work of other scholars at different institutions in
Prussia, which would be lost for individual universities. Because the increase in the
social value of a good tends to lead to a stronger specification of rights, it is not
surprising that the Althoff system exercised its academic decision rights more
strongly."*
Market failures like externalities are an important condition for government action. If
the external benefits are so diffuse that they are not captured by private investors,
then there is a potential role for the state. Many of the spill-over effects of academic
research to the economy are free, diverse and diffuse. Following a human capital
approach, academic research and training is an important determinant of economic
growth. The Prussian state could eventually capture the free externalities of academic
production through the growth in the tax base."'
researcA to a pure />uo//c good a/ia" ca/inoi /va/i/v t? wiartefea'. ,4caa'«mc
to /oato/ wifA ex/erna/ir;>5, am/ /Ato im/>/;>j rAa/ /AÉ acafcm/c
proceu ca/i/w/ raurt/y i f $c"(£/ïna/ic«/. 77ito to, of coune, rA? r«uo/i
wAy rA« Wategy q/" economic aVvWop/n^m purouw/ fry /A* P/mtia/i a*/ni/>iijfra/orj
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255 lAiicm. p. 350
256. See observation 15.
257. The Althoff system also used a system of state licenses to capture the economic benefits of
app/i>J academic research Like the patent system, it allows the self-financing of applied
research. In exchange for the right to mass produce the diphleria serum, the Hoechst corpora-
tion financed the research institute of Behring, who had developed the serum. While Althoff
secured the financing of the institute, the Prussian state took its cut by letting the price* for the
serum.
258. Jürgen G. Backhaus (1990). fojutojon and SW/rrju/a/iVwi bi (to K/i<»vfa/;« /«Kfanry. Paper
Symposium on Law and Economics. Lugano, p 16.
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6.3.2. Principal-Agent Relations
The problem of monitoring sometimes causes huge transaction costs, which may
hinder the full exercise of property rights. Attenuated property rights often lead to
principal-agent problems. An agency relationship is a contract under which a principal
engages an agent to perform some activity on his behalf and which involves the
delegation of some decision-making authority to the agent."* Being utility-
maximizers, agents do not always act in the interest of their principal, especially
when there is imperfect information about their actions. The principal can limit the
agency costs by monitoring the agent's behavior or by designing an incentive scheme
that motivates the agent to act in the principal's interest.''" If the principal has
limited information about the activities of his agents, he can still induce them to take
into account the true costs of their behavior by delegating property rights, which
motivates the agents to act efficiently. The principal should make sure, of course, that
the partitioning of property rights is not unintended.
The task of the science administrator is to design an incentive scheme that motivates
the academic scholar lo be and stay productive without an unintended partitioning of
property rights. The administrator should also find a monitoring technique that does
not entail prohibitive costs. If the scientific community functions well, such a
monitoring technique is available."' The incentives for productive scholarly
behavior are determined by the property rights structure which sets forth a cost-re-
ward scheme. The agency relationship can be substantially improved by a suitable
property rights system that gives the right incentives to scholars.
6.3.3. Academic Organization
Alchian and Demsetz claim that an organization that bundles a specific set of property
rights solves the monitoring problem better than a decentralized system can do.""
This bundle of five rights constitutes the firm, which is a type of institution that deals
with the monitoring-information problems more efficiently than the market. It is
characterized as follows. A central party has (1) the right of control over inputs and
outputs and (2) the right of control over the composition of the production team. All
contracts of the firm enter into the hands of (3) one central contracting agent, who
has (4) the right to claim the residual profit after all expenses have been met and (5)
the prerogative to change, sell or liquidate the organization.
259. M.C. Jensen and W.H. Meckling (1976). "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure", Jou/na/ o/fïmjflcia/ £cwiomicj 3. p. 308.
260. Agency costs are the sum of the monitoring costs and the residual losses of the principal plus
the bonding costs of the agent.
261. See proposition 7.
262. A. Alchian and H. Demsetz (1972), /Wurrion. /n/bmtariVw! Cewtt anrf Economic
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The combination of these property rights, that are exercised by a central agent,
reduces the monitoring-information problem of team production better than a
decentralized system does. The cost of monitoring the production by a central
monitor, who disciplines himself because he is a residual claimant, is low relative to
the cost of attempting to measure the marginal output of team members. The firm is
particularly suitable for r«vri production."" However, there is no reason for the
firm to be uniquely related or even highly correlated with team production. Il may be
used equally probably as a viable solution to other sources of monitoring costs Each
source of the information problem can entail specific monitoring costs, which a
specific distribution of property rights may reduce. The Alchian-Demsetz model
describes five property rights thai determine the working of an organization The
analysis in the following chapter tries to point out how the distribution of these rights
may influence academic performance.
In the traditional (German) faculty system, (1) the control over inputs and outputs is
dispersed. While output control is basically left to the individual faculty member,
input behavior is monitored by insisting on the observance of certain professional
rules of conduct. (2) The decision right of appointing academic team members is nol
concentrated in the hands of one decision-maker. (3) Faculty majority voting is an
often used technique here. (4) The residual claimant is the individual professor, but
this status is undermined because the externalities generated by the academic
production remain dispersed and unclaimed. In Germany, (5) the right to found, close
or substantially change the academic production unit remained with the sovereign. As
a conclusion, it is fair to say that the traditional university system does not have the
property rights structure of a classical firm.
Backhaus has argued that the Althoff system can best be understood as a concerted
action to run the Prussian academic system "as if" it were a classical multi-divisional
firm."* The state official Althoff was the central manager, who controlled academic
inputs, monitored academic output, selected and appointed academic staff and
implemented major changes in the existing system. The state became a partial residual
claimant due to the growing tax base. Although the firm is not uniquely related with
team production, Backhaus tries to show how Althoff s institutional innovations fulfill
the original Alchian-Demsetz conditions of team production in order to fully exploit
the advantages of the firm structure. However, many academic activities are highly
individual efforts.
Proposition 8: The faculty system is patterned after the needs of the educational
system and of individual research activity.
263. When team production is more productive than individual production, individual contributions
to the total product are not separable and individual marginal productivity of the team member»
is difficult to determine. Therefore, in the classical firm, individual marginal productivity it
monitored at the input side and assessed by a central coordinator. Due to the input monitoring
problems, the classical firm structure can not j/mp/v be adopted for the organization of
academic production.
264. See: Jürgen G. Backhaus (1989c), "The University at an Economic Institution". Wonb/ig
9.017. University of Limburg. 29 pp
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Academic research is very often carried out by scholars who work by themselves.
The traditional German university system was exactly patterned after this type of
research. Faculty members are combined in faculties for teaching purposes and work
independently from each other. Their productivity is not dependent on the
productivity of a colleague, who may teach completely different subjects, but on the
informal cooperation with other scholars in the scientific community who work at
different locations. Although there is little team production in the faculty system in
the Alchian-Demsetz sense, this need not imply that the firm structure is inadequate
for academic production.'*'
Some academic activities can be carried out by formal team production. By its very
nature, multi-disciplinary research is a candidate. Data collection is also susceptible to
team production. Research can be done by the formal cooperation of many scientists
working on essentially the same research program. In these cases, the productivity of
one scholar clearly depends on the work of the other. Formal team production is a
feasible solution for some academic activities. However, the truely productive
moment of scientific discovery remains in many cases the outcome of the mental
activity and ingenuity of the individual members."* This does not preclude (hat
research is a highly cooperative activity. Most of the interaction between scholars,
however, takes place in the in/brma/ scientific community."' In team production,
the interaction with academic colleagues may play a similar role.
Proposition 9: Research institutes are patterned after the needs of academic team
production.
When the specific scientific requirements of concerted research programs require the
formal cooperation of many scholars, specific institutional responses are needed,
because the traditional faculty system is not patterned after this type of research.
Specific research institutes may accomodate team production. This system has the
advantage compared with the traditional faculty system e.g. of having more strictly
defined measures in terms of the research program by which to monitor the academic
performance of its members. However, it is not certain whether the team auditing
procedures lead to a better performance than those of the scientific community. If the
team has a monopoly and is capable of withdrawing itself from the control of the
scientific community, the quality of the output is likely to diminish. This reinforces
our assertion that the informal aspects of scientific team production remain important,
which leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 10: The ultimate control of the academic output of an institute remains
with the scientific community although team production clearly offers internal
monitoring advantages.
265. As mentioned earlier, the firm is not uniquely related to team production.
266. It is often argued that medical progress is related to the systematical treatment of large
numbers of patients, requiring a team of physicians. However, a new medical procedure is
often discovered (produced) by one physician, who applied it on just one patient
267. See assumption 3.
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Hypothesis 4: AlthofFi independent research institutes and seminars stimulated
formal academic team production.
In the Althoff system, large research projects were organized in a new institutional
form, namely seminars and independent research institutes ** Each independent
research institutes was directed by an outstanding scholar, who laid out the program
and coordinated the activities of his collaborators Since the scientific reputation and
residual income of the director depended on the performance of his institute, he had a
dear incentive to monitor his collaborators. In the seminars, which were also
conducted by prominent scholars, young scientists were educated to do research in a
formally interactive way. They worked together on a specific research program. For
example, the historical-economic research program laid out by Gustav Schmoller
could only be carried out as a common venture. The same was true for the historians
and archeologists. With the creation of large laboratories, natural scientists, who had
been educated in different disciplines, also began an intense formal cooperation.
Medical progress in the Althoff era was also related to the construction of large
clinics, in which large numbers of patients with similar conditions could be treated
with a new medical procedure or drug
Proposition 11: The evaluation of academic output as an instrument of control should
be the rule, evaluation of input behavior the exception.
Backhaus has argued that
"Mow 5cno/ar/y uwrfc « o/" a &/K/ JMC/I /feu /« va/u? can fr* aj«rra/n«/ on/v fry
rey>«/rion. 77u'i IJ a/i exrrevnW)' rim^-co/uumi'^ approach /or
<7«a/iry, ant/ cwtiÉflUÉn//y araaVmt'c pro/i»$5/<wu ;«nJ fo dVvWop fl cafe
H-i// u/ufcr nomm/ c/rcK/rwfa/icM arcma/n />rop*r ana" rW»ai>/f r«u/«. /../
/npitf « /A* on/y way ro
proa"«cfiv/ry can o«/y i>* ajjM^a' ^fr r^am, nor
/o
However, most verification takes place as a free by-product of scientific activity.
Scholars may sometimes engage in the repetitive verification of the work of others,
but most of the time they evaluate scholarly output in the course of their own research
activities. Professional ethics, the strength of which is not so easily observable, play a
secondary role in controlling academic performance. Many scientific discoveries are
even made by accident or non-conformistic behavior. The indoctrination of
professional standards is not the main instrument of control. Instead, the disciplinary
procedures of the scientific community do modify scholarly behavior to cautiously
produce reliable research results.
The evaluation of academic productivity by monitoring output is more difficult,
however, in the case of team production and young inexperienced scholars. In spite of
the problems with monitoring input behavior, the marginal productivity of scholars
268 See observations 16 and 17
269 JQrgen G. Backhaus (1990). fojutoton. p 14.
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who are engaged in team production can also be assessed at the input side. The
team's monitor can observe whether a scholar adheres to some code of academic
conduct in the team or whether he has obtained intermediate research goals.
Monitoring input performance by a peer is also practically the only way to assess the
performance of a junior scholar, because there is little output yet. This does not imply
thai young scientists should not be exposed to the scientific community. With few
exceptions, academic control takes place in the scientific community. Following
proposition 6, reciprocal monitoring among scholars is a rational solution, because the
costs of specialized management of academic input are rather substantial. In our basic
model of scholarly behavior, there is no active role for a central monitor. Yet, a
central manager can actively stimulate the system of control by trying to keep the
scientific community open, thereby introducing more competitive pressure.""
Property rights shape the institutions, in which they are specified, and determine the
content of incentives and constraints, which, in turn, are the underlying determinants
of performance. Following Alchian and Demsctz, the following property rights are
studied in more detail:"' (1) the right to appoint the members of a faculty or
academic institute, who determine its performance; (2) the right to monitor academic
performance, reward productive and sanction unproductive scholarly behavior; (3)
residual claimancy, if the academic residual can be captured; (4) the right to change
(part of) the structures of the academic system, i.e. the agreed or innovative
reallocation of property rights; (5) the existence of a central party common to all
inputs, which creates a bureaucracy. It has been pointed out that the classical firm can
deal with different information-monitoring problems, not only those associated with
team production. Jensen and Meckling have confirmed that the emphasis placed on
joint input is too narrow. The problem of agency costs exists for all contractual
relations, independent of team production.'"
Scholars respond and adjust their behavior to the institutional environment in which
they work. Different organizational designs provide different incentives to scholars,
which affect academic performance. Since the Althoff system implemented several
institutional innovations, our analysis tries to show how a different distribution of
property rights influences academic productivity. To answer the initial question of
how the organization and change of the Prussian academic system affected academic
performance, the institutional differences between the traditional university system
and the new academic system are studied in terms of property rights.
270. Hypothesis 1 pointed out that Althoff appointed outsiders in homogeneous faculty structures,
emancipated the technical colleges and set up international professorial exchanges in order to
keep the academic community open. Building on the traditional structures, AlthofT introduced
new forms of direct regulation, aimed at the dissemination of research results and the
deregulation of discriminating procedures. This indicates that an administrator of science can
take corrective action toward scientific community failures.
271. See chapters 7 and 8.
272. M.C. Jensen and W.H. Meckling (1976). TVory o / ' V ATm, p. 310.
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7. Academic Property Rights
and Scientific Production
7.1. Academic Appointments
7.1.1 Cooptation Right
Proposition 12: It is rational for faculty to be ignorant about the research
performance of present and potential faculty members.
Hypothesis 5: Althoff improved the selection of academic scholars in
Prussia by processing information generated by a network in the scientific
community.
7.1.2. Screening of Candidates
Prop. 13: The quality of the screening and subsequent signaling variables
in selection procedures, determines academic performance.
Hyp. 6: The Althoff system stimulated academic performance not only by
appointing productive scholars, but also by the incentive value of its
screening method.
7.1.3. Residua] Claimancy
Prop. 14: The right to claim the residual gives an important incentive to
the holder of the right to carefully monitor academic scholars and evaluate
candidates.
Prop. 15: The academic residual can take the form of increased academic
reputation or of increased revenues from an increased tax base.
Hyp. 7: The Althoff system improved the quality of academic appointments
by having the residual claimant make the final decision.
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7.2. Academie Compensation
7.2.1. Implicit Contracts
Prop. 16: Academic compensation, which is not likely to reflect the
marginal productivity of a scholar, functions as an incentive for academic
performance.
Hyp. 8: The Althoff system is likely to have set an efficient level of
compensation, since the residual claimant determined academic rewards.
7.2.2. Academic Salaries
Hyp. 9: In accordance with human capital and implicit contract theory, the
Althoff system paid low starting salaries for young scholars and huge
wages for top scholars.
7.2.3. Research Facilities and Prizes
Prop. 17: Research facilities and scientific prizes are likely to stimulate the
performance of the pure curiosity scholars.
Prop. 18: Salaries and non-specified monetary prizes are likely to stimulate
the performance of the induced curiosity scholars.
Prop. 19: Non-specified awards may provide a stimulus for basic research,
much as the patent system works for applied research.
7.2.4. Academic Tenure
Prop. 20: Tenure is likely to lower academic performance, unless the
scientific community continues to perform its auditing and disciplinary
role.
Prop. 21: Academic tenure may entail substantial rent-seeking costs as well
as benefits
Prop. 22: Tenure protects the idiosyncratic investments of the tenured
scholar.
Hyp. 10: The Althoff system reduced the disadvantages of academic
tenure.
7.2.5. Teaching and Research
Prop. 23: The salary system is better attuned to the dual academic
production of teaching and research than is the (strict) fee system.
Prop. 24: Teaching and research can be separated as long as academic
output is freely disseminated.
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7. Academic Property Rights
and Scientific Production
Did the Althoff system allocate resources efficiently? How did it select and appoint
academic scholars? Was there a consistent compensation package that motivated
Prussian scholars to perform well? The first property right is the right to control input
and output. In the academic system, this means monitoring scholarly activities and
assessing the productivity of the academic scholars. It also implies the rewarding of
productive behavior and the sanctioning of malperformance. The second property
right is the right to hire (and fire) employees. This task consists of selecting and
appointing scholars. Let us look at this responsibility first.
7.1. Academic Appointments
7.1.1. Cooptation Right
When faculty decide whom they want as a new member, they exercise their so-called
cooptation right. This cooptation right of faculties, which is still widespread, is
viewed as an important safeguard of academic freedom. Although the employing
authorities may officially appoint the new academic scholars, they typically ask
faculty for an opinion concerning the academic credentials of candidates and leave the
outcome of the decision to the university professors. This procedure was also
customary in Prussia. The university that had a vacant chair to fill was asked by the
Ministry of Culture to suggest a candidate. Although the appointment was made by
the sovereign, the faculty proposal was approved most of time.
Proposition 12: It is rational for faculty to be ignorant about the research
performance of present and potential faculty members.
Most of the vital information about the productivity of a scholar and the value of his
research output is known to the scientific community in his field."' The members
of this community typically work at different institutions at different locations,
dispersed for teaching purposes. In turn, the traditional faculty is composed of a large
number of scholars, who are active in different disciplines.™ Indeed, the university
community is not identical to the scientific community of scholars in a certain field.
Only a few members of the faculty are likely to work in more or less the same field
as the candidate, while the majority of faculty members is more or less ignorant about
273. See proposition 2.
274. See proposition 8.
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his qualifications.'" Because their marginal productivity is not substantially affected
by appointments in other disciplines, faculty members invest little time and effort in
evaluating a candidate and remain rationally ignorant since it is already hard to keep
up in their own disciplines.
The selection of candidates is, therefore, often delegated to a small committee with
members who work more or less in the same field as the candidate. These faculty
members may have a direct incentive not to appoint the best candidate, if their
position and share of the budget is to be negatively affected by adding dynamic and
new members. On the other hand, a less able candidate might inflict damage to the
reputation of the faculty, which reduces the ability to raise funds. However, faculty
reputation is a public good. The benefits of having the best candidate, who might
increase the reputation and the total budget of the faculty, is shared by many, while
the cost is borne by the individual committee members who have to invest time and
effort in assessing the performance of a candidate in a discipline they are not so
familiar with. This creates a free-ride incentive for these committee members to
remain largely ignorant about the qualifications of the candidate.
If most faculty members remain rationally ignorant about the academic credentials of
a candidate, other criteria become more important for appointment decisions. It seems
reasonable to argue that this will not lead to the consistent appointment of the most
suitable candidates. The cooptation right, exercised by small preselecting committees
and subsequent faculty majority voting, tends to lead to the preference of better
known over better qualified candidates. Indeed, the cooptation right has been used as
a discriminatory instrument aimed at professional homogeneity. In Prussia, Protestant
faculties discriminated against Catholic, Jewish, atheist and Social Democratic
scholars for no other reason than their convictions. This practice was partially over-
come by stimulating scientific competition and by keeping the academic community
open, which forced faculties to take the best candidate irrespective of race, sex or
religion.*™
A fundamental solution lies in the design of a system that gathers reliable information
about the academic performance of scholars, which is stored in the scientific
community. Such a system would have to create incentives for the vital information to
be released and to be transmitted without distortion. The valuable information would
have to be processed appropriately as well.
Hypothesis 5: Althoff improved the selection of academic scholars in Prussia by
processing information generated by a network in the scientific community.
Althoff had observed that the cooptation method had failed to bring about the desired
results in Germany.'" But in order to make better appointment decisions himself.
275. Since only a few faculty members are likely to work in more or less the same field as their
present colleagues, the majority is quite ignorant about their qualifications as well.
276. Cfr. hypothesis I.
277. See observation 27.
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he needed accurate and specialized information about the academic performance of
candidates. This information is typically stored in the scientific community. So, he
confidentially consulted other scholars. This direct monitoring of output performance
is what made Althoff legendary. Because the scope of science was so large, it was
necessary to maintain a whole n^rwort of confidential agents. It was his accomplish-
ment to have established this network of experts in virtually every relevant discipline.
This allowed him to gain the advice of different experts in the same discipline '"
The network, which embraced the scientific community, generated the information
that was needed in order to substantially improve the selection of scholars in
comparison with the faculty cooptation system. Following proposition 6, it also
lowered the transaction costs in the Prussian academic system.
7.1.2. Selection of Candidates
Proposition 13: The quality of the screening and subsequent signaling variables in
selection procedures determines academic performance.
Spence and Johnson have argued that the main function of an academic education is
not to increase the skills and knowledge of students, but to provide a screen that
determines which students are able to obtain important positions.*™ Passing the
screen has important signaling value in the labor market. Wolpin tested the screening
hypothesis, but found evidence in support of the standard human capital theory.*"
However, the real issue concerns not the mere existence of one or the other effect,
but the extent to which education performs each of these roles."' Garner has
applied the model to the case of scholars being screened for initial employment and
subsequent promotion. He argues that the common practice of screening on the basis
of quantity of publications
"may Was r««jrc/i dVcw/'onj toward o/T/wdox, /ow-rait prey>ctt,
r/ie ooW Aypof/iMeM a/id vigorous cowipem/o/i /je-CMjary
adva/ice. ""*
While publication is an essential scholarly activity, problems arise when objective
variables are considered to be the sole signal of professional ability. Screening on the
basis of the number of publications induces scholars to pursue conventional, instead
of innovative, research. Indeed, screening practices sometimes help to explain the
patterns of scientific development. The methods ultimately determine signaling
pressures which affect the nature of academic research and influence the choices of
278. See observations 25 and 26.
279. Michael Spence (1973), "Job Market Signaling". 0"<«"*y A W I M / o/Economic* 87, pp 355-
374, and Harry G. Johnson (1973), 'The University and Social Welfare", Aft/Knu 11, no. 1,
pp. 30-52.
280. Kenneth I. Wolpin (1977), "Education and Screening", /fcn^naui £co/u>mJc fcvtew 67, no. 5,
pp. 949-958.
281. (Mdrm, p. 957.
282. Alan C. Garner (1979), "Academic Publication, Market Signaling and Scientific Research
Decisions', Economic /nouiry 17, p. 575
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scholars. This need not be detrimental to scientific development per je\ It just
depends on the type of screening variables the employing authority uses.
Dependence upon a quantitative variable such as the number of publications might
lead to a proliferation of minimum publishable articles that have a minimal added
value, while citation counts induce the creation of citation cartels. Personnel policy
determines academic performance to the extent that scholarly productivity is taken
into account and to the extent that there exist signaling incentives which favor either
established or innovative research strategies. To improve academic performance,
remedies may come from the screening methods used by the employing authorities.
Hypothesis 6: The Althoff system stimulated academic performance not only by
appointing productive scholars, but also by the incentive value of its screening
method.
Following hypothesis 3, Althoff managed to select productive scholars by using a
network, which he had carefully built in the scientific community. The combination
of propositions I and 13 leads to (he conclusion (hat the selection of suitable
candidatei on the basis of informauon from the scientific community also improved
academic performance by using the high standards of the scientific community as
signaling pressure. The informal scientific community played a formal role in the
performance-based Althoff system.
Maintaining the quality of the network was, therefore, of the utmost importance for
Althoff. The subjective information on the performance of a candidate-scholar had to
be as unbiased as possible.*" The independent information of numerous top scho-
lars was evaluated on accuracy, speed of response and unanimity.*" Although they
may not have been under great pressure to give correct information under the shield
of the confidential procedure, their membership depended on the quality of their
information. Biased judgements about scholarly performance could easily be detected
by comparison with the other members that were consulted. However, there was also
an important incentive for these strategic network members to keep sending accurate
information. Abuse of the trust, built between Althoff and them, could have serious
career consequences and exclusion from the network.
283. For a young scholar, most of the indicators of scientific performance are not yet available.
Therefore, an evaluation is made on the basis of a number of input variables. To make
appraisals by peers as accurate as possible, there should go some credit for the training and
recommendation of new scholars to their academic superior, while some of the blame for
inaccurate appraisals should reflect on this senior scholar as well.
284. The members of the confidential academic network, who belonged to different institutes, were
often asked for their opinion about a scholar. Althoff was more confident in appointing the
right candidate when they unanimously proposed one specific scholar. He would be suspicious
if faculty proposed another.
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Katz found out that some administrators of science do try to assess the research
ability and national reputation of scholars, in addition to their publication record.*"
Teaching ability and public service to the university had less influence on their
personnel decisions. The administrators revealed that they could assess the quality of
a publication by noting whether or not an article was rated good by experts and was
published in a quality journal, and whether or not a book received good reviews. At
our analysis pointed out. they looked for judgements by experts from the scientific
community. But the outcome in this case depends on the quality of the formal
reviewing and editorial process, whereas most evaluation remains unpublished and
stored in the informal scientific community. Sound decision-making is dependent on
the ability of the administrator to understand, interpret and critically evaluate the
scientific comments from other scholars, whereas Allhoff asked for direct statement»
on the position of a scholar in the scientific community. Katz did not point out either
whether these administrators could overrule faculty decisions if they had another
opinion about the quality of a candidate.
7.1.3. Residual Claimancy
Proposition 14: The right to claim the residual gives an important incentive to the
holder of the right to carefully monitor academic scholars and evaluate candidates.
This is the basic argument of the Alchian-Demsctz scheme. The agent who can claim
the residual has an incentive to monitor (inefficient behavior and evaluate new
employees. Because he is more likely to invest in an appropriate evaluation technique,
it follows that he is also granted the right to make appointments in spite of the
problems associated with the evaluation of performance.
Proposition 15: The academic residual can take the form of increased academic
reputation or of increased revenues from an increased tax base.
Following property rights theory, the information-monitoring problem can be
reduced, if the monitor is the residual claimant. The residual has a special form in the
case of public goods and externalities. When consumption is free or not excludable,
no proceeds are generated that can create a residual. In that case, residual claimancy
is not fully exercised. Academic production may not produce a residual that can be
easily claimed.*"** Even if there is a residual, the university is often a nonprofit
organization, which cannot distribute the residual among owners.'" It is held in
reserve or used for the future expenditures of the organization.
285 David A. Katz (1973), 'Faculty Salaries, Promotions and Productivity at a Large University",
/4wric<w Economic /frvtov 63, no. 3, pp. 469-477.
286. The patent system allows the capture of some residual gains from applied research. It assigns a
private property right to knowledge. The focus of our analysis, however, is on academic out-
put, which often takes the form of a public good, loaded with free externalities.
287. A.G. Holtmann (1988), "Theories of Non-Profit Institutions". 7o«ro<j/ a/Economic Sttrvry» 2,
no. 1, pp 29-45.
110
In a sense, however, scholars can be said to be the residual claimants of their own
academic efforts The residual may take the form of an increase of their reputation in
the scientific community. When academic output is put to productive use. another
residual claimant appears in the form of the tax authority/** Assuming that
academic teaching and research stimulate economic progress, the state has a larger tax
base upon which to levy taxes. For basic research that is not yet put into practical
use, the scholar can be viewed as the sole residual claimant. The residual of applied
research can also be the patent-holder or the tax state. As far as teaching is
concerned, a lecturer may exclude some students and charge lecture fees.
When the cost of excluding nonpurchasers is great, private production of public goods
does not seem practical. If no consumer can be excluded, all may tend to underreveal
their true marginal willingness to pay for the good. It may be possible, however, to
tie in the consumption of a second product with the consumption of the public good.
Private incentives may very well exist for the production of the tied-in good."* The
tie-in mechanism does not automatically lead to the efficient private production of
some public goods, but may create a residual for the private sponsor.
Althoff used some tie-ins. Special favors or circumstances were used to secure
resources from private sponsors. Every conceivable source could be tapped in
exchange for special grants, promotions, ennoblement, orders and other
distinctions."" Sometimes, sponsors were attributed property rights. In the
Göttingen Association and the A^a/ier-Wi7/ip/m-G«f//jc/iq/t, private sponsors and the
state were represented in a board that monitored the rational use of resources in the
academic institute. State representatives protected the research program against
commercial pressures. The sponsors exercised a sort of input control, while the
output control was left to the scholars and the scientific community. Providing and
securing financial resources is an important task of the academic administrator. The
long-term approach of certain research projects requires a stable financial basis for
academic production. The multi-source funding approach successfully integrated the
private sector and made the system less vulnerable to political interference, while
strengthening its financial base.
Hypothesis 7: The Althoff system improved the quality of academic appointments by
having the residual claimant make the final decision.
In the Althoff system, appointment procedures differed between the traditional
universities and the independent research institutes. In spite of the cooptation right,
faculty members were selected and appointed by the central Prussian administration,
while institute directors could freely choose institute members. Since the institute
director was entitled to the financial residual and owed his reputation to the
performance of his institute, he had a clear incentive to monitor his collaborators and
288. Or the pitent-holder.
289 Harold Demsett (1970), 'The Private Production of Public Goods", Vounwi/ of taw and
£ctviomitt 13, no. 2. pp. 293-306.
290. See observations 32 and 33.
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lo select and appoint the best candidates. Since the director also defined the research
program, he could maintain specific criteria for output control. If he used specific
research procedures, performance could he monitored by observing input behavior as
well, especially in team production. Although the central monitoring status has some
dear advantages, it is the scientific community which, in the end, monitors scholarly
performance by verification and dissemination without even knowing the internal
monitoring procedures of the academic institution. A bad personnel policy, resulting
in poor performance, ultimately reflects on the institute director. Therefore, Althoff
decided to delegate the appointment responsibilities to the institute directors.
The appointments of faculty members, however, were handled by the central
administration of the Prussian state, which could claim a twofold residual. The
relationship between the academic productivity and the fertility of the tax base was
never neglected by the Prussian administration.""' Therefore, the Althoff system put
an emphasis on research that was immediately conducive to technical and social
progress/" The Prussian state could not only claim a financial residual, resulting
from the growth in the tax base, but was also motivated by the international
reputation of German science and scholarship itself. The Althoff system used the
scientific community to protect the reputation of the German academic system. By
consulting the leading experts in the profession, Allhoff tried lo preserve high
standards at Prussian academic institutes. This meant that, on occasion, another
candidate was appointed than faculty would have wanted.
The reputation of the faculty is a public good. Faculty members are likely to take a
free-ride and remain largely ignorant about the credentials of a candidate because
appointments in other disciplines do not cause a substantial increase in their individual
reputation.™ The reputation of an entire discipline is also a valuable collective
good. Indeed, low-quality production may impair the future of a whole profession.
Scholars have an interest in protecting the reputation of their discipline, which
directly influences their own. Since, they monitor the activity of other scholars simply
in the course of their own activities, the cost of assessing and reporting low-quality
output is quite low, which gives the scientific community a clear advantage over the
university community in these matters.***
Lecture fees created a strong incentive for the individual teacher to monitor his own
teaching performance.^ Althoff decided to cap these fees partially to strengthen the
cooperative aspect of academic teaching. The receipts were used for discretionary
purposes. This had the effect of containing competition among professors for students
291. See hypothesis 3.
292. Along with a principle of academic freedom, Althoff supported e g the chair socialists, who
formulated practical recommendations for economic and social policy. He also stimulated
medical progress related to public health issues. The academic emancipation of the technical
colleges was another measure to stimulate the productive use of academic output.
293. See also proposition 12.
294. Cfr. proposition 1.
295. See proposition 23
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and strengthening the institute system by attracting leading scholars with salary
supplements and supporting the non-salaried faculty members.
The appointment of good scholars was a precondition for the scientific performance
of Prussia. However, it is only one aspect of a successful science policy, because
rtx/ncf/0rt >v//n /irt*/r£*/i«>i« r«ourc« »j a r«u// nor on/y o/
rwourcrj, ow /n Jbiowfnx more <j<rcura/e/y in* rila/ive praaWrive-
mancM o/ /now r«ourcM. /"oorer rrjourcw can fe* /ra/a" / « J in accord tw'fn
/n/Srrioriry,- #r«i/rr accuracy o/ tnovWedg* o/ f/r* /xw*n//a/ and acrua/ ^
acrionj o/ /n/iu/.t ra/nrr /nan navin^ /»'#« prorfMc//V/ry r«owrc« maik j^ a /ïrrn for
an ajj/^n/n^« o/ inpu/^ prq^ra/»/^ . "^ **
Therefore, the compensation policy requires a close look as well. Althoff introduced
some major innovations in this area.
7.2. Academic Compensation
The economic theory of labor markets suggests that workers receive their marginal
revenue product. However, compensation in real-world labor markets often does not
correspond with the theoretical wage. In practice, the variation in productivity of
scholars does not coincide with their wages. Academic salaries are often based on a
fixed wage scheme. The implicit contract theory reconsiders the function of
compensation to explain this forementioned observation.*"
7.2.1. Implicit Contracts
A contract is a voluntary agreement that resolves the distribution of uncertainty as to
the value of labor productivity. When wage payments are negotiated beforehand and
laid down in a contract, they reflect both labor productivity as well implicit payments
or indemnities of insurance. The implicit contract theory argues that, over their life-
time, workers are paid the value of their marginal product, although in any single
period the worker may be paid more or less. The idea behind this is that workers are
risk-averse and that therefore the organization provides an earnings insurance by
paying the worker more than productivity merits during periods of low worker
productivity and less during periods of high productivity. The implicit insurance is
meant to promote socially beneficial activities by separating expected benefits from
fear of risk.
296. A. Alchian and H. Demsetz (1972), Protfurrion. /n/brouzrion COIM am/ Economic
OrjanKariofl, p 794.
297. For a survey of the implicit contract theory, see: Sherwin Rosen (1985). 'Implicit Contracts: A
Survey" JOUSTM/ O/ Economic lif^ra/urr 23. no. 3. pp 1144-1175; or: Donald O. Parsons
(1986). "The Employment Relationship: Job Attachment, Work Effort and the Nature of
Contracts", in: O. Aschenfelter and R. Layard (eds ), //onttoooA o/LdAor £conomi«, vol. 2,
Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 789-848.
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Implicit contracts play a major role in the academic system, because the value of
academic output is extremely uncertain and (he risks of innovative research are rather
high. When scholars receive monetary compensation, their wages often do not reflect
their actual academic productivity. Moreover, their theoretical wage level is hard to
determine. Following assumption 2. precise measures of scholarly productivity are
not easily available since academic output is not readily marketable Following
proposition 6. it is also extremely costly to measure individual differences in
academic productivity well enough for these differences to be reflected in
compensation. Although scholarly productivity within the contract period is uncertain,
information on the performance of a scholar is generated by the scientific community.
The contract thus has to incorporate some rules for the adjustement of
compensation."* While standard economic models would argue that scholars are
paid their marginal revenue product by cost-minimizing organizations that buy their
services in competitive labor markets, academic compensation is different than would
be warranted for productivity reasons alone.
Proposition 16: Academic compensation, which is not likely to reflect the marginal
productivity of a scholar, functions as an incentive for academic performance.
Under competitive conditions, workers arc paid the value of their marginal products.
The economic and transactional properties of academic output make it hard to
determine appropriate academic compensation."" However, the administrator may
take account of the simple fact that maintaining incentives and selecting the best
candidates has great value for the performance of the academic system. Payments to
chairholders and institute directors have indirect effects of increasing productivity
down the hierarchy. Although the large salaries of top scholars may not correspond
with their current marginal productivity, they provide incentives for all individuals in
the academic community, who work to get one of the top positions.
If marginal revenue product is hard to determine, the relationship between compen-
sation and productivity lies in the incentive value of the compensation schemes.
Lazear and Rosen have modelled this in a rank order tournament.** They argue
that top bureaucrats do not necessarily earn more because they are more productive,
but because the incentive payment structure makes them more productive over their
entire working lives. The top position is a reward for the winner of a rank order
tournament. This requires only an assessment of the relative output levels. However,
a threshold is necessary to guarantee the overall quality of the competition.
The scientific community plays an essential role in promoting competition among
scholars, while it also succeeds in preserving cooperation The chairholder or institute
298. Seniority and level of education are often used as performance proxies to determine rewards.
299. In spite of implicit contract theory, it is highly unlikely that academic scholars are paid the
value of their marginal product over their life-time. Nevertheless, the wage-incentive idea from
implicit contract theory is maintained in this analysis.
300. Edward P. Lazear and Sherwjn Rosen (1981), "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor
Contracts", 7oMnw/ o//"o/i/ica/ Economy 89, no 5, pp 841-846
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director can be viewed as the winner of a scientific contest. Such positions serve to
induce the other scholars to perform well in more junior positions. The challenge to
beat a standard has the same incentive effect as attempting to beat a competitor.
Scholars could be compensated on the basis of the value of their academic output or
on the basis of their position in the scientific community. Both methods induce them
to work hard. For the academic administrator, it may be less costly to observe re-
lative positions than to measure the value of each scholar's output.
Rosen has pointed out the importance of top salaries and top-ranking prizes for top
bureaucrats. They keep them performing, independent of past achievements. A
contest may be disadvantageous to timid individuals, who undervalue their
performance. Therefore, private incentives may exist to invest in signals that mislead
opponents.'"' Spence conjectured that these signaling costs are negatively correlated
with productivity.'" This again emphasizes the importance of screening and
signaling variables in academia. In the academic system, rewards may take many
forms: professorships, attractive salaries, sabbatical leaves, tenure, scientific prizes
and research facilities.
The Althoff system used several compensation forms for academic performance. A
professorship at a Prussian university was the final goal of most scholars.*" Faculty
members were paid a fixed salary with the exception of the private lecturers."*
Wage increases were basically determined by the seniority principle. However,
Althoff could and did pay higher wages to reward outstanding performance or to
attract international top scholars. The income of most faculty members was
supplemented by lecture fees, which constituted an important part of their total
earnings. Althoff succeeded in capturing some rents by taxing part of the excessive
lecture fees, which he used to attract top scholars and to improve the financial
situation of the unpaid faculty members. Top scholars could also count on excellent
research facilities. In the Wilhelminian era, marks of honor also played an important
role. The Althoff system had a broad array of compensation instruments which were
used to reward academic performance.
Hypothesis 8: The Althoff system is likely to have set an efficient level of
compensation, since the residual claimant determined academic rewards.
The residual claimant has an incentive to determine an appropriate compensation
level. If compensation is put too low, he may not find enough workers or only
workers with poor skills. In the opposite case, he suffers residual losses. The Prussian
state via Althoff determined the compensation level of professors and institute
301. Sherwin Rosen (1986), 'Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments"
£«wiom/c RrWrw 76, pp. 701-715.
302. Michael Spence (1973), 70» M<vto fljna/toj, p. 358.
303. Chairs often remained vacant for long periods, which indicates that Althoff maintained a
threshold of minimal academic standards.
304. The private lecturers took the risk of having to finance their research themselves. A potential
pay-off, e.g. in the form of a professorship, came only as a reward for successfully completed
research.
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directors, while they, in turn, determined the compensation of their research
collaborators.
7 J J . Academic Salaries
Following the standard proposition that workers should receive earnings equal to the
value of their marginal product, some economists have studied the salaries of
university professors. When salary functions are determined, they implicitly assume
they have precise measures of scholarly productivity On these premises, Tuckman,
Gapinski and Hagemann e.g. have argued that the wage level of faculty members is
determined by their research skills.™' Professional reputation has also been recog-
nized as an important determinant of salary differences among scholars.*"
Gary Becker has argued that investment in human knowledge is an important
determinant of economic growth, just like investment in physical capital *" In turn,
education and training are important factors that explain the differences in earnings
among individuals and at different points in the life-cycle of the same person."*
Human capital theory argues that the accumulation of knowledge usually has a
positive effect on earnings. With respect to academic scholars, however, most human
capital is acquired by self-education. This makes it difficult to draw their human
capital-earnings profile. Moreover, as human-capital theorists point out themselves, it
is not the accumulation of knowledge, but rather the creative use of it, that
determines the pay-off of human capital formation. While Becker assumes that human
capital is primarily embodied in individuals. Aoki argues that human capital may be
accumulated by means of a collective learning process as well."' For the Althoff
system, this underscores both the role of the team work in the independent research
institutes and the interactive learning method in the seminars.
Freeman has applied the implicit contract model to the case of research scientists.""
The lack of information about salaries leads to strategies by administrators to
exaggerate actual wage differences in order to reduce utility resulting from low
productivity. Top scholars are in effect paid huge salaries, which are meant to induce
305. Howard P. Tuckman, James H. Gapinski and Robert P Hagemann (1977), 'Faculty Skills and
the Salary Structure in Academe: A Market Perspective', /4mfrica#i Economic /fcvirw 67,
pp. 692-702.
306. Daniel S. Hamermesh, George E. Johnson and Burton A. Weisbrod (1982), "Scholarship,
Citations and Salaries: Economic Rewards in Economics', Sott/>i*ni Economic Jou/na/ 49,
no. 2, pp. 472-481.
307 Gary S. Becker (1964), Human Co/rf/o/, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York.
308. See also: Jacob Mincer (1974), Sc/ioo/mj?, £>p?rj?ncr and £anu/i;j, National Bureau for
Economic Research, New York. For a recent survey of the economics of education, based on
human capital theory: George Psacharopoulos, ed. (1987), £conrtm/cj o/ £</ura/fon. /?««wcA
antf SrucflM, Pergamon Press, Oxford
309. Mashiko Aoki (1984), 7V Ooprra/iMf Cam; 7nwr> o/«/* Firm, Clarendon Press, New
YorkyOxford.
310. Smith Freeman (1977), 'Wage Trends as Performance Displays Productive Potential: A Model
and Application of Academic Early Retirement. BW/ youroo/ o/EconomicJ 8, pp. 419-443.
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other scholars to reduce inefficient behavior. Freeman concludes that junior scholars
must accept reduced initial earnings in the prospect of the assurance of stable future
incomes because of the uncertainty of their production. Moreover, jobs that have a
relatively low training component, must pay relatively high salaries, because the
individuals, who accept these positions, are sacrificing high future income. Because
research skills require a longer period to develop than teaching skills do, researchers
accept lower starting salaries.'"
Hypothesis 9: In accordance with human capital and implicit contract theory, the
Althoff system paid low starting salaries for young scholars and huge wages for top
scholars.
Professors at Prussian universities earned a fixed salary as members of the civil
service. But Althoff made considerable efforts to attract top scholars by offering them
higher salaries.'" Following proposition 16, this created an incentive for junior
scientists. Young Prussian scholars often started their career as private lecturers and
received no income other than their lecture fees. They also lived from private wealth
or were supported by their spouses. The compensation of the unsalaried lecturers was
contingent upon real, not expected academic output. So, they were able to earn a
living with teaching, which required skills that were acquired over a shorter period.
Income differences may be necessary to recruit and keep enough incentive for qua-
lified scholars in disciplines where demand is increasing rapidly.'" However, equity
considerations may interfere with efficiency standards. Income discrimination on the
basis of popularity is bound to clash with the principle of academic solidarity and
equality. Therefore, Althoff put a lot of the applied and technical research activities
into institutes that were independent of the traditional university system. Business
schools were financed by private sponsors and the Ministry of Commerce. This made
it possible to pay higher wages in these disciplines without putting pressure on the
rest of academic salaries. The lecture fee system also created an income difference in
favor of those disciplines that were more in demand.
7.2.3. Research Facilities and Prizes
Incentives are designed to induce or restrain some activity. Performance can be
improved by designing better incentives. An effective academic compensation
structure has to set incentives tailored to the motivations of scholars. In this way, the
academic administrator can resolve part of the agency problem. Scholars who are
motivated by pure curiosity, do not have to be monitored as closely, because they are
311. George E. Johnson and Frank P. Stafford (1974), "Lifetime Earnings in a Professional Labor
Market: Academic Economists", JOUSTUI/ of AWi/irc/ Economy 82, no. 3. pp. 549-569.
312. See observation 21.
313. A.G. Holtmann and Alan E. Bayer (1970). "Determinants of Professional Income Among
Recent Recipients of Natural Science Doctorates". JOU/TU/ O/BUI i« i j 43, no. 4, pp. 410-418.
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self-motivated to peifwm well. Providing compensation forms that particularly attract
these scholars, may therefore be one way to economize on monitoring costs.
Proposition 17: Research facilities and scientific prizes are likely lo stimulate the
performance of the pure curiosity scholars.
Scholars who do research simply as a living, have an induced curiosity and have to be
motivated to devote their attention to research. They are more easily distracted by
other goals. This creates an agency problem, which is aggravated by severe
monitoring problems and attenuated property rights. Therefore, the administrator may
want to attract pure curiosity scholars, who are self-motivated to do research. Such a
personnel strategy cannot be implemented simply by asking the candidates to reveal
their true motivations. However, compensation-incentives like research facilities and
prestigious scientific prizes are more likely to attract those who are genuinely
interested and personally devoted to solving scientific problems than the induced
curiosity scholars.
Transaction cost analysis has suggested that the monitoring of scholars may be
expensive. It seems reasonable to argue that the institute directors are truly devoted to
the research program, which they have laid out themselves, i.e. they are pure
curiosity researchers. This would imply that they do not have to be monitored that
closely because they are self-motivated to perform well. If the institute director is an
induced curiosity scholar, the financial residual forms an important incentive for
productive behavior. In both cases, the reputation of the top scholar and institute
director makes it very likely that his academic output is more often read, used and
tested by the scientific community than the products of less-reputed scholars. This
also lowers monitoring costs for the administrator.
Proposition 18: Salaries and non-specified monetary prizes are likely to stimulate the
performance of the induced curiosity scholars.
Two methods exist to organize induced curiosity research. The more common method
consists of hiring a researcher who is paid a salary. This method entails substantial
monitoring and evaluation costs. The other method is the use of monetary prizes to
induce scholars to investigate problems, which the sponsor is curious about. A system
of prizes can be set up for two objectives, namely to make specific discoveries or to
stimulate unspecified scientific progress. The specific prize is a way of directing
research efforts towards some specific end without planning the research activity
itself."* However, as the specificity of the requirements increases, so does the
specificity of the scientific output that will be rewarded. Because a scholar often does
not know what will come out of his research, it becomes more uncertain whether the
scholar will meet the specifications. So, the uncertainty about income increases also.
In the end, it may prevent him from entering into scientific activity. Salaries and non-
314. Direct rewards can stimulate scholars to undertake research, resulting in minor, practical
discoveries which are not patentable.
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specified awards seem, therefore, more appropriate to stimulate the research activity
of these scholars.
Proposition 19: Non-specified awards may provide a stimulus for basic research,
much as the patent system works for applied research.
The non-specified award seems more suitable for basic research, because the patent is
already a non-specified reward for research in the applied field. Of course, the
usefulness of the method is dependent on the quality of the decision process in the
awarding of the prize.
Allhoff set up a combined salary-prize system. The less productive scholars obtained
a fixed salary, while brilliant scholars could earn high salaries and lecture fees.
Marks of honor and research facilities were part of the compensation package of
Prussian scholars as well. Althoff became legendary in providing brilliant scholars
like Koch, Ehrlich and Behring with excellent research facilities. Top scholars were
given their own i>ufc/>f/kfc/i/ research institutes, since they did not have to be
monitored that doseJy. /n the AlJhoff era, (he NobeJ Prizes already existed. Many
researchers who worked at German academic institutes won the prestigious prize.'"
Althoff also used his own system of non-specified rewards, namely titles and marks
of honor. Their incentive value has to be understood in the cultural and societal
context of the time. They were a cheap, yet very effective, compensation instrument.
7.2.4. Academic Tenure
Proposition 20: Tenure is likely to lower academic performance, unless the scientific
community continues to perform its auditing and disciplinary role.
Economic theory shows that nonprofit organizations such as universities tend to spend
more in the work environment than for-profil organizations because they cannot
distribute the financial residual. Due to the nature of the academic residual, even for-
profit universities would have great difficulty in capturing the residual. Therefore, the
members of these organizations have little incentive to reduce costs and instead try to
improve working conditions, including job security.'" A specific aspect of the
academic labor conditions is tenure. The tenure system is said to have two
advantages: it saves the universities money in the short run and it provides some
elementary protection for minority opinions. An important incentive to be productive
may, however, disappear.
Professors may be willing to accept a lower wage if they are protected against
discharge. In this respect, the university administrator can reduce wage payments. In
the long run, however, tenure may reduce the incentive for faculty members to stay
315. See conclusion 2.
316. Armen A. Alchian (1958), 'Private Property and the Relative Cost of Tenure", in: Economic
<tf Wort (1977), Liberty Fund. Indianapolis, pp. 177-202.
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productive. In that case, it will increase the costs of academic production. While the
possibility of getting dismissed for reasons of malperformance tends lo keep scholars
productive, some faculty members may enter a period of quasi-retirement once they
are granted tenure. Since an important incentive to keep performing well has
disappeared, the tenure system may result in inefficient scholarly behavior.
The second argument in favor of tenure is that job security permits scholars to take
unpopular views.
*7>nure M a /O/TTUI/, injmu/;wuiV conjfro/n/ rfoy fonrrj rA? COM O/ arr/nj on one" 'J
conviction."'"
In that case, tenure should apply to the start of a scholarly career, since new and
radical ideas are most likely to occur at the beginning of a career. However, this is
not the period when tenure is usually granted. According to Carmichael, tenure i»
awarded to protect the tenured professor from his colleagues.'" His argument in
favor of tenure rests on the crucial assumption that faculty members are belter
informed than the administration about the quality of new candidates."* Therefore,
tenure is awarded in order to increase the probability that the tenured faculty selects
the best new candidates. If current faculty members were to be evaluated relative to
the new faculty members they were about to appoint, they might have an incentive to
be inaccurate in their judgements about candidates. Therefore, tenure is an efficient
solution, because, without it, professors would never be willing to appoint scholars
who might turn out to be better than themselves. However, following proposition 13,
even tenured faculty members act rationally when they stay unfamiliar with the
credentials of the candidate. Carmichael argues that the abolition of tenure would
reduce the career prospects of very brilliant young scholars, unless the administration
began to devote time and effort to the screening of applicants.'"
Tenure is said to protect academic freedom and to make sure that the truth is sought
and taught. Untenured scholars, however, have considerable freedom to disagree with
their superiors. One reason is that most scholars are genuinely curious and interested
in the advancement of science. However, a scholar who disagrees sufficiently with his
professors, may find his career prospects reduced, even though he is consistently
317. Armen A. Alchian and Susan Woodward (1987), "Reflections on the Theory of the Firm".
Journal o//furi/itf/oni/ and 77»or«ic<i/ £co/iomi« 143, pp 110-137
318. H. Lome Carmichael (1988), "Incentives in Academics: Why is There Tenure ?", .founui/ o/
Po/irifa/ Economy 96. no 3, pp 453-472
319. Carmichael's assumption is in clear contrast with proposition 13
320. This is precisely what the Althoff system did. Carmichael believes, however, that the selection
of candidates is a task that is best left to the experts in the faculty. The academic network of
Althoff was set up, however, exactly because the experts typically work at different location!
in different academic institutes.
120 7 V Economic* o/SciVnc* <WK/ Scno/arj/u/>. ^n <4no/yj<j o/rA*
right."' Nevertheless, faculty is under great pressure from the rest of the scientific
community to tolerate considerable freedom for the young scholar."*
"7Ju«, a/i trkfrp?n<fcn/ young ma/i may HT// aVvWop conwaVraM* a»«» in /n«/O/TTI
o / O U / J I ^ rr.s/>tcf. (fn* M fadïy fr?a/?</ bv nij own J«pamn«n;, n« can
«u/Ay mow* WrovAtrf. On/y /n* / « J />roa"ucf/v^  jci>n/if/ n*«/ uwrry
o//UJ i/Twiftf/aff jupiriorj For /n* man wno reviV/y dow nave" in
H>n/'cn *vortt ou/ w /^
n^ naj no /*mir*, n« w jq/ir
Although most academics, even with tenure, avoid actions which might seriously
affect the Financial situation of their institutions, tenure may be of some use to an
administrator who wants to protect his academic employees against undue dismissal
by the sponsor.
It has been argued that the work load of tenured faculty may gradually erode in the
long run. Some continue to do research, possibly of improved quality, but some stop
and a great number slow down."' However, this depends largely on the pressure
they are under to perform and to perform well. The pressure, which is exercised by
the scientific community, is such that it maintains high academic standards and
performance. If the scientific community functions well, it induces scholars to keep
publishing. When tenured faculty are able to isolate themselves from the scientific
community, their productivity is likely to erode.
Proposition 21: Academic tenure may entail substantial rent-seeking costs as well as
benefits.
Rent-seeking is the socially unproductive activity that seeks to capture part of the
social surplus by obtaining a higher compensation than would be required by
competitive market forces. The traditional example of a rent-seeking activity is the
lobbying of government to obtain an exclusive license in order to create a monopoly
that will permit the charging of prices above the competitive level. The concept was
321. In 7 V Orjdniza/ion o//mjuirv, Tullock gives the example of Albert Einstein. He had not
impressed his professors enough to be offered an academic job after graduation. Instead,
Einstein was forced to lake a job in the Swiss Palenl Office. There, he could spend most of his
time each day on matters of interest to him and developed the special theory of relativity.
However, Einstein is also the prime example that a man who is consistently right gets other
opportunities from members of the scientific community. Einstein was awarded a full
professorship of physics in 1905 and the directorship of the Afuircr-HWiW/n Institute for
Physics in 1913.
322. Another opportunity for the scholar, who does not fit into the prevailing academic system, is
amateurism. Being under less time pressure, these scholars can often work matters through
thoroughly.
323. Gordon Tullock (1966). Orjamidrion <>ƒ/(ujuin-, p. 217.
324. See: Armen A. Alchian (I9S8). Knurr, pp 1T7-2O2.
ftigAu omf So«m>5c /Va&erion 121
introduced by Gordon Tullock, while the term was coined by Anne Krueger.**
McKenzie applied rent-seeking theory to academic behavior."* His departmental
model can easily be extended to the academic system as a whole. McKeiuie argues
that the amount of salary increases available to the academic administrator ts a fixed
sum. which is unrelated to productivity, i.e. there exists a wage fund Within the
academic organization, the fund is distributed in accordance with the relative
productivity of scholars. A faculty member thus has two methods to increase his
salary: he can increase his own academic productivity or he can decrease the
productivity of the others. Decreasing the productivity of others is an example of
rent-seeking.*"
and Totlison also adopted the wage fund approach at the departmental
level.*** They assume that department heads decide on salary increases, seeking to
maximize the academic worth of the department The academic worth of a faculty
member is equal to the highest salary offer that the faculty member could generate
from any other university or academic institute. A department head with perfect
information would pay each faculty member exactly his reservation wage."* Since
the department head does not have perfect information on individual reservation
wages, the rent-seeking faculty member has an incentive to make the reservation
wage seem higher than it actually is.
Again, this can be done in a variety of ways: exaggerating the attractiveness of
outside offers or complaining about the current location. Other possible rent-seeking
strategies are: searching for better-paid jobs, making other offers public, emphasizing
the prestige of the alternative institute or indicating to the administration that moving
costs are low. Assuming that scholars are willing to move in response to a better
salary offer made by an academic institution of comparable rank, Robert Frank argues
that the observed stability in the hierarchy of departments implies that professors in
those departments are paid their marginal products."" In fact, they are paid their
reservation wage, which may not be even a close approximation of their marginal
productivity."' Although mobility is penalized to the extent that the uncertainty of
production induces employers to underpay new faculty, the productive scholars, who
325. Gordon Tullock (1967), "Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft', H>j«rn Economic
7ou/7ioy 5, pp. 224-232, and A.O. Krueger (1974), 'The Political Economy of the Rent-
Seeking Society', /^n^ricafl Economic /frvtov 64, pp. 291-303
326. Richard B. Mckenzie (1979), "The Economic Basis of Departmental Discord in Academe",
Sociu/ Sacner Oua/wry 59, no 4, pp. 653-664
327. The creation of unnecessary committee work in order to waste the time of the productive
scholars is an example of rent-seeking.
328. H. Geoffrey Brennan and Robert D. Tollison (1980), 'Rent Seeking in Academia', in: James
M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison and Gordon Tullock (eds), 7OHÖ/Ï/ o 7foory <?ƒ rt* fe*-
Sttting Soci«y, Texas A & M University Press, pp. 345-356.
329. Because individuals cannot move to other employments without cost, it is possible to pay a
scholar a lower salary than he could earn in a comparable university. Since mobility costs
differ between individuals, they generate different locational rents.
330. Robert H. Frank (1984), 'Are Workers Paid Their Marginal Products ?*, /1/rwnca/i Economic
fevfew 74, no. 4, pp. 549-571.
331. See proposition 16.
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«re likely to receive offers from other employers, are more willing to move, because
of the discrepancy between their wages and academic productivity."'
Talented scholars might have a higher opportunity cost of their time than their
colleagues, because they are more engaged in research. As a result, the latter are
more likely to serve and participate in committees. Therefore, the latter have a
greater influence on formal professional standards and on hiring, promotion and
salary decisions, than would be warranted by their numbers and ability alone.'"
Tenure may be a source of waste and inefficiency if rent-seeking takes place. To
obtain a tenured position, scholars may undertake wasteful activities like lobbying
academic authorities and influential academics. While rent-seeking creates welfare
losses when the activities to capture the rent are socially unproductive, it can also
create social benefits if the right to capture the rent is obtained by socially beneficial
actions."* For example, to obtain a production licence or patent in the pharma-
ceutical industry, potential monopolists engage in valuable research, which may result
in the production of a drug This research would not have taken place if the pharma-
ceutical firm was not granted a temporary monopoly patent."' If tenure induces
risk-averse scholars to engage in high-quality research, then rent-seeking may entail
substantial social gains.
Proposition 22: Tenure protects the idiosyncratic investments of the tenured scholar.
Although tenure may lower academic performance in the long run and may entail
rent-seeking costs, Peirce has suggested that tenure is a precondition for those
academics who are invited to suggest cost cuts. They must be sure that they will not
be made redundant as a consequence of their own cost cutting proposals.'* In
general, the rationale for tenure rests on the concept of firm-specific human capital.
While research and teaching skills with few exceptions are not university-specific,
administrative tasks often are. Scholars who at a higher age tend to be less
productive, may engage more in academic administration and management. So, they
are granted tenure in order to protect firm-specific human capital.
Another rationale for tenure is the protection of the costs that are made to establish a
research program. The chairholder or institute director, who invests time and effort in
building a team of qualified scholars or establishing a coherent research program, is
vulnerable to a hold-up situation and may become a victim of opportunistic behavior
from the administration. A way of protecting himself is to stay in the academic labor
332. Armen Alchian, 7rnurr. p. 190 and 191
333. Herbert G. Grubd and Liwrence A Boland (1986). "On the Efficient Use of Mathematics in
Economics: Some Theory. Facts and Results of an Opinion Survey", üfyt/oj 39. pp. 419-442.
334. Thomas J. DiLorenzo (19881, "Property Rights. Information Costs and the Economics of Rent-
Seeking", younw/ o//orwu/iona/a*y 7Vcwrfirui EowMwrua 144. no. 2. pp. 318-332.
335. Jürgen Backhaus (1983). "Competition. Innovation and Regulation in the Pharmaceutical
Industry". Atowj'rid' <wJ /Vcii/o/i fconomirj 4. no 2. pp. 107-121.
336. William S. Peirce (1983). "Repealing Parkinson's Law: Incentives to Encourage Bureaucrats to
Save the Taxpayers" Money", flwrarrft Paprr. Case Western Reserve University, 51 pp.
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market continuously, but this hampers the development of the long-term research
projects that require this type of investments. The value of idiosyncratic, specific
investments depends to a large extent on the continued cooperation of one party with
a specific party. Under some circumstances, these specific assets can be protected by
contingent contracts. However, if transaction costs are high, tenure may be an
efficient solution for reducing opportunistic behavior towards scholars with specific
Nevertheless, the threat of termination of the contract serves as an incentive to the
employee to keep pursuing the goals desired by the employer, i.e. the production of
new knowledge.'" Tenure should not imply that scholars stop producing. However,
this depends to a large extent on the auditing and disciplinary efforts of the scientific
community.
Hypothesis 10: The Allhoff system reduced the disadvantages of academic tenure.
Scholars who were appointed at Prussian academic institutes, were state bureaucrats
with life-long tenure. However, academic freedom was also guaranteed by the
Prussian constitution. The Ministry of Culture acted as an effective safeguard against
political interferences and commercial pressure."* The system of private
lectureships was another protection against state interferences.**' Following
hypothesis 1, the scientific community played a crucial role in the Allhoff system and
kept the Prussian academics under great pressure to perform well. Since scholars
were appointed on the basis of their scientific merit, it is likely that academic tenure
created substantial rent-seeking benefits. Since many administrative tasks were carried
out by the central professional bureaucracy, a lot of committee work at the faculty
level was reduced, which implied less opportunity for typical rent-seeking actions.
7.2.5. Teaching and Research
Academic output consists of different products: research, teaching, university
management and social service. In most models, scholars are considered to produce
two goods: research and teaching. Whether these goods are complements or
substitutes is still an issue of dispute."' Wilhelm von Humboldt's principle, which
favors the complementarity idea, has long influenced the ideas about academic
337. Oliver Hart and John Moore (1990), "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm", JOU/TUI/ O/
Po/inca/ £conom> 98, no. 6, p. 1133.
338. Jürgen G. Backhaus (1989d), "Workers' Participation Stimulated by the Economic Failure of
Traditional Organization", #««wcA MfmoranJum 89.11, University of Limburg, 39 pp.
339. See observation 31.
340. Arons was dismissed as a private lecturer because he was a member of the "subversive" SDP
Although Althoff did the utmost, he could not prevent this particular dismissal. At a result of
his resistance, Althoff did succeed, however, in improving the financial and statutory position
of the private lecturers in general.
341. William E. Becker Jr. (I97S), "The University Professor as a Utility Maximize* and Producer
of Learning, Research and Income", VOU/TUJ/ O///uma/i /JMOK/TM 10, pp. 107-1 IS.
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organization. Economie research on the academie production of both products has
usually been carried out separately for each product. Love 11 was one of the first to
estimate production functions that contained measurements of research
performance."* Other economists have estimated production functions using some
measurement of teaching effectiveness as output variable.*"
Proposition 23: The salary system is better attuned to the dual academic production
of teaching and research than is the (strict) fee system.
Adam Smith believed that universities would work more efficiently if wages for
lecturers were to be derived from students' fees.***
"77i* emfowmen/j of JCAOO/J O/K/ CO//*$M nave /»c«jan7> aVmini.i/iea' mo/? or / « j
//i« ««crMiry o/<yy>/i'ca//on /« r/ie reacnerj. / . . . / 77io.ie parrj o/«tfaco/ion, « « /o
far /n* ƒ earning o/ w/i/cn ;/i*r* ar^ no /JM/>//C
' /A* few/ raug/u. "*"
Following Smith, Rosen has asked whether academic salaries should be more directly
provided from lecture fees. His conclusion is that this might be right if teaching was
the sole output of the university, but not if research is also an important output.'*'
Smith suggested a compensation method, which related the income of the professor to
the teaching quality, assessed by the students.*" He argued that salaries adversely
affected the incentive to give good lectures, because the lacking threat of student
withdrawal diverted the attention of the lecturer away from the teaching task.
However, lecturers seem to have an incentive to lower teaching quality irrespective of
the fact that they are paid by salaries or by lecture fees. Fees give incentives for
professors to increase course enrollments by making the course content easier and
more popular.**" Salaries provide incentives to reduce enrollment by making
courses difficult and boring. Rosen concludes that a salary system and a fee system
are approximately equivalent. Therefore, lecture fees were gradually replaced by sa-
laries to reduce transaction costs, i.e.
"/••/ w aw/a" fne /IOSS/M o/ 0/7/ co//fc/i>]^, a/frac»>i^ a 5ft*fen/ c/ien/W?, a/w"
cowrj* jc/ieaW/ng, o> fuming /n«e </uri» ov^r f o a more ce7!/ra/iz«a' agency o/
non/eacn/ng perron/iW ana" r/iu, /n ram, promofea' ww/bnn pncing pracricw
342. Michael C. Lovell (1973), fWucrio/i o/Economic Lwerafu/r, pp. 27-55.
343. A summary of the research on teaching effectiveness is given by Eric A. Hanushek (1986),
"The Economics of Schooling". 7ournu/ o/Economic £iwarn/* 24, no. 3, pp. 1141-1177.
344. E.G. West (1970), ftfuatfio/i and f/v S/J/C. Institute of Economic Affairs, London, p. 120.
345. Adam Smith (1776), Hn /n<7U/r> /wo r/v Mwu/r and Caiuw o/r t* Wfa/rt o/ Mui'o/u (1976),
Clarendon Press. Oxford, p. 760.
346. Sherwin Rosen (1987), "Some Economics of Teaching", Jou/Tutf o/Lotor Economics S, no. 4,
pp. 561-575.
347. Smith assumes that teaching is readily measurable and that its quality can be accurately
measured by the students.
348. The quality of the information, transmitted in a course, is likely to reduce as class size and stu-
dent diversity increase because the professor has to address himself to the median student.
349. Sherwin Rosen (1987), Som* ftwio/rucs o/ 7>ac/un^. p. 566.
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In a strict fee system, a scholar's incentive to do research is his anticipated effect on
the content of his lectures, hence on his future fees, paid by the students. It seems
reasonable to suggest that investments in scientific research would be lower if
academic activity was to be financed only through lecture fees A professor, who
would reveal original thoughts to students, would immediately create some fierce
competition. Thus, the scholar might just as well use (he ideas of others rather than
invent new ones The strict fee system would slow down the pace of scientific
progress. In this respect, a salary system promotes the free dissemination of
knowledge, which productive research demands.'*' It does not necessarily promote
the efficient allocation of a scholar's time beleen teaching and research."'
Althoff maintained a mixed salary-lecture fee system. While the salary system
promoted the free dissemination of knowledge, lecture fees created a strong incentive
to self-monitor teaching quality. Althoff decided to tax part of the excessive lecture
fees in order to strengthen the cooperative aspect of academic teaching "• The
receipts were also used to support unpaid faculty members This had the effect of
containing competition among professors for students, while strengthening the
institute system.
Proposition 24: Teaching and research can be separated as long as academic output is
freely disseminated.
In the university system, research is often organized and financed as a by-product of
teaching. Scholars typically work at different institutions, dispersed according to the
needs of the educational system since the number of employed scholars depends
primarily on the number of students that choose to enroll in certain courses. This may
not be the most efficient allocation of resources because teaching is frequently about
the specific subficld. in which the scholar is doing research, instead of the broader
area desirable for educational purposes. In other words, the combination of research
and teaching may lower academic productivity and performance. Therefore, it seems
desirable to some extent to leave the Humboldtian principle and to organize teaching
and research in separate institutions. Althoff created many research institutes, in
which scholars had no teaching obligations.
An effective educational system requires teaching practices to pay attention to new
and relevant developments in science, for which scholars heavily involved in research
are the best source of information. One reason why a top scholar should give some
classes is to avoid the possibility that scholars of less ability do not transmit the new
information correctly. It is also valuable to some students to be exposed to knowledge
at the leading edge. Future research projects have to recruit among the newly
educated, whose performance is also dependent on the quality of their formal
350. See proposition 3.
351. Compensation, which is determined entirely by one aspect of academic output (teaching or re-
search), tends to result in poor performance of the other.
352. Education is a complex activity, determined by the collective efforts of the teaching staff in-
stead of one particular lecturer.
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education. Teaching and research are therefore understood as complementary and
enhancing each other. In this respect, there is a need for teachers who are actively
involved in scientific developments. It follows, however, that the academic authorities
should consistently adhere to this policy because, if research is actually higher valued
than teaching, rent-seeking scholars may try to shift the burden of teaching to others
in order to decrease the research productivity of their colleagues.
A partial solution may be to leave teaching at the advanced and doctoral level to the
research oriented scholars, because it is understood to require the same abilities as
research. Suppose graduate students would participate in the research program of a
top scholar. This would generate benefits for both parties. The top scholar could still
carry out hit research program, while students would learn to do research even
without any formal instruction. This concept was realized in the Prussian seminar
method, which was systematically introduced in the Althoff system. Some doctoral
programs are also good examples of a successful combination of teaching and
research.
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8. Bureaucratic Governance
8.1. Bureaucratie Control Loss
Proposition 25: Loyalty and discipline reduce the monitoring costs of
production.
Prop. 26: Structural bureaucratic inefficiency results from information
distortions.
Prop. 27: Hierarchical loss of control is likely to occur when the span of
control and the number of hierarchical levels increase.
Prop. 28: Economies of scale in information gathering can offset
managerial overload.
Hypothesis 11: A manageable span of control and a comparative
information advantage contained the bureaucratic costs of the Althoff
system.
Prop. 29: The need for effective communication may offset information
distortions.
Prop. 30: Academic performance is likely to be lower in the public sector
unless the scientific community performs its auditing and disciplinary role.
8.2. Authority
Prop. 31: The authority of a bureaucrat depends on the ability to maximize
the budget of the department in which he is working.
Prop. 32: If monitoring by the sponsor takes place in order to modify
bureaucratic overexpansion, the authority of the bureaucrat depends on the
ability to reduce the financial and review constraints.
Hyp. 12: The multi-source financing system strengthened Althoffs
authority.
Prop. 33: Bureaucrats who forgo the standard forms of compensation,
create an opportunity for independent behavior.
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Prop. 34: Professional ability and behavior strengthen the authority of a
bureaucrat.
Hyp. 13: AlthofTs authority was based on professionalism.
Prop. 35: Rational deference strengthens the authority of the informed
bureaucrat.
8.3. Networks
Prop. 36: Bureaucratic performance is dependent on the informal services
rendered to the bureau.
Prop. 37: Bureaucratic performance is dependent on the intensity and the
extent of internal networks.
Hyp. 14: AlthofTs network improved the performance of the bureaucratic
and academic system.
Prop. 38: Continuity is likely to improve selective bureaucratic behavior.
8.4. Public Entrepreneurship
Prop. 39: A public entrepreneur has to acquire a sufficient degree of
autonomy.
Prop. 40: Entrepreneurial capacity is determined by the extent and the
intensity of the networks that are set up by the entrepreneur.
Hyp. IS: Althoff was a public entrepreneur.
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Chapter 8: Bureaucratic Governance
In the property-rights theory of the firm, there is I role for a central contracting party
who specializes in monitoring performance."' While the central party takes the
residual, the organization protects itself against poor management."' When
externalities can be captured, property rights are more fully exercised. This promotes
an efficient allocation of resources. Following transaction cost theory, hierarchical
institutions have a competitive advantage in monitoring costs and accomodate
idiosyncratic investments and uncertain production.
The centralization of rights was accomplished by the independent research institute
structure, but also by the Althoff system as a whole, with Althoff and the state
bureaucracy trying to exercise coordinated control. It is in this sense that the
bureaucratization of the academic system should be understood, since Althoff did not
wish to abolish traditional faculty independence.'"
Centralization and decentralization both entail specific benefits. Both impose as costs
different forms of inconsistent action. While there is a positive effect of increased
coordination in a bureaucracy, there are also costs related to bureaucratic behavior
and organization. Before taking a closer look at how Althoff lowered the costs
typically associated with a bureaucratic and hierarchical organization form, it should
be taken into account that bureaucratic inefficiency can be the result of bureaucratic
as well as political failure. The outcome of a bureaucratic production process is the
result of a chain of choices and decisions, made in both the political and the
bureaucratic system. Procedures adopted by the bureaucracy, which seem
unproductive or inefficient, may be necessitated by the political system."*
Determining whether something is inefficiently produced or not requires that the
political constraints, under which the bureaucracy operates, are clearly spelled out.
Otherwise, bureaucratic inefficiency may be observed by simply assuming other aims
than the goals achieved by the bureaucracy.'" When political interferences beyond
the sponsor's need of monitoring the agency are taken into account, the presumption
353. Robert E. McCormick and Roger E Meiners (1988), "University Governance: A Property
Rights Perspective", yowTia/ of Law ana* £conomia 21, vol. 2, pp. 423-442.
354. Eugene F. Fama (1980), "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm", Jou/Turf o//>o///fca/
£cwiomy 88, no. 2, pp. 288-307.
355. See observation 27.
356. See: William S. Peirce (1981a), flu/TOKcro/Jc faüurf and PuWk Eiprfk/ifl/rr, Academic Pre*»,
New York.
357. The political vacuum approach has its merits for showing internal inconsistencies in
bureaucratic behavior.
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of inefficiency can only be held up by indicating the (lost) opportunities to circumvent
these political constraints.
In the Althoff era, there were some appointments of mediocre scholars that were
purely political decisions."* It would be wrong to blame the Prussian bureaucracy
for the outcome. However, Althoff was a master in circumventing political, financial
and bureaucratic constraints."* Therefore, if there were failures of science policy
that lowered scientific performance, they can be accounted to Althoff and his staff
more easily than should be done otherwise.
8.1. Bureaucratic Control Loss
The main objective of our research effort is to achieve a better understanding of the
economics of science and scholarship. The Althoff bureaucracy was the institutional
basis of the German academic system and is. therefore, a legitimate object of this
study. Moreover, the Althoff system also contains some untypical characteristics of
bureaucracy, which makes it an interesting case to test the economic theory of
bureaucracy. Public choice scholars have revolutionized this field, which until them,
had been dominated by the Weberian tradition. Following the work of Tullock,
Downs and Niskanen,** the traditional view of the rational, bureaucratic apparatus
has been replaced by a model in which bureaucrats have their own private motives,
according to which they behave.**' In public choice analysis, the attenuation of
control as a result of information distortions makes bureaucracy a type of organization
that is not typically associated with efficient, devoted and hard-working agents.
The Prussian bureaucracy in general, and the Ministry of Culture under Althoff in
particular, are such untypical cases. The organizational efficiency of this department
was certainly influenced by the Prussian tradition of personal devotion and military
discipline. While these social values played an important role in the performance of
the civil service, the economic approach takes a closer look at the institutional
structure and the degree of entrepreneurship in the Prussian bureaucracy.
Proposition 25: Loyalty and discipline reduce the monitoring costs of production.
Monitoring costs can be kept minimal in an agency where tradition, convention and
goal congruence have made the behavior of bureaucrats to a large extent
358. See observation 28.
359. As illustrated by observations 2, 7 and 32.
360. See: Gordon Tullock (1965), 7V Po/irici o/ Buiraurracy. Public Affairs Press, Washington;
Anthony Downs (1967), /vufr Bu/rourrarv. Little Brown, Boston: William Niskanen (1971),
fiurrourrao' anrf /frpmrn/o/iuf Govrnimr/tf. Aldine-Atherton, Chicago
361. The rationality of bureaucratic administration is not synonymous with efficiency. In the
Weberian tradition, efficiency is assumed to follow either from the knowledge and skills of
dedicated bureaucrats or from the rational and systematic structuring of decision-making.
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predictable.'*' If agency members have a common ideology, which expresses the
purposes of the organization, they can refer back to this aim in order to keep their
own behavior in line with purposes. Goal congruence is said to increase the effective-
ness of management by decreasing the burden of hierarchical supervision. Team
spirit, mutual trust and loyalty are examples of attaining goal congruence. The inter-
nalization of such values could compensate for structural bureaucratic inefficiency.
The Prussian tradition of military discipline is an element that definitely enhanced the
efficiency of AlthofTs department Ul and the academic system. Moreover, Allhoft
could rely on a team of loyal department members.
Proposition 26: Structural bureaucratic inefficiency results from information
distortions.
The early theories of bureaucracy were constructed on the idea of a rational
organizational structure, in which impartial civil servants were concerned with serving
the public interest. Public choice theory has analyzed the internal organization of
bureaucracy, noting the loss of control associated with this form of economic
organization. An early challenge to the prevailing bureaucratic theory was offered by
Anthony Downs, who described five different types of bureaucrats.'*' However, as
Peirce pointed out, this rich typology
" / . . . / ra/iwuj/i'zM «v^ry/Aing aid /?r«//ctt nor/ung. 77i* ana/v.M niftfc a
«xam/>ia/ion o/ «jen /wrtaucra/ i>e/o/r /i* can yore ca5/ f A* ft*naWo
or rA? £>ur«iu. "'**
Tullock reduced the complex utility function of Downs into one dimension: the
personal advancement of intrahierarchical climbers. His analysis is restricted to
bureaucrats, who are able and determined to rise to the top ranks of the hierarchy.
The model starts from the basic public choice assumption that individual bureaucrats
also have private objectives and, when faced with a choice between furthering the
purpose of the organization or advancing their own goals, often choose the latter.
To get a promotion, even the most able experts in the bureaucracy are dependent on
the favorable opinion of their superiors. Therefore, they rationally seek to provide the
information that they judge their superior wants to receive.**' In the constant
process of adjusting the information transmitted up the hierarchy, the coordinator fin-
ally receives information from his staff which is more likely to resemble his initial
judgement rather than the facts. Moreover, most bureaucrats play the dual role of
362. T.L.C.M. Groot (1988), Atowjown/ vu/i ifa/wrrji/ri/M. WoltetvNoordhoff, Groningen,
p. 131.
363. "Climbers" are primarily driven to enhance their own career, while "conservers" try to obtain
power, income and prestige with the least possible effort. The other three categories are partly
interested to promote the public intrest. "Zealots" are dedicated to implement a narrow policy,
while "advocates" want to make efforts from which their own department benefits. "Sta-
tesmen" aim at broader goals and are eventually willing to compromise.
364. William S. Peirce (1981b), "Bureaucratic Politics and the Labor Market'. />u*f(c OK>/« 37.
p. 308.
365. Gordon Tullock (1966), />ofl«« £ƒ flumiurrary, p. $2.
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subordinate and superior. In the process of transforming policy into rules, regulations,
formal procedures and informal practice, the content gradually evolves until it
corresponds with the preferences of the agents.'** The results are twofold. There is
a loss of control for the principal, because agents lower in the hierarchy selectively
filter information upward in order to match the judgements of the principal, while
orders from the top are gradually transformed to fit the circumstances and preferences
of the agents. Of course, any top manager loses some degree of control, because he
cannot know all activities in the organization. However, the control loss of
bureaucracy is not as much the result of an information-processing overload, but
rather due to structural distortions that occur as information is transmitted through the
hierarchy.'*'
Proposition 27: Hierarchical loss of control is likely to occur when the span of
control and the number of hierarchical levels increase.
Information distortions are a primary source of the attenuation of control in a
bureaucratic organization. In a classical hierarchy, each agent is responsible to a
single superior. In turn, he is the principal of a limited number of subordinate agents,
who are reporting to him. This basic structure can be replicated in as many levels as
necessary to perform the task of the organization. The number of agents of each
superior at a particular level is called the span of control. Any element that decreases
the span of control necessitates an increase in the number of hierarchical levels, given
the number of agents to carry out the task. If some loss of control occurs at each
level, performance departs further away from the purposes of the top management as
levels are added to hierarchy. There is a tradeoff between span of control losses and
level control losses. Given the tasks and the number of personnel specific to the
organization, managers try to minimize the departure of operations from managerial
Proposition 28: Economies of scale in information gathering can offset managerial
overload.
Work overload and control loss lead to inefficiency.'*' When economies of scale in
production are exhausted, average costs rise as the size of the organization is further
increased.'™ The absolute number of decisions, which the top manager has to
make, increases proportionally, placing an ever larger burden on the top coordinator.
Such administrative overload is likely to result in a deterioration of the decision-
making quality. Administrative loss of control also results in increasing average costs.
366. William S. Peirce (1981a), Bur?aucra/ic Fai/urf, p. 26.
367. This cumulative distortion of information, which is called the control loss, increases with the
number of levels it moves through.
368. William S. Peirce (1981a), Bureaucraric Fai/ure, p. 20.
369. Oliver E. Williamson (1967), "Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size", younw/ o/
/W/rica/ Economy 75, no. 2, pp. 123-138.
370. The optimum firm size theory is concerned with the formal structure of an organization. When
applied to the workings of a public bureaucracy, the informal networks have to be taken into
account as well.
133
The distortion of information influences the quality of the principal's decisions as well
as the content of the command passed down. It has been argued by Wilson that the
economies of scale in formal and informal information collection are sufficiently
important within the organization to offset administrative overload and control
loss."'
Hypothesis 11: A manageable span of control and a comparative information
advantage contained the bureaucratic costs of the Althoff system.
Along with the traditional Prussian discipline, a manageable span of control contained
the costs associated with a bureaucratic form of organization. Hie Prussian Ministry
of Culture was organized as a hierarchy that counted several levels. Althoff, who
frequently bypassed his superiors, was the real manager of the department.'" This
reduced the number of echelons, thus the level control loss. The number of levels
under Althoff was rather small as a result of a clear division of tasks among fifteen
referendaries. Although fifteen is not the optimal span of control that would be
suggested by standard theory/" their number did not increase in the Althoff era
either. Bureaucratic mismanagement as a result of the great number of employees was
reasonably contained in this way. The small size of the Althoff bureau eliminated
some control problems associated with hierarchies. Althoff also maintained control of
the department by assuming strategic tasks such as the recruitment of academic
personnel and the procurement of financial resources.
Nevertheless, the work load was enormous. It took four bureaucrats to take over all
of Althoffs formal duties following his retirement. Following the historical
observations, it seems reasonable to suggest that there was some degree of work over-
load. Considering the results of the Althoff system, however, there seem to have been
some offsetting effects. The comparative information advantage of the Althoff system
resulted from an extensive informal network."' Among other reasons, the break-
down of the system and the decline of German scholarship that followed, may have
been the result of the truncation of the network necessary to run such a system. The
truncation of the network was the logical consequence of the division of tasks and
responsibilities which was meant to relieve the head of the agency from the total
burden. But the decrease in managerial overload in the Ministry of Culture came at
the loss of the economies of scale in the informal information processing capacity
and, as a consequence, decision-making quality. This underscores the idea that it took
an Althoff to run the system, which, in turn, makes the issue of bureaucratic behavior
an important aspect of academic management.
Proposition 29: The need for effective communication may offset information
distortions.
371. R. Wilson (197S), "Informational Economies of Scale", BW/ 7ou/7ui/ of Economic* 6, no. 1,
pp. 184-195.
372. See observation 3.
373. Optimal is considered between 5 and 10.
374. See observation 25 and hypothesis 5.
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The attenuation of control in a bureaucracy is a structural information problem. To
tome extent, it is counterbalanced by the need of the bureaucrat to communicate
effectively with the sponsor who allocates the available resources. Assuming that it
lakes an efficiently managed organization to market a product successfully, Breton
and Wint robe have argued that efficient departments have the best capacity to market
their policies. They produce reports or release press articles that demonstrate the
results of their programs or disprove allegations of inefficiency.'" Often the
department head has informal relations with the bureaucrats, who are evaluating their
programs on behalf of the sponsor. Although the performance evaluation studies
produced by these departments tend to document its efficiency, a return to
inefficiency always includes the risk of discovery and sanctions by the sponsors.
Althoff used many forms to promote the policies and achievements of his
department."* Being aware of the tactical importance of public relations for the
existence and the viability of his department, he acquired his own journal.'" Althoff
launched vigorous press campaigns, often without any immediate trace to his person
and addressed himself directly to the sponsors in parliament on several occasions. As
suggested by the exchange theory of bureaucracy, Althoff was in close contact with
Germar, who worked as a referendary in (he Ministry of Finance where he was
responsible for the budget of the Ministry of Culture.
Proposition 30: Academic performance is likely to be lower in the public sector
unless the scientific community performs its auditing and disciplinary role.
Peirce has conjectured that bureaucratic failure is more likely to persist than market
inefficiencies because there exists no mechanism as strong as bankruptcy to discipline
or eliminate inefficient behavior."* Although there may be disagreement about the
relative strength of alternative disciplining devices, it can be argued that the academic
sector has a control mechanism that seems to operate with a comparable persistence.
The auditing and disciplinary procedures of scientific production by the members of
the community normally reduce the number of fraud cases and promote high-quality
output."* In a competitive system, like the Althoff system, even low academic
production is likely to attract as much negative attention as fraud and incompetence
would.
373. Albert Breton and Roiuld Wintrobe (1982). 7V k w <>ƒ flu/raucraric Co/k/ucr. An Economic
Analysis of Competition, Exchange, and Efficiency in Private and Public Organizations,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
376. See observation 11.
377. First, the respected journal .-(//jfrmWv Zrfrun;. later the specialized weekly
378. William S. Peirce (1981a), fiu/rourron'r Fai/u/r, p. 84.
379. Cfr. proposition I.
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8.2. Authority
Althoff had an autocratie and energetic working style. Although he was not in the
formal position to shape Prussia's science policy, he informally obtained the authority
to do so."° To understand his authority and subsequent behavior, the institutional
and financial constraints on discretionary power are studied.*" Frey points to
several types of constraints that help to explain economic behavior: resources (e.g.
the budget), formal institutional codes, informal norms and self-imposed
constraints.'" These constraints determine the range of activities of an individual.
Taking these constraints into consideration constitutes the decisive stage in the
behavioral decision process.
*77if oppnoac/i evnpnafiz» rfetf cAa/i£» in frWwmor j/iou/rf 6? «/>/ai>i«/ i>v
in fofese'rvaMe') corumunK Cant/ nor fry iuua//y «on-o^j^rvai/r or non-
In line with Frey, attention is given among others to the review constraint, the budget
and promotion barriers.
However, the objectives of bureaucrats are often explicitly given in the economic
models of bureaucratic behavior. In addition to the growing size of the (discretionary)
budget and department, it has been suggested that the goals of bureaucrats are job
security, promotion, avoidance of risk and responsibility, leisure or a personal
conception of the public interest."* While these models may have limited value to
Frey, they are useful to the extent that they also point at the obstacles or constraints
that the bureaucrat has to overcome in order to pursue some or all of these goals.'"
Furubotn has even argued that the "entrepreneurial" Althoff can hardly be understood
as a type of bureaucrat and seems to lie outside the scope of standard bureaucratic
theory."* However, Althoff was a bureaucrat, who held a major position in the
Prussian administration. The economic theory of bureaucracy helps to explain which
constraints he presumably had to overcome before he could acquire his autonomous
position and become a public entrepreneur.'"
380. An organization is defined as bureaucratic if its employees have to act according to rule* and
instructions from above and are formally not allowed to use their own discretion or authority.
381. The economic approach to human behavior studies the individual preferences and constraint»,
taking changes in constraints to be the driving force for human action. Instead of imposing
ad Aor motivational assumptions of bureaucrats, it studies how exogenous or induced changes
in institutional and financial constraints affect bureaucratic behavior.
382. Bruno S. Frey (1986), 'Human Behavior: Possibilities Explain Action", ,/OU/TUJ/ o/fconomJc
ftyc/ioto£y 7, p. 140.
383. (ftufem, p. ISO.
384. In the classic model, the bureaucrat follows orders. In Tullock's model, the bureaucrat wants
to climb through the ranks by means of distorting information, while the Nijkanen bureaucrat
maximizes personal objectives by maximizing the budget of his bureau.
385. The budget-maximization model, for example, also looks at the effect of the sponsor's review
process on budget-maximizing bureaucrats.
386. Eirik Furubotn (1989). /4n Economic /Ina/yiir o/rn? /4Wio# Syrtwn: Gwnmn», Discussion
Paper Althoff Conference, Heilbronn, p. 6.
387. See proposition 39.
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In the economic literature, there are several models for the analysis of bureaucratic
behavior. Niskanen focuses on the budget determination process and stresses
ailocative failure in bureaucratic organizations. Tullock analyzes the internal processes
of bureaucracy and finds that the incentives facing individual bureaucrats tend to lead
to a loss of control. Peirce discusses the issue of professionalism by comparing the
internal labor market and outside job opportunities for public officials. Buchanan and
Vanberg look at the calculus of rational agents who defer to a principal. Breton and
Wintrobc look at the informal services delivered within the administration and claim
they are a determinant of selective, i.e. efficient or inefficient behavior.
Proposition 31: The authority of a bureaucrat depends on the ability to maximize the
budget of the department in which he is working.
Niikanen subjected bureaucracy to a comprehensive analysis, based on the self-
seeking assumptions of public choice. He focused on bureaucrats, who exercise
responsibility over budgets. Their bargaining position for their own salary increases is
weak due to the fact that bureaucracies are mostly long-term contracting institutions
that often use a wage scale system. This means that the wage level is dependent on
internal promotion, which is usually granted on the basis of seniority. Furthermore, if
the agency produces public goods, the assessment of the bureaucrat's marginal
revenue product is particularly hard to make. Instead of salary, other variables like
prestige, office perquisites and discretionary power enter the utility function of the top
bureaucrats. According to Niskanen, these variables are associated with the size of the
budget. Therefore, budget maximization serves as a proxy to the maximization of
personal utility. It becomes the aim of the leading bureaucrat. Reputation,
discretionary power and authority are an increasing function of the total budget of the
department.
Budget maximization implies ailocative efficiency losses due to ovcrsupply."* A
program with total costs exceeding total benefits is not likely to be sustained by the
sponsor. In the basic Niskanen model, the bureaucratic failure is ailocative, but many
qualifications are discussed. By assuming that output is produced with technical
efficiency, a vast range of problems that are associated with bureaucratic production
is abstracted from.'***
The German academic system expanded rapidly during Althoff s time. The Prussian
Ministry of Culture was also the largest department. It absorbed more than a quarter
of total public expenditures. Although the size and the expansion of his department
might explain his growing reputation and authority. Althoff does not fit the
characteristics of the Niskanen bureaucrat. The Althoff system was essentially demand
driven. The traditional university system was breaking down under the growing
388. It should be remembered that the supply of public goods exceeds the volume that would maxi-
mize the utility of the j/x?njor
389. If budget-maximizing bureaucrats have to deliver a larger quantity of the public service in
order to obtain larger budgets from the sponsor, they have an incentive to run their agencies
technically efficiently.
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demand for more research and higher education *° The ovenupply model of
Niskanen is, therefore, not the most appropriate model.*"
Indeed, in spite of the growing budget, the allocative inefficiency that follows from
budget maximization seems not to have been the case. Since AlthofTs department was
in the budget constrained region, the growing financial needs were met by attracting
private funds, i.e. off the budget. Unlike the Minister of Finance, who finds it hard to
assess the true costs of public output, private sponsors know exactly the private
opportunity costs of the public good they finance. In contrast, it is comparatively
difficult for bureaucrats to estimate the true value to the citizens of their services. The
observation that Althoff was very effective in raising private funds, indicates that
allocative failure was not perceived so substantial as to divert the private resources to
other, more efficient ventures Although research institutes and universities could be
run as private organizations, German bankers and captains-of-industry voluntarily
made substantial contributions to public research programs.
Proposition 32: If monitoring by the sponsor takes place in order to modify bureau-
cratic overexpansion. the authority of the bureaucrat depends on the ability to reduce
the financial and review constraints.
The most important qualification which Niskanen makes to the basic model is the role
of the review process by the sponsor. When government monitoring takes place, it is
likely to modify the overexpansion of the state agency, although political sponsors
typically are more concerned with reelection issues than with monitoring bureaus.™'
Of course, other incentives than reelection may motivate the review committee
members. The leading bureaucrats also have a strong interest in the performance of
their department.
"// « AyporAejizA/ ftotf on q/^/c/a/ ca/i /ncr*a5* A/J ffarga/'m'ngj powr
a///a/ic« VC/M'C/I mewu r/10/ r/ie o^ïc/a/ mutt ma£« /I/J own goa/i CO/UIKM
are vWaV/y j>wr«f,- rfotf «, /A* puZ>/;c inrerejr. **"
390. A rapidly growing number of students enrolled in some form of higher education to satisfy the
demand for well-trained academics in industry and government Spurred by the industrial
revolution and international competition, more research also took place
391. While yielding strong theoretical conclusions, Niskanen bureaucrats can behave only in
accordance with the motivational assumptions and in response to measurable change» This
deprives the bureaucrat of a real choice whether to act efficiently or not. Therefore, Nitkanen
gives several qualifications to the basic budget-maximization model.
392. Niskanen argues that the sponsor's comparative information disadvantage tends to divert him
away from his monitoring responsibilities. Quite often, the sponsor does not have the
information pertaining to the true costs of public production. In contrast, it is comparatively
easy for bureaucrats to estimate the value of their production to the politicians Although the
interests of sponsors and bureaucrats might be different, the costs of an effective review make
sponsors accept the budget-output proposals of the bureaucrats The rational sponsor may not
want to bear the individual costs of monitoring if the benefits go to the whole population as a
function of their tax costs.
393 William S. Peirce (1981a). Biu-roufroric fai/urc, p. 83.
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Even without effective monitoring by the sponsor, there are clear limits to the
expansion of a bureau's budget. When the budget-maximizing bureaus have to
compete for public resources, they can expand only in response to an increase in the
relative demand for their services. Furthermore, when the sponsor believes that the
information from a bureau is distorted, he might rationally allocate fewer resources to
the bureau. The mobility of bureaucrats also constrains the growth of budgets,
because the most effective way to obtain a larger budget may be to move to a larger
department rather than to attempt to expand the budget of the department in which
one is currently working. The leading bureaucrats may even be willing to expend less
as long as they can retain a discretionary budget.'*'
Hypothesis 12: The multi-source Financing system strengthened AlthofTs authority.
In Prussia, public opinion was becoming increasingly aware that knowledge also was
a factor of production. At the time, a new term was coined: 'science policy". Indeed,
politicians took a particular interest in the German academic system,'*' because they
had clear reelection incentives to do so. Other motives, like the international
recognition of German science and scholarship and the growth of the tax base, also
stimulated politicians to monitor the performance of the academic system.'*
Bilateral negotiations with the Finance Ministry were closely scrutinized. If the
private donations to the public academic sector are seen as voluntary tax payments or
Lindahl prices, the allocation of resources before the voluntary taxation was non-
optimal.'" Nevertheless, it was a rational decision of the Minister of Finance to
undcrprovidc resources. Althoff stayed in the same department for twenty-five years.
For the mobility argument to hold, Althoff s department had to be the largest, which
it was. Although a discretionary budget may provide a certain amount of satisfaction
to the top bureaucrat, it should be reminded that higher output increases the likelihood
of further budget increases by the public sponsor. Among other grounds, the authority
of a bureaucrat depends on the financial independence of his agency. Financial
independence includes two aspects: generation of off-budget revenues or exemption
from audit. Althoffs multi-source financing system also generated revenues from
private sponsors, which strengthened the autonomous position of Althoff in the
Prussian administration.
Proposition 33: Bureaucrats who forgo the standard forms of compensation, create an
opportunity for independent behavior.
A bureaucrat who has chosen to disregard the consequences of a decision for his own
career is no longer constrained by his superior's orders or by the agency's rules and
394. J. Migué and G. Bdanger (1974), "Toward a General Theory of Managerial Discretion*,
PMN/C Oioicr 17. pp. 27-43.
395. Observation II noted that Althoff addressed the Prussian parliament several times defending
the science policy of the Ministry of Culture.
396. See observation 4 and proposition IS.
397. Richard Abel Musgrave (1938), "The Voluntary Exchange Theory of Public Economy",
Ouanrrry ./ou/Tia/of£awwmic.r S3, no. 2, pp. 213-237.
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procedures. Such independent behavior can be explained by the fact that utility-
maximizing behavior is motivated by a compelling goal, overriding traditional
incentives, such as job security and promotion. Following this option, the bureaucrat
performs his tasks in such a way that his actions have a positive or neutral impact on
that particular aim. but which does not necessarily have to coincide with his
superior's aim.'" Independent behavior can also be explained by the bureaucrat's
successful lifting of institutional and bureaucratic constraints. Supposing his actions
and decisions clash with the views of his superior, he can still pursue his own ends, if
he manages to bypass his superior. This requires the support of a superior who works
at least two levels higher in hierarchy, i.e. a superior of his superior. Forgoing (he
standard set of administrative rewards also creates some operational room for
personal initiative. Having reached the appropriate formal position in the hierarchy
from which to pursue some own goals, promotion perspectives are less capable of
disciplining the bureaucrat's behavior.
Proposition 34: Professional ability and behavior strengthen the authority of a
bureaucrat.
A bureaucrat is likely to be more willing to take the risk of dismissal, if he has one
or more opportunities outside his department. Autocratic behavior, like Althoffa
"personal regime",'** is therefore determined by opportunity cost. Peirce recognized
that
"f/ie" ///eTafure" on /A* iWum'or o/ /ndhidiwAs w/7/ün r/i* bureau ignores rA*
/A* fcur*au /o wA/c/i r/i* tnJivM/ua/ m/'g/i/ jA//r. 77iij rte-g/err »j
f/ie £ « / c/ioice* op«i fo rfo fcurfawcra/ outt/J? r/i* Zwnau
coif qfimfcpemfc/i/ fo/saWor vv/7/i/n //i* £ure*au. "*"
Buchanan demonstrated at length that the forgone value of the best alternative is the
only measure of value when there exists no competitive market.*" Forgone job
alternatives determine opportunity costs, which give proximate evidence of the value
of current labor performance. The opportunity cost, i.e. the best offer obtained from
a different employer, increases by performing in such a way as to maintain the
respect of others in the profession. A professional is a person for whom the cost of
leaving his current job is neglible. The implication is that the professional, unlike the
climber, does not have to compromise on his own opinion. The professional
bureaucrat is not forced to give his superior the information the latter wants to hear,
because he can find another employer who will reward him for his professional
integrity and ability. Professionals have a primary commitment to their profession,
rather than to the organization. The existence of an outside labor market permits the
individual to keep up professional standards.
398. Economists would not consider a psychological examination of the bureaucrat's motivation
scheme to be particularly useful, but an attempt can always be made See: Bemhard Rothman
and Charles Strem (1982). "The University Administrator as a Utility Maximizer",
/n/^nuciomj/^ </i 5c(?/iz« £rononucA^ f Gvn/nfrcta/< 29, no. S, pp. 451-464.
399. See observation 2.
400. William S. Peirce (1981b). Bu^raucro/ic />o/mcj a/itf JLotor Martyr, p. 308.
401. James Buchanan (1969), Co» am/ Owicr, Markham, Chicago
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Hypothesis 13: Althoffs authority was based on professionalism.
Althoff had gained the support of the Emperor and many politicians of different
parties. This allowed him to bypass his superiors, the Undersecretary and Minister of
Culture. At times when there was considerable pressure on his position, he was
strongly backed by the Emperor and political friends in parliament. Althoff rejected
an offer to become Minister of Culture twice and stayed within the state bureaucracy.
Job security might have played a role in his decision. His refusal of further promotion
not only made him independent of the instability of political life, but also created the
opportunity for independent behavior from which to counter e.g. the opposition of
certain academic interest groups.
Following the first option of explaining independent behavior, it should be recalled
that Althoff and many contemporaries, in the spirit of the times, were personally
devoted to the international recognition of German science and scholarship. This goal
was a driving force behind Althoff and the Althoff system, overriding other concerns.
The question why the Emperor and certain politicians wanted to back lower staff may
be a matter of rational deference.*" It is known that the Emperor liked Althoff as a
person for his devotion and sense of humor. With the German public opinion focused
on scientific progress, Althoff was just the man to turn to. One obvious reason why
Althoff was allowed to follow his own path was that, by promoting German science
and scholarship, he promoted a broader goal of the top officials, namely the
recognition of Prussia in the world.
Professionalism in a bureaucracy can be assessed by taking into consideration the
opportunity cost of staying in the administration. Soon after Althoffs death, his staff
members Friedrich Schmidt-Ott and Ernst Eilsberger accepted top jobs in the
chemical industry.*" This gives some evidence of their management capacities and
the quality of their work in the public administration. Althoff himself was offered
chairs of Law by the universities of StraBburg and Bonn. He was also asked to
become Minister of Culture. These were highly-regarded positions, but more
important these outside offers enabled Althoff to maintain professional standards
within the bureau. Professional control by the scientific community was incorporated
in AlthofFs academic policy. Offers and counteroffers from foreign universities gave
Althoff some evidence about the opportunity cost for the scholar.
Proposition 35: Rational deference strengthens the authority of the informed
bureaucrat.
Buchanan and Vanberg developed a model of rational choice to cover the behavior of
persons who are observed to invest scarce resources, particularly time and intellectual
energy, in becoming more fully informed about alternatives. The model is applied to
the behavior of persons who arc observed to defer to the opinions of those who do
402. See proposition 35.
403. Schmidt-Ott went to Bayer Chemicals. Eilsberger to Solviywerke A C
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choose to become more fully informed.*" Individuals may choose to become
followers of an intellectual leader. This leader earns their deference on his own
differential investment in the acquisition of knowledge.
To seek to oust Althoff would have involved an enormous investment in time and
resources in order to obtain an information advantage over the Althoff system. The
model of Buchanan and Vanberg, therefore, rationalizes the deference of the Minister
of Culture, the rest of the staff and the academics, in spite of the fact that Althoff was
not always in the formal position to command.*"
8.3. Networks
Proposition 36: Bureaucratic performance is dependent on the informal services
rendered to the bureau.
The formal structure of a bureaucracy determines the official distribution of tasks, (he
rules designed to regulate the behavior of the bureaucrats, and the official lines of
command and authority. Breton and Wintrobe have refocused the discussion of
bureaucratic behavior away from authority and control toward exchange and
competition.** Basically, they argue that a bureaucracy cannot operate efficiently
on the basis of authority alone. Loyally, internal cooperation as well as competition
between members of so-called bureaucratic networks play an important role in
practice. The authority of a bureaucrat is not only related to his hierarchical position,
but also to his ability to obtain, control, distort and restore information. The
distortion of information occurs along the lines of the formal structure and creates a
loss of control. The typical monitoring and control mechanisms associated with the
formal structure are often expensive and mostly imperfect.
Therefore, the principal's need for accurate information is often satisfied by bypassing
the formal structure, i.e. by obtaining and delivering informal services. According to
Breton and Wintrobe, the exchange of informal services is a characteristic feature of
bureaucracy that determines its productivity. Exchange of goods and services requires
the existence of property rights, which are hard to establish in the case of
bureaucratic relationships because the value and quality of the informal services are
difficult to measure. Therefore,
404. Junes M. Buchanan and Victor Vanberg (1989). "A Theory of Leadership and Deference in
Constitutional Construction". /"uWic Gtoicv 61, pp. 15-27.
405. Cfir. observation 7.
406. Breton and Wintrobe (1982), Log/c o/fiurfaucra/if Co/nfocr.
407 ttofem, p 61.
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Supported by trust, bureaucrats are linked with each other by more or less strong ties.
These networks in the organization are referred to as the informal structure.*'*
Proposition 37: Bureaucratic performance is dependent on the intensity and the extent
of internal networks.
The productive capacity of bureaucratic organizations is determined by the informal
services that are rendered within and among bureaus. The essence of the Breton-
Wintrobe theory is that bureaucrats choose whether to be efficient or not. This
selective behavior is the outcome of an exchange process, determined by the rewards
for informal services relative to the cost of acting inefficiently. Efficiency in a
bureaucracy is defined as
*/../ 'A* cooperarion o/ ju/wrrf/na/w »Wfn rA«> ji^erioro /o acAitve fne
By intensity is meant the degree of cooperation between the bureaucrats, including the
value of the services exchanged. The intensity of the network depends on the volume
of trust accumulated between sponsors and bureaucrats and among bureaucrats. Trust
in networks accumulates partly as a result of (he response of an individual who
forgoes opportunism. When trust accumulates and monitoring costs fall, the problem
of incentives is also reduced in networks. Breton and Wintrobe argue that
"fo fne «fen/ f na/ *v?ry memoer « ao/e (o accumu/a/e an o/vi'mum a/noun/ q/7/nj/,
fne profr/cm o//ncen/i'vej dors nor «in".'"'
The size of a network is proportional to the flow of informal services produced and
supplied by that network. Informal contacts have to be sufficiently large to produce
relevant information.
\Soria/ //'n« o/ demarca/ion, wA/'cn produce ne/wonfc rrunca/ion, are mi/ Carriers
in rne jewe fna/ if requires rne Rie o/r«i/ r«o«rc« ro overcome rnem. **"
Common education and brokerage are important devices to overcome network
truncation in bureaucracy and stimulate cooperation between non-trusting
individuals.'" In order to find sufficient members for the network, initial trust can
be build on common factors like origin or religion, although their role is transitory.
While some factors like race, sex and family background are given, others can be
altered such as reputation, education, and religious beliefs. The value of these
indicators declines, to be eventually replaced by the transactions themselves.
The cumulative inefficiency of informal services is the result of deficiencies in the
extent and intensity of the network. Network failure depends on the riskiness of an
inefficient supply of informal services, which, in turn, depends on the cost of
408. The formal structure stays important because it is a significant determinant of the cost of
accumulating and maintaining networks
4W Breton and Wintrobe (1982). i o j i c o/Burr<mcraric OHK/UCT. p 38
410. M>tfrm. p. 88
411. /J>i</rm. p. 84
412. The cost of network truncation, namely the loss of informal services, has to be weighted
against the costs of rent-seeking by interest groups, that may arise from a common educational
background or religion.
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monitoring.'" So, bureaucratic loss of control can arise from formal operations and
from network failure. However, there are ways of bypassing formal routines and
inefficient informal sources and thus increasing the speed and quality of operations.
One technique by which the head of the bureau can maintain control is to obtain
external information about what the lower-ranking agents of the organization are
doing. Also the costs of informal services can be reduced, if there exists competition
for network membership. Competition for positions in networks eliminates the rents
due to selective behavior, but it does not eliminate selective behavior.'" When poor
informal services are discovered, exclusion from the network is a likely penalty,
decreasing the former member's power and influence.
Hypothesis 14: AlthofTs network improved the performance of the bureaucratic and
academic system.
Althoff was a legendary master in building an extensive informal network in academic
and bureaucratic, as well as financial and political circles. The informal network was
strictly confidential. It provided Althoff discretionary financial means, but most
important qualitative and accurate information about scholarly performance.
Donations from private sponsors were often rewarded with a distinguished mark of
honor, for which Althoff had to activate other network contacts since he had not the
authority to award them. Operating the academic network came at low cost because
the scientific community is basically an existing, informal social network in which
Kholars freely participate and which generates and stores valuable information about
scholarly performance. The network played an important role in reducing the
monitoring costs of the employing authority, i.e. the Prussian state.'" Exclusion
from the Althoff network was a likely penalty for giving inaccurate information. It
could have career consequences as well.
The threat of network truncation was reduced by the existence of schools from which
all or most senior bureaucrats were recruited. The modern Prussian universities of
Königsberg, Halle and Berlin were important schools for high-ranked civil servants.
Brokers further reduced a permanent form of truncation. Schmoller, for example, was
the intermediary between Althoff and Johannes von Miquel, the Minister of Finance.
Proposition 38: Continuity is likely to improve selective bureaucratic behavior.
Bureaucrats render more and better informal services, when there is a higher degree
of continuity in the formal structure. The problem of efficient behavior and
cooperation by bureaucrats can be analyzed using standard game theory like the
prisoner's dilemma. In the game, two parties gain from cooperation, but each can
gain even more if he cheats while the other cooperates. Despite the mutual benefits of
413. The desired amount of monitoring is the level that equals the marginal benefit! of reducing
inefficient behavior with the marginal opportunity cost of the resources devoted to monitoring.
414. This accounts for the emphasis by Breton and Wintrobe on the simultaneous uie of direct,
formal monitoring by sponsors to eliminate inefficient behavior.
415. Cfr. proposition 7.
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cooperation, selective inefficient behavior is the dominant strategy if the game is
played only once. However, if the game is repeated a large number of times, each
participant has an incentive to cooperate. If he does not cooperate, the other can
retaliate on the next round. This seems to offer a way out of the prisoner's dilemma.
The argument of repeated interaction and a long time horizon is often used to explain
why fraud is not a more prevailing feature of economic behavior. In situations of
continued interaction, individuals typically cooperate with each other/" The
amount of trust is likely to be an increasing function of the time that the individual, in
whom trust has accumulated, stays in the same position.
Althoff worked in the Ministry of Culture as a leading bureaucrat for a quarter of a
century/" This enabled him to set up a very large, well functioning informal
network.
8.4. Public Entrepreneurship
The most typical feature of the classical model of bureaucracy is the hierarchical
structure, in which rules specify official duties and limit the authority to give
commands. Appointment procedures often even specify the selection of bureaucrats,
who advance through the hierarchy by meeting objective standards for promotion.
Compensation is related to factors such as hierarchical position and seniority. Such an
organization form seems to leave little room for entrepreneurship. Peirce and Krueger
have noted that
"iWe\H a ffiq/or new iVfca comw ,/rom fne" fop, if 15 a7#ïcu/f fo see /tow if can twer
f/ie /riim/rAy of a/7. "*"
The public entrepreneur is bound by the same bureaucratic rules and procedures and
has to eliminate hierarchical as well as budgetary constraints to innovate the public
sector. If successful, the elimination is the expression of an initial act of entrepreneur-
ship.
Although there exist several theories about the risk-bearing properties of the entre-
preneur/" and his alertness to unnoticed opportunities/"' there are few formal
models of entrepreneurial behavior, probably as a result of the very nature of entre-
416. At the end of the repeated game, the rational strategy for both players is non-cooperation. If
each participant expects the other to cheat in the last round, non-cooperation is also the
dominant strategy in the next last game. Non-cooperation then remains the prevailing strategy
throughout the game.
417. See observation 1.
418. William S Peirce and Peter Krueger (1989). EnwpwiMirjMp i/i a Bureaucracy, Paper
Althoff Conference. Heilbronn, p. 9.
419. See: Frank Knight (1921. repr. 1971). /?«*, (/ncrrroiiify <"»<< Pro/if. Univ. of Chicago Press,
Chicago; Ludwig von Mises (1949). Huma/i .-Icrion. Yale Univ. Press. New Haven.
420. See: Israel M. Kiirner (1973), Conv*"'"»' ana" £wr</>n«*urjMp. Univ. of Chicago Press,
Chicago; Harvey Leibenstein (1968), Btfrf/vrvurjWp and ZV\«/qpm«if, American Economic
Review 38. pp. 72-83.
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preneurship, which is characterized by spontaneous initiative.*" Entrepreneurial
innovation has been defined as the implementation of changes in products and in
organizational and technical production methods and the opening of new markets.*"
Innovations in the public sector have not often been modeled as an entrepreneurial
process.*" although new programs and policies can be readily understood as
innovations in the Schumpeterian sense. The allocation of resources to the
implementation of a new public policy is an act of innovation and entrepreneurship.
Proposition 39: A public entrepreneur has to acquire a sufficient degree of autonomy.
Following Frey,** it is hard to impute motives to the public entrepreneur. When a
bureaucrat is dedicated to a new policy or program, he may well see the innovation as
his persona] goal. First, however, the public entrepreneur must obtain some degree of
autonomy, as well as resources. Peirce and Krueger have distinguished several key
problems for the public entrepreneur: (I) moving up the hierarchy to a position,
sufficiently high (o launch new projects, attaining enough autonomy, while
maintaining managerial control of agents, (2) obtaining control over sufficient
resources, while finding resources for eventual growth, (3) establishing a network of
relations outside the department in order (o obtain the support necessary to realize
new programs.*"
The entrepreneur has to occupy a formal position in the hierarchy with enough
authority to get a minimal amount of cooperation from the bureau's staff. But instead
of considering the limits of the organization, the successful entrepreneur generally
bypasses hierarchical constraints. Entrepreneurial activities in public agencies differ
from the private sector in the way money is raised. The bureaucratic finance market
is often internal and hierarchically organized. Peirce and Krueger have argued that
"m a contf/fttfi'ofui/ /ra/nfworfc a'omina/e'a' fry a srrong mortarc/wea/ power, Mg/i
mor* /r^ow^n/fy r/ian m par//a/nevi/ary
Even if political instability implies that decision-making tends to fall into the hands of
the bureaucracy, the public entrepreneur's problem stays the same, to launch
innovations within an organization that is structured to achieve stability, consistency
and predictability. He must arrange to obtain autonomy and to acquire resources.
Proposition 40: Entrepreneurial capacity is determined by the extent and the intensity
of the networks that are set up by the entrepreneur.
421. W.I Baumol (1968), 'Entrepreneurship in Economic Theory", /4snrrfc<ui Economic Jtevfew 58,
pp. 64-71.
422. Joseph A. Schumpeter (1934), 7 V 7Vory of Economic Drvr/opmwi/, Harvard University.
Press. Cambridge Mass.. This author makes a clear distinction between the moment of
invention and the entrepreneurial moment of making productive use of it
423. Major innovations are not hard to list though: the social security system, cost-benefit analysis,
science policy, etc.
424 Bruno Frey (1986). / /umoi fif/wvior. p 140.
425. William Peirce and Peter Krueger (1989). fTtfTrprrrvurjWp /n o Burauicrocy.
426. <M<fem, p. 32.
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Casson's entrepreneur is a person who specializes in taking judgemental decisions
about the allocation of scarce resources.
acri/ig u/kfcr ji/miar arcwrwra^rw, vvouid ma** di/fewi/ de-
because there exists no objective decision rule or because individuals have different
access to information and different processing abilities. Casson acknowledges the
difficulty for an entrepreneur to raise funds in order to exploit his better judgement,
which is based on a comparative information advantage. The sponsor has to have
confidence in the entrepreneur's judgement and conduct. This leads to the questions
raised earlier about reputation and the accumulation of trust. Breton and Wintrobe
have defined entrepreneurial capacity as the capacity to accumulate trust and build
networks.*"
Hypothesis 15: Althoff was a public entrepreneur.
Althoff was the driving force behind the implementation of various academic
innovations. He could rely on hard-working staff members, who prepared his
measures. Although (he term "Althoff system" probably gives too much credit to one
man, it was Althoff who made the ultimate decision to implement a new policy.*"
This accounts for the fact that the entrepreneur is essentially an innovator, not an
inventor. The degree of public entrepreneurship is also affected by the bureaucrats
who have to carry out these new measures. Althoff was one of the leading
bureaucrats in the Prussian Ministry of Culture, whose authority was reinforced by
the multi-source financing system, his professionalism and the support from the
Emperor. He also maintained a manageable span of control within his own
department. Althoff operated a large network for financing and information purposes.
Althoff succeeded in building a flexible, innovative bureaucracy, although principles
of bureaucracy often clashed with the traditional rights and liberties of the old
universities. To the extent that some negative comments on Althoff are justified, they
may be related to the inconsistency between the routines of bureaucracy and the
ambitions of the entrepreneur. However, Althoff, who was a pragmatic manager, did
not abolish the vital elements in scholarly self-management. While he took many
measures to create a modern academic framework, he never took action to interfere in
the creative process of scholarly teaching and research.
427. Mark Casson (1982), 7V Ewrrpwvu/-, Martin Robertson. Oxford, p. 24.
428. Breton and Wintrobe (1982). tojic o/But"aucTa/ir Cbnrfucr. p. 108.
429. See observation 6.
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9- Conclusions
9.1. The AHhofT System
Conclusion 1: The international recognition of German science and
scholarship in the Althoff era reflected its academic performance.
Con. 2: The Althoff system improved the performance of the German
academic system.
9.2. Economics of Science and Scholarship
9.2.1. Science Policy
Con. 3: Policy measures that aim at keeping the scientific community open
are likely to improve academic performance.
Con. 4: Policy measures that aim at enhancing the dissemination and
verification of academic output are likely to improve academic
performance.
Con. 5: Policy measures can improve the quality of academic decisions,
hence academic performance.
Con. 6: Academic statistics have incentive value for scholarly performance,
but should not be used as policy targets.
9.2.2. Economic Theory
Con. 7: The economic theory of science and scholarship demonstrates that
institutional conditions are an important determinant of academic
performance.
Con. 8: The economic theory of science and scholarship points out how the
institutional conditions in the academic system affect scholarly
performance.
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9. Conclusions
How effective was the "Allhoff system* in improving the academic performance of
the scholars it employed ? Which role is (here for politicians and administrators of
science ? How effective is the economics of science in helping to answer these
questions ? In this final chapter, an evaluation is made of AlthofTs science policy and
the economic analysis of science and scholarship, which was used and developed in
this study. An attempt is also made to point out some relevant principles of science
policy.
t.1. The Althoff System
Althoffs science policy contained many innovations. A major achievement was the
establishment of independent research institutes that became particularly successful for
research in the natural and medical sciences."" They freed brilliant scholars from
their teaching duties at the university. The expensive institutes were closely linked to
the multi-source financing system, that tried to secure the financial basis for long-term
research projects.'" The excellent research facilities at these institutes attracted
many scholars to Prussia and were also part of Althoffs differentiated and
performance-based compensation system.*"
Undisputed was the expansion and reorganization of the traditional universities, the
medical sector, the seminar system, the library system and the start of an international
science policy/" The latter took its most visible expression in the international
professorial exchanges. Independent research institutes found their educational
counterpart in the establishment of seminars.
Althoff reorganized the Prussian academic system to solve the problems of the
Humboldtian university system and to gain international recognition for Prussian and
German science and scholarship/" These goals were achieved by a mixture of
public and private financing and implemented through a carefully organized network
of confidential relationships. The central administration of the universities implied a
loss of the independence of faculties as well as of individuals. They both became
dependent upon a bureaucracy, whose internal workings they could not always
understand. The Althoff system was directed by an autocratic, yet devoted,
430. See observation 16.
431. See observation 32.
432. See observations 20. 21, 22 and 29.
433. See observations 14, IS, 17, 18 and 23.
434. See observations 4 and 12.
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bureaucrat, whose policies were intended to keep a liberal and competitive climate at
Prussian universities."' A policy of equal opportunities opened the universities to
minorities previously excluded. Althoff s role in the protection of minorities and
academic freedom at universities is still widely acknowledged. He also looked upon
universities and academic institutes as parts of a large academic system and started its
rationalization. The process involved the simplification of some procedures while
breaking up traditional structures. Althoff insisted on common rules, procedures and
requirements, cataloguing systems and statistical procedures in order to facilitate
contacts between various institutions.
Conclusion 1: The international recognition of German science and scholarship in the
Althoff era reflected its academic performance.
At the turn of the century, Germany was a leading academic nation. Although there is
no satisfactory way to quantify this observation, historians of science basically agree
about (he existence of scientific centers shifting from Italy to England in the middle of
the seventeenth century to France during the first half of the nineteenth century and
then to Germany from the middle of the nineteenth century. Germany retained its
leading role until the 1930s when the United States took over this position."* While
not precisely measurable, the interest and respect of foreign administrators, scholars
and students for the Prussian system can be observed to reflect this international
recognition. Many countries turned to the Prussian system as the ideal type to model
their own academic system. Although severe criticism was passed on some methods,
the scientific performance of the Althoff system was beyond dispute. The success of
Prussia's science policy was recognized by scholars working in the system and those
observing it from outside.
"Afa/ry o/ rne mos/ jfnVting /Imerican /'n/e//?aua/ aru/ organiza/iona/ i/inovarioru
were *«A«r i'/up<rfd oy or rf/>fCf/>' a^apied _/rom Gfrma/i mode/*, /or German
/«afr«A/p in aattfemic science and icno/arjnip was wiaWy acvfcnow/ea'ged'. ""'
"77ie purcuif o / r««ircn was recognized <u an i/nporfan/ pro/essiona/ activity
w/r/i/n porn rne I/. 5. inaWry an<y nigner eaWarion on/y in rne /are n/ne/een/A
cen/ury, and rejearcn in town venue* was in/Zuencea" fry rne examp/e and fry rne
contpefi'rive pressure q/" German i'na"iufry ana" academia. ""*
435. See observation 2 and 30.
436. Joseph Ben-Divid (1971), Sriewür'; Kok to Sociery, pp. 15 and 186.
437. A.W. Coats (1987). 7V /wmii/iofw/jjofion o/ /"o/m'ca/ Economy in European, ,4meric<jn a**
7<yxinr*e l/mVrji/i«, Paper Fifth HESA (History of Economics Society of Australia)
Conference, p. 21.
438. David C. Mowery (1990), "The Development of Industrial Research in U.S. Manufacturing',
/t/nericun Economic Review, Papers & Proceedings, p. 347
"/» MYU fnu <&?u£fc o//^i(vice »o Ai^ /i*r /ranting - jrn^rofion o/ n*w /knotWctfgr <u
<u diwrana/iwi of r*c«v«/ Jknow/ft/gr - rnor in /n* to* /iin««n/A rrn/ury
' fn* an*n/ion <vu/ admira/jwi on /n* part o/ /Im^riran arafrmi'r;. / . . /
wwv*rjiriM wer* fn* mot/W Jbr rn* 'rejewrA uiu'vvn</j>j' in /n*
German science and scholarship were internationally respected. The German
universities had a great appeal to large numbers of foreign students In the first
decade of the twentieth century, foreigners represented 7.5% of the male student
population in Germany,*" which made it the nation with the largest share of foreign
students.*" To inform all these students about the possibilities of higher education
in Prussia, the Ministry of Culture set up an Academic Information Bureau in
Berlin.*" International recognition also came from the research front. A large
number of Nobel Prize winners worked at German academic institutes.*"
International recognition also resulted in official exchange professorships. American
academics knew the value of the German university system, because many of them
had been educated there.*** At the turn of the century, German scholarship could
claim international recognition, which had been a primary goal of the Althoff sys-
tem.**' The Althoff system achieved this international recognition by means of an
exemplary scientific performance.
Scholars working at Prussian institutes made some pathbreaking scientific discoveries.
The Prussian administration fostered the development of medical science. In the
Althoff era, it opened eight hospitals for ophtalmology, nine institutes for dentistry,
seven psychiatric clinics and sixty-two new clinical buildings connected to
universities. Several pediatrie clinics and academic institutes for hygiene were built in
order to battle tuberculosis and infant mortality.*** The reorganization of the
Charité-Hospital meant a major step forward in the public health situation of the
439. Fritz Machlup (1982), AT/IOHV«^.- ƒ« Orarfon. Dtori&ur/on and Economic
(vol. 2: The Branches of Learning), Princeton University Press, Princeton, p. 141.
440 Bernhard vom Brocke (1981a), / V o ^ j c t e fliWunjjpo/M*. p. 743.
441. Wendel reports that in 1904 there were more Russian than German students, who studied
medicine in Berlin. See: Giimher Wendel (1991). /Ur<vM(r«i /4WOT0J, p. 126.
442. The Academic Information Bureau was directed by Wilhelm Paszkowski (1867-I9I8), who had
been a librarian and lecturer of German for foreigners at the University of Berlin. To
emphasize the importance of the position. Althoff awarded Paszkowski a professorial title.
443. Nineteen of the fifty-five Nobel Prize winners in the natural sciences before 1918 worked in
Germany. Thirteen were active in Prussia. Most famous are Emil Behring (Medicine, 1901),
Jacobus van 't Hoff (Chemistry, 1901), Emil Fischer (Chemistry, 1902). Robert Koch
(Medicine. 1905). Philipp Lenard (Physics, 1905), Paul Ehrlich (Medecine, 1908) and
Albrechi Kossel (Medicine, 1910). For many of them, Althoff created career opportunities and
research facilities.
444. Three of the finest American universities (Harvard. Columbia and Chicago) set up exchange
programs of professors. Their presidents (Charles W Eliot (1834-1926) of Harvard (1869-
1909), Nicholas M Butler (1862-1947) of Columbia (1902-1945) and William R. Harper
(1856-1906) of Chicago (1891-1906) had all studied in Germany
445. See observation 4.
446. AhfaorT presided over the International Tuberculosis Society, which he had founded in 1902.
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Berlin region.*" To update the knowledge of practicing physicians, local academies
for practical medicine were created. Three German Nobel Prize winners for Medicine
personally acknowledged Althoffs support in providing them with the means to
pursue their revolutionary research.***
Chemistry was a booming industry and scientific discipline. A lot of research was
carried out in the research and development centers of chemical corporations, while
the state laboratories specialized in qualitative fundamental research. Famous scholars
worked at the state institutes, among whom Adolf von Baeyer, Emil Fischer, Jacobus
van't Hoff, August Hofmann, Victor Meyer and Walther Nernst. Since most
university chairs in chemistry had been occupied by scholars in the organic tradition,
organic chemistry had developed rapidly. However, new disciplines such as inorganic
chemistry, physical chemistry and electro-chemistry were also emerging. Althoff
created a suitable infrastructure for these disciplines as well.**' He was also
personally interested in issues of biology."" His appointment of professor Adolf
Engler added to traditional taxonomy the study of biotopes.*" Biochemistry and
evolutionary physiology were also new and promising fields in which German
scholars made considerable progress.'" Technological progress made possible the
447. The project was financed by selling the Botanic Garden in Schöneberg and moving it also to
Dahlem
448. Emil Behring. who had been considered somewhat as an academic outsider, received the Nobel
Prize in 1901 for the development of a diphteria serum. Althoff had appointed Behring at the
University of Marburg in 1895 in spite of a threefold refusal by the medical faculty. Behring
was given an extraordinary professorship without teaching duties to pursue research in his
laboratory, that was financed largely by the Hoechst corporation. Althoff also supported Robert
Koch, who became full professor in Berlin, member of the Academy of Science and director of
the Institute for Infectious Diseases. Koch, who received the Nobel Prize in 1905, gratefully
acknowledged Althoffs role for his career. Paul Ehrlich. who discovered the salvarsan cure
for human syphilis and got the Nobel Prize in 1908, was liberated by Althoff from his
oppressive superiors, professors Rudolf Virchow (1821-1902) and Ernst von Bergmann (1836-
1907). Ehrlich was given the opportunity to have his own research institute in Frankfurt.
449. In Göttingen, the chair for physical chemistry was offered to the brilliant scholar, Walther
Nernst (1864-1941). Nernst became full professor in 1894. In 1899, Althoff created a chair for
inorganic chemistry, which was filled by Gusiav Tamman (1861-1938). With the help of the
German Electro-Chemical Society, Althoff also financed an ordinary professorship of electro-
chemistry at the University of Gottingen.
450. Althoff was one of the first to promote the protection of the environment. At the request of the
Prussian Ministry of Culture. Hugo Conwentz (1855-1922), the director of the Westprussian
Province Museum in Danzig, wrote a pathbreaking document (Di> O/OWun/t dw
Mtfusrfrnjbnd/rr unJ VoricWflgf zu ttrw Er/ui/ruii;). On December 12, 1898, the Prussian
Ministry of Culture even organized a conference about environmental protection.
Representatives of other ministeries attended.
451. Engler received the chair of systematic botanies and became director of the Botanic Garden in
1889
452. In spite of the criticism from Wilhelm Waldeyer (1836-1921) and Oscar Hertwig, Althoff
supported the development of evolutionary physiology by scholars like Eduard Pflügler (1829-
1910). Wilhelm Roux (1850-1924). the pioneer in evolutionary physiology, was appointed as
extraordinary professor in 1884. Four years later, Roux became director of the Institute for
Evolutionary History and Mechanics at the University of Breslau. In a letter of August 2,
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emancipation of the technical sciences and colleges While the Göttingen Association
set up institutes to do research on technical problems like aviation, hydrodynamics,
aerodynamics and theoretical physics became the cornerstone of the Berlin university
with distinguished scholars like Max Planck, and later Albert Einstein.
The only discipline in which the Althoff system was less successful, was philosophy.
The reason was that the characteristic Althoff network was not so well-balanced in
this field.'"' The large majority of informants were scholars of the New Kantian
doctrine, which had risen to a kind of Prussian state philosophy. AlthofTs confidential
agents promoted, of course, this line of thought, which came at the disadvantage to
Hegelianism and Herbertianisnv It led to the dominance of the Marburger school of
Kantianism, leaving little room for alternative views. Nevertheless. Althoff supported
the emancipation of new disciplines emerging from the traditional Held of philosophy
such as pedagogics, psychology and sociology He promoted their scientific
development by setting up psychological institutes and pedagogical seminars.
Although some academic problems, like the legal and financial position of the private
lecturers, were not resolved, most of the grievances of professors revolved around
lost appointments and salary questions and did not address the innovations that
comprised the Althoff system. Criticism was often directed at the fact that Althoff
was not in the formal position to shape Prussian science policy.'"
Since it takes an Althoff to run an Althoff system, Naumann wrote:
«'« Wa/i/j H>*> /4///iq/f a/? rfer 5/>i/z* «Wi/, /<J/Jr JIC/I «n '.Syj/e-m
JO W/> ya anc/i <fcr au/^ ?£/<Irri /Itao/ummw JW/I* £W«i Se»
Ge-rdr a£*r grojfc MacA/ in WWn^  /AJ/ufe, JO wind A/Wi/icAir M{/M>raMc/i
The Weber-Althoff controversy, which was also mentioned earlier, is probably the
best-known criticism of the Althoff system.'" In 1911, Max Weber (1864 1920)
delivered a speech in Dresden in which he admitted that Althoff had taken a much
broader point-of-view than the faculties to promote scientific development. He added
that Althoff s structural measures and strong administration had pushed Prussian
452. ...
1907, Roux thanked Althoff for his support and the advancement of the discipline, which, after
years of ignorance and struggle, was finally recognized by the scientific community. Althoff
had also set up a research institute for his opponent. Oskar Henwig
453. Ulrich Sieg (1991). "lm Zeichen der Benaming Althoffs Wissenschaftspolitik und die deuttche
Universititsphilosophie*. in: Bernhard vom Brocke, Hrsg., Wij!rnjc/i<2/fr#fifAirA/r u * /
Wiswurfoi/ipo/irii inj /ndujrrirz«/a//fr, Verlag August Lax. Hildesheim, pp. 287-306.
454. See observation 7.
455. Quoted in: Bernhard vom Brocke (1980), Woc/uc/iu/- UK/ Wl»f/uc/u/ijpo/fr/J:, p. 109.
456 Max Weber (1973). translated by Edward Shils. "The Power of the State and the Dignity of
the Academic Calling in Imperial Germany: The Writings of Max Weber on University
Problems", Mm^rvu II, no 4. pp. 571-632 See also: Peter Senn (1989), HTIOT / I /«WIO07,
66 pp., and Helmut Spinner (1991), "Das 'System Althoff und Max Webers Kritik", in:
Bernhard vom Brocke, (Hrsg), W!»«urfa#bgMrMrfae' und Wï««uc/i<j/*.ipo/iriJk im
r, Verlag August Lax, Hildesheim, pp. 303-563.
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universities forward and that nepotism had not existed in the Althoff era. However,
Weber was very critical about the confidential consultation of academic agents and the
process of bureaucratization. Ironically, bureaucratization was understood by Althoff
in the Weberian sense of rationalization. Weber became more and more critical,
however, about the prolonged existence of a system that no longer demonstrated the
exceptional performance of the time when it was run by its founder. Senn has argued
that
Vv«» 1/ MVfer HYU ri$A/, 1/ wou/o* to on/y a /oo/no/* aAow /1///K>#5 mrtAodj. For
fA* /u'j/oria/i o / jcirnce n-Aa/ wi/7 COM« ar« rA* rau/K. 771* product, nor rA<
procru, « /A« /mporra/i/ rA/'/ig.u/ifcH »/ can fc« jAown rAa/ jome-Aow fA« procew
<A'</ <>^7u?nce rA* prodwc/ - wA/cA WVZ>*r aW nor a*o. "*"
Moreover, in spite of the authority which he had earned, Althoff always had to
seriously take into account the reasoned demands from the universities. After
Althoffs death, the system could no longer uphold its performance because the
informal scientific-administrative network became more and more truncated.
Conclusion 2: The Althoff system improved the performance of the German
academic system.
The Althoff system is the German term to describe the reform and expansion of the
Prussian academic system, which, at the turn of the century, spanned a period of
twenty-five years and pushed the development of science and scholarship. Although
Althoff did not produce a single plan to show a system,"* he took a number of
CO/IW/I/ measures, which enhanced the productivity of the academic system. This
study has tried lo show how changes in the academic organization affected the
performance of German scholars in the Althoff era.*" From the economic analysis
in this study, it follows that the Althoff reforms were very helpful in upgrading
scholarly performance. The gradual reform of the academic system by Althoff had the
following characteristics.
Since the scientific community constantly evaluates academic output and gives credit
to productive scholars, it was rational to take the reputation of German science and
scholarship as decided by the world community of scholars as a criterion of academic
performance.*" Althoff stimulated academic productivity by taking measures that
kept the scientific community open and improved the dissemination of knowledge.
Wru]n<fcr6tt/?A?n We/cr
HWrff. "*"
457. P«er Senn (1989). W*r* ü /4/f/wJf?, p. 21.
458. Unlike other prominent German administrators of science like Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-
1835) and Carl Heinrich Becker (1876-1933).
459. Although it is hard to value the importance of those who facilitate or make possible the work
of others, the efficient organization and administration of institutions to produce knowledge
enhanced scholarly performance. From this, it follows that Althoff deserves some of the credit
for e.g. Ehrlich's or Schmoller's work.
460. See observation 4.
461. Renata Tobies (1991). Wjuwuc*q#/ic*< ftAHvrpwOrtiiJiu;, p. 97.
r
The bundle of measures enhanced the workings of the scientific community, hence
better guaranteed the quality and accuracy of academic output. Althoff processed
information about scholarly performance, generated by a network in the scientific
community, to select and attract the most suitable scholars to Prussian universities.
He could assume the appointment responsibility because he had established a
comparative information advantage over the university community, that remained
rationally ignorant. Althoff was better informed about scholarly performance via his
contacts in the scientific community of a certain discipline. In turn, it allowed the
scientific community to play a more formal auditing and disciplinary role."" Althoff
not only used it as a monitoring technique, but also as an incentive instrument to
overcome the principal-agent problems in the academic system."' Indeed, the
Althoff system enhanced academic performance, not only by appointing the most pro-
ductive scholars, but also by the incentive value of the screening method.
Faculty management is often associated with reduced academic output, because
control is less concentrated. *** Transaction cost analysis demonstrated that
centralization of decision rights can be efficient. The Prussian bureaucratic academic
organization lowered the monitoring costs of academic production, and at the tame
time internalized some of the external benefits.**' Althoff saved on monitoring cost»
by using the free auditing results of the scientific community. To process this type of
information and to capture the academic externalities required some degree of
centralization. The transaction cost rationale holds for (he independent research
institutes as well. Because the monitoring costs of true talents are low. they could
operate outside the hierarchical organization in independent research institutes.
The property rights theory of the firm affirms that centralization of rights improves
the quality of decision-making. The Prussian bureaucracy or the institute directors
took over managerial responsibilities of faculty in matters like appointments,
promotion, tenure, etc. The Prussian state and the institute directors had an incentive
to be good managers, because they were the central monitoring party that could
capture the reputational or financial residual. Finally, Althoff introduced a motivating
and performance-based compensation system. Since the residual claimants determined
compensation, they had a clear incentive to be as accurate as possible in the
assessment of scholarly productivity. In accordance with human capital and implicit
contract theory, the Althoff system paid low starting salaries for junior scientists, but
huge wages for top scholars.
However, hierarchical organizations suffer from control losses that are created by
information distortions and lead to inefficient results. The principal-agent problem
that arose from the attenuation of control was solved by the comparative information
462. Due to the use of scientific community, the Althoff system could reduce the disadvantages
associated with academic tenure. See hypothesis 10.
463. Following the exchange theory of bureaucracy, the informal network! determine the efficiency
of bureaucratic organizations. See also hypothesis 14.
464. Robert E. McCormick and Roger E Meiners (1988), l/n/wiuy GOWTM/K*, pp. 423-442.
465. See hypotheses 2 and 3.
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advantage and the authority of Althoff. In a relatively small bureaucracy, Althoff
maintained a manageable span of control. Although he was never in the formal
position to shape Prussian science policy, Althoff became known
"no/ o/i/y <u fne motf en//gn/ened\ on/ aAso f/i« mow aVcfaroria/ Mm/jwr o/
£c/uca//'o/i (sic), /Vi«.Ha na*/ ever AaJ. ****
The public choice approach to bureaucratic behavior revealed the basis for Althoff s
authority, which allowed him to operate beyond the limits of his formal
responsibilities:"" lifting of some of the bureaucratic constraints such as sponsor
reviewing, professionalism and continuity. Along with a manageable span of control,
Althoff s entrepreneurship is likely to have improved the efficiency of the academic
system as well.
The institutional innovations introduced an element of competition in the Prussian
academic system. New chairs, new institutes and new universities undermined the
monopoly position of the traditional universities. This created new opportunities for
individual scholars to leave the university, which exerted pressure on the academic
authorities to reward them according to performance. The Prussian academic
administration also worked efficiently, because it had reliable information sources and
a correct evaluation method. However, this does not imply that different organiza-
tional answers may not reduce transaction costs, capture external benefits and
encourage competition in the academic production process as well.
From an economic point of view, the Althoff system can be defined as a systematic
policy to institutionalize the incentives and monitoring procedures of the scientific
community, which involve the careful evaluation of scholarly output, and to enhance
academic decision-making methods by distributing decision rights to the residual
claimants of academic production. Althoff s science policy was so entrepreneurial that
it created room for competition in the academic system. It has also been desribed as
"a concf rr«d po/i'cy /o j/imu/a/e wor/t /'/i acai/em/'c i/u//rurio/u. By ou/'&rtng on /ne
earring i/uf/ruriona/ «rucrurw, new organiza/iona/ <fcj/'gns were etfai'/tf/iea' a/ong
w/>A a common in/roj/rucfure /or acarfem/c research and" insfrua/on. "***
The Althoff system was a balanced combination of central administration and
individual freedom.
"Grofc &o>in/e man aïe von / . . / fn></nc/i /4/rno/fpraifcf/z/erre /4/uiefa jo/brmtt//eren,
</aj8 ej in o'er HYwenicna/fr weniger a<irau/° anJtomme, /"erjonen wn/er ;/ur;ru/«?n<?//
vorgegefcene /fo//en zu juA.jum/eren, una" menr tfarau/ Jïir /"er5ön//cnjte/fen
we/7reicnen</e Freirdume ;w afaiven 5e/o5/ge«a/fung günjfiger
By taking the view of a wider academic mrent, Althoff was in a position to interject
competition from other scholars when the vested interests of one particular academic
institution tended to promote scholarly qualities other than academic proficiency.
466. William H. Dawson (1919). 7J* Grnruw Enpfrv / 5 6 7 - / 9 / ¥ a/id ri* l/njry
Macmillan. New York, vol 2, p. 411.
467. See observation 7.
468 Jürgen G. Backhaus (1990), fcgu/ariofi. p. 30.
469 Hubert Laitko (1989), Hum/xV* unJ ,4/rtojf. p S
1S7
9.2. Economics of Science and Scholarship
In this study, an attempt has been made to find out how the institutional environment
affects scholarly behavior and to determine, if possible, the conditions for productive
academic activity The study of the Althoff system has made it clear that institutional
changes can drastically improve academic productivity. The economic theory,
developed in this book, which draws on the new institutional economics, claims to
add more to the theory and practice of science policy than repeating the rules of good
management. It is capable of assessing the effect of institutional changes on academic
performance.
Since it is hard to assess the value of academic production and measure the
advancement of science by means of quantitative indicators alone, efficiency standards
are hard to establish." There is simply no way of determining whether any given
amount of resources is the correct amount to invest in the academic system, nor is
there a set of administrative rules that would be capable of assuring efficient
outcomes. Nevertheless, economic analysis can be helpful in finding ways to stimulate
academic performance. In that case, there is also room for an active science policy,
that takes measures to improve the performance of the academic system.
Nevertheless, science policy should never try to plan research too precisely, because
research is, by definition, a c/wtf/v^ search for the u/i&notvn.
9.2.1. Science Policy
The auditing and disciplinary procedures of the scientific community exert such
pressure on academic scholars that they bring about a high level of quality and
accuracy in academic output. These procedures are based on the continuing
verification and dissemination of academic output. Improving these functions, which
require an open community, is likely to enhance the quality of the academic output as
well.
Conclusion 3: Policy measures that aim at keeping the scientific community open are
likely to improve academic performance.
The scientific community functions well only if newcomers and new ideas are allowed
to challenge the existing body of knowledge. Measures can be taken that increase the
heterogeneity of the academic population, for example, by allowing academic
newcomers with alternative views. However, the entry to the academic profession is
sometimes refused for reasons irrelevant to the quality of production. There often
exists discrimination on the ground of criteria irrelevant for academic performance
(religion, race, political conviction, sex). The academic system should be kept open
to outsiders, who may follow unconventional research procedures that may
revolutionize science.
470. A tilled research project may Kill have some value for other scholan and scientific progreu.
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Although there is a role for amateurism in science, science administration can actively
improve the alertness of the scientific community to new and promising discoveries
by planting these scholars with alternative ideas in the academic system. Outsiders not
only bring new human capital to the scientific community, they often open new
financial sources for the development of knowledge as well.'" Academic inbreeding
can have stifling effects on scientific progress. Faculty homogeneity can be easily
prevented e.g. by facilitating academic mobility or by insisting on open vacancies.
When scholars refuse to accept new methods or theorems, competitive pressures can
create the opportunities for alternative views, that are vital for scientific progress.
Academic expansion with the creation of new chairs in new and existing disciplines,
institutional reform and international cultural exchanges are three effective means to
stimulate competition among scholars and to open the scientific community. While
growth and reform of the university system create more breathing room for new
scholars, exchange programs are favorable for an open climate. The principle of
academic freedom has its greatest merit as a guarantee for a diversity of views. Since
the marginal return on increasing faculty is likely to decline, it is wise to keep
scholars somewhat dispersed in their interests. Concentration is likely to lead to a
marginal increase in the rate of discoveries in some fields, but may greatly reduce the
rate in the fields from which scholars have been drawn/"
Conclusion 4: Policy measures that aim at enhancing the dissemination and
verification of academic output are likely to improve academic performance.
The dissemination of scientific knowledge is essential for the verification process.
Well-organized libraries may, therefore, improve academic performance by lowering
the search costs of scholars and by facilitating the dissemination of scientific
knowledge. Search costs can decline further by establishing good cataloguing systems.
A system of puW/c lectures and prin/fd papers and dissertations is likely to restrict
the possibility that knowledge is kept inside an academic group so that no further use
can be made of it, or that it is not produced at all."'
Another method is to stimulate ap/?/i></ research, because when research is tied to its
applications, it creates incentives for accuracy.*''* Applied researchers tend to be
less interested in the intellectual elegance of various theories, but do want their
applications to work. Since it is impossible to predict which use they make of any
given theory, these scholars are the strongest possible check on the accuracy of the
471. While the appointment of Catholics and Jews to academic positions opened up a new labor
market and created the possibility of making outstanding appointments, it also opened
additional financial resources, which facilitated the expansion and reform of the academic
system.
472. Gordon Tullock (1966), Ojanteorion o///ufuiry, p. 129.
473. The requirement to print dissertations, urged by Althoff. was also meant to protect the brand
name of the German doctor's title.
474. In this respect. Althoff upgraded the technical colleges, promoted the foundation of business
schools, set up numerous research centers and stimulated the applied fields in the medical
sciences (e.g. hygiene).
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work of the pure scientists. The absence of a community of such critics may greatly
retard the development of a discipline. The scientific community itself is also subject
to social pressure, which can create an unfavorable atmosphere for research. There
lies a task for the science administrators to help and create a more favorable
environment for research.*"
The quality of the review and editorial activity has an impact on both the
dissemination and verification of academic work. Improvements in these areas can be
made as well. The problem is largely one of incentives. A higher pay and improved
prestige for these strategic members of the scientific community is likely to attract
into editing scholars, who may have lost some of their creativity, but who are still
able to recognize good new research.
The decoupling of research and teaching can relieve leading scholars of repetitive
duties and allows them to use their resources most effectively. Il can be done by
means of research directorships or professorships with primary teaching
responsibilities in order to support selected chairholders. However, the separation can
lead to a slow-down in the dissemination of new knowledge as well, which, in
accordance with conclusion 4, is likely to lead to less scientific progress."* To
satisfy the need for teachers who are involved in research at the leading edge,
students could participate in the research program of a top scholar, who could still
carry out his research program, while students would learn to do research without
formal instruction. Teaching at the advanced and doctoral level mostly requires the
same ability as research.
Conclusion 5: Policy measures can improve the quality of academic decisions, hence
academic performance.
A science administration can reduce the burden of leading scholars, whose time and
energy are taken up otherwise with administrative activities and management tasks.
Moreover, by taking over management tasks of the faculty, opportunities for rent-
seeking are reduced. To maintain a high quality of decision-making, it makes sense to
attribute academic decision rights to the residual claimants, who have a clear
incentive to run their institutes efficiently/" Appointment decisions can be left to
the party who can claim the residual and has the best access to the scientific commu-
nity to assess the scholarly productivity of a candidate. This can be the central
administration - as it was in Althoff s case - or the director of a research institute.
The residual provides an incentive to make sure that appointment and promotion
procedures involve more than counting the number of articles without making any
serious effort to determine how important they are. To attract real scholars.
475. In Prussia, there was a huge demand for trained economists and lawyer» to work in the public
administration. Social scientists were involved in experimental legislation and in the creation of
the social welfare state.
476. See also proposition 24.
477. In the Althoff system, the academic residual took the form of increased profeuional
recognition or increased revenues from an increasing tax base
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compensation can be offered in terms of research facilities, which emphasize the
scholar's direct interest in research.'™
Academic administrators have to allocate resources over various scientific projects.
Not every administration possesses the academic network of the quality and extent as
Althoffs to evaluate a project or the productivity of a scholar. When it has to allocate
research grants, it should pay less attention to the nature of the specific project and
more to the results achieved by the scholar. If the scientific community functions
well, the performance of scholars is reflected by their professional recognition. The
administrator should, therefore, make an effort to get an idea about the position of a
scholar in the scientific community. Productive researchers should then be given the
means to carry out the research program of their own design, under the condition that
further funds depend on the results they obtain. In addition to being given research
facilities and grants, these scholars could be asked to recommend newcomers for
initial positions. Although the evaluation of academic output should be the rule, it
makes sense to evaluate input behavior in the case of team production and junior
scientists. If the new scholars produced good work, the senior scholars could be asked
to suggest some more.
While it can take a decade or more to establish a research program or to build an
academic tradition and institutions, they can be destroyed rapidly. An essential part of
academic management is therefore to provide a sound and stable financial basis.
Althoffs multi-source financing system spread the risks and, at the same time,
guaranteed academic independence from specific money providers. Financing of
research by private foundations, that are set up by prominent leaders from industry
and trade, has the advantage of breathing an entrepreneurial spirit into the academic
institutions.
Conclusion 6: Academic statistics have incentive value for scholarly performance, but
should not be used as policy targets.
Administrations have to be aware of the problems associated with quantitative
indicators to evaluate academic performance. For example, graduation rates do not
reflect teaching performance, because examination standards can be relaxed easily to
improve these rates. Therefore, academic statistics should not be used as allocation
devices for grants. However, when the reputation of a professor is not affected by the
number and quality of his students, he has an incentive to take few students with easy
subjects, in which he has to invest little time and effort. It takes formal reports with
the history of rejection policies and public examinations to assess and improve
teaching performance per faculty or per chair. As a method of adjusting the
478. Economic theory suggests that academic compensation is not likely to reflect the marginal
revenue product of a scholar. It operates as an incentive for the employed scholar and his
colleagues. Whereas patent monopolies and certain tax privileges provide good incentives for
applied research, non-specified awards are well-suited for basic research. Compensation should
be determined by realized output, with the exception of the junior scholar, whose compensation
can only be determined by expected output based on input measures.
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motivation of professors, a system could be set up that makes promotion policies
public. A more formal approach to assess academic performance would be to trace
the graduation of productive as well as the rejection of unproductive students in the
interest of scientific development. Administrations should be aware that their helpful
planning instruments have great incentive value for scholars and build signaling
pressures. Therefore, they should be performance oriented.
A more general danger of statistics lies in the fact that academic performance is more
likely to be lower when some aspects are measured while important aspects are not
Formal auditing upon observable variables with formal policy implications with
regard to the availability of funds may cause a misdirecting of efforts toward
measured from unmeasured activities. Moreover, the reliance on statistics alone tends
to undermine the authority of the monitor. Although the qualitative and public nature
of academic output limits the effectiveness of such techniques in the academic system,
the formal auditing procedures exert a certain pressure upon the individual scholar to
perform. The practices of citation and publication counts for example are means to
control and ensure some minimum level of activity, but do not measure (he quality
and value of academic output. Using them as the sole determinants of decision-
making would lead to serious misallocations.
9.2.2. Economic Theory
Conclusion 7: The economic theory of science and scholarship demonstrates that
institutional conditions are an important determinant of academic performance.
Transaction cost analysis pointed out that academic knowledge production can be
organized only under a specific governance structure to protect the scholars and the
employing authorities and to save on transaction costs. Especially, the monitoring of
academic production can be very costly. However, academic monitoring costs can be
kept quite low if the monitor succeeds in obtaining the free results of the voluntary
auditing of scholarly output, that takes place among the members of the scientific
community. Monitoring costs can also be reduced by hiring workers that need not be
watched so closely (like pure curiosity scholars). Transaction costs can be further
reduced by a standardisation of some procedures, for example by setting up coherent
university regulations and examination requirements. Loyalty and discipline reduce
the monitoring costs of production as well. Indeed, shirking problems can be solved
by a positive work ethic or social pressure to abstain from shirking.'" The problem
is also dealt with by an open scientific community. The community is an informal so-
cial organization that coordinates the activities of scholars and allocates scholarly
efforts efficiently. While reciprocal monitoring of scholars is a rational and cost-
saving solution, it implies that there is no immediate role for a central monitor. Yet, a
science administrator can make substantial improvements to the academic system and,
to a large degree, he can correct scientific community failures. Important is that he
479. Estelle James and Egon Neuberger (1981), " The University Department at a Non-Profrt Labor
Cooperative", />uWic Owi« 36, pp. 585-312.
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can create an institutional environment which is favorable for productive and creative
academic activity.
Conclusion 8: The economic theory of science and scholarship points out how the
institutional conditions in the academic system affect scholarly performance.
Professorial and academic appointments are an area which is susceptible for science
policy. The quality of the appointment procedures determines academic performance
in a sense that incentives are created for scholars to pursue a certain research
strategy.*" Accurate assessments of scholarly productivity are needed not only to
appoint productive scholars, but also for the incentive such procedures create for the
scholars seeking appointment. These assessments are best left to the open scientific
community, not to faculty,*" nor to an administration.
Property rights analysis indicates that the residual claimant, who has a good incentive
to evaluate candidates, is most likely to look for the opinions of experts in the
profession. Therefore, institutions should be devised, in which the right to appoint is
attributed to the residual claimant. Because academic output is a public good, loaded
wifh externalities, /he academic residua/ is difficu/f (o capture and norma//y (aites fhe
form of increased academic reputation or increased revenues from a growing tax
base. Tie-ins can also be used to stimulate academic production or to raise private
funds.
Academic compensation takes many forms. Research facilities and prestigious prizes
are more likely to attract the pure curiosity scholars, while salaries and non-specified
monetary prizes are more likely to stimulate the induced curiosity scholars.
Professorial top salaries induce scholars down the hierarchy to be productive when in
more junior positions. The salary system or a mixed salary-fee system is better
attuned to the dual academic production of teaching and research, compared with the
strict lecture fee system which would slow down research activities.*" Tenure,
which is a typical characteristic of the academic labor market, is important to protect
the specific investments of scholars. However, it is likely to lower academic
performance and may entail rent-seeking costs, unless the academic administration
continues to audit and discipline academic performance of the tenured academics. The
non-specified awards provide a stimulus for basic research, much as the patent system
works for applied research.
While transaction cost and property rights analysis point out that a hierarchical
organization is a suitable form for academic production, public choice theory shows
that bureaucratic inefficiency can be substantial. It is the result of information
distortions, associated with the organizational structure of bureaucracy. Normally, the
480 Cfr. proposition 13.
481. See propos it Kin 12.
482. See proposition 23 ind recently: Bengt Holmsrrom and Paul Milgrom (1991), "Multitask
Principal-Agent Analysis: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design", /ouniaf <>ƒ
Law. Econom/a A OganiM/ion 7. special edition, pp. 24-52.
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information distortion results in a hierarchical loss of control which deteriorates when
the span of control and the number of hierarchical levels increase. Bui the need for
effective communication, economies in informal information processing and
monitoring of strategic tasks can partly offset the structural information distortions, so
typical for a bureaucracy. The scientific community is precisely the type of
organization that can provide high-quality information to academic administrators. A
vital task for an academic administration is the control over the quality of
appointments. As in other lines of production, organizational planning is essential, but
administrative planning of the scientific activity itself would be a complete waste of
resources.
Academic performance in the public sector is not necessarily lower than in the private
sector as long as the scientific community continues to perform its auditing and
disciplinary role. But the public entrepreneur, who normally is a bureaucrat, has to
put more energy in acquiring a sufficient degree of autonomy than his private
counterpart, who gets his autonomy through the market by being successful. The
authority of the public bureaucrat depends on the size of the budget he administers,
the strength of the financial, review and hierarchical constraints, and the opportunity
cost of alternative employment, which is determined by his professional ability and
the deference of politicians and other bureaucrats. Entrepreneurial capacity and
bureaucratic performance are determined by the extent and intensity of the informal
networks, in which the members render services to each other. Continuity enhances
the development of networks, hence bureaucratic efficiency. While common educati-
on, goal congruence and brokerage can overcome network truncation, competition for
membership can resolve network failures.
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Appendix
A.I. List of Assumptions
1. Academic output is • public good, loaded with externalities.
2. The economic properties of academic output make it very difficult to assess its
value by means of quantitative indicators alone.
3. The scientific community is an informal social organization that coordinates the
activities of scholars.
4. The auditing procedures of the scientific community consist of the continuing
and alternating process of verification and dissemination of academic output.
5. Transaction costs consist of the costs of information gathering, contracting and
monitoring.
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A.2. List of Observations
1. Althoff was the leading public administrator of science in Germany for a quarter
of a century.
2. Althoff s "personal regime" is characterized by an autonomous and autocratic
working style, a strong personal administration and independent professionalism.
3. Althoff had excellent contacts with the Imperial Court and obtained the
exceptional right of direct address to the Emperor.
4. Hie international recognition of German science and scholarship was a major
objective of the Althoff system.
5. The Prussian Ministry of Culture was organized as a typical hierarchical
bureaucracy.
6. Althoff could rely on a professional staff of experts in his department.
7. Althoff operated beyond the formal limits of the authority invested in him.
8. The Ministry of Culture coordinated the initiatives in the field of science and
education in Prussia.
9. Prussia determined the science policy of Germany.
10. The Austrian university system had the special mission to integrate the different
peoples of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.
11. Althoff used many media to promote the policy and the achievements of his
department.
12. The traditional university system was no longer able to cope with the growing
demand for its services.
13. Althoff was an experienced manager of science when he assumed a position in
the Prussian Ministry of Culture.
14. The academic system, taking the form of a large bureaucracy, expanded rapidly
in the Althoff era.
15. Althoff bureaucratized the academic system, which he ran as an integrated
system of all academic institutes.
16. Research institutes were created that were independent of the traditional
universities, in order to allow scholars to devote their efforts solely to research.
17. The seminar method was a new form of interactive education and research.
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18. The reform of the German scientific library system was twofold, expansion and
structural reorganization.
19. Althoff made the university regulations and degree requirements more consistent
and less discriminating.
20. The academic staff earned a basic salary according to a wage scale system for
the Prussian bureaucracy, that was supplemented by lecture fees.
21. Top scholars earned top wages and researchers of genius obtained their own
research institute.
22. Marks of honor were an important compensation instrument in the Althoff
system.
23. The Ministry of Culture conducted an active international science policy in order
to obtain international recognition of German science and scholarship.
24. The Althoff system marks the start of statistical studies, that would underlie the
modern administration of science in Germany.
25. An extensive, informal network of confidential agents provided Althoff with
qualitative academic information as well as additional financial resources.
26. When Althoff appointed a member of the academic staff, he combined expert
knowledge on the scientific situation of a discipline with accurate scholarly
appraisals of the academic performance of the candidate.
27. Althoff respected the traditional academic rights as long as they were not used
for the protection of vested interests.
28. The autocratic "personal regime" of Althoff was not absolute.
29. Althoff not only appointed suitable candidates to existing chairs, he also created
new positions with excellent research facilities in order to attract top scholars.
30. Althoff gave scholars who belonged to a minority group equal opportunities to
an academic career.
31. The Ministry of Culture protected academic freedom as guaranteed by the
constitution.
32. Althoff built a multi-source financing system for the academic system.
33. Orders, ennoblement and licences were specific incentives to attract private
money for academic research.
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A.3. List of Propositions
1. The auditing and disciplinary procedures of the scientific community exert such
pressure on the scholars that it brings about a high level of quality and accuracy
in academic output.
2. The scientific community generates and stores information about the value of
academic output.
3. Dissemination of scientific knowledge is a necessary condition for the audit of
academic output by the scientific community.
4. Well-organized libraries may improve academic performance by lowering the
search costs of scholars and by facilitating the dissemination of scientific
knowledge.
5. The transactional characteristics of academic production reveal a need for a
specific academic governance structure.
6. Monitoring academic production by using the market entails substantial
transaction costs.
7. The voluntary auditing procedures of the scientific community may lower the
monitoring costs of academic production.
8. The faculty system is patterned after the needs of the educational system and of
individual research activity.
9. Research institutes are patterned after the needs of academic team production.
10. The ultimate control of the academic output of an institute remains with the
scientific community although team production clearly offers internal monitoring
advantages.
11. The evaluation of academic output as an instrument of control should be the
rule, evaluation of input behavior the exception.
12. It is rational for faculty to be ignorant about the research performance of present
and potential faculty members.
13. The quality of the screening and subsequent signaling variables in selection
procedures, determines academic performance.
14. The right to claim the residual gives an important incentive to the holder of the
right to carefully monitor academic scholars and evaluate candidates.
15. The academic residual can take the form of increased academic reputation or of
increased revenues from an increased tax base.
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16. Academie compensation, which is not likely to reflect the marginal productivity
of a scholar, functions as an incentive for academic performance.
17. Research facilities and scientific prizes are likely to stimulate the perfonnance of
the pure curiosity scholars.
18. Salaries and non-specified monetary prizes are likely to stimulate the
performance of the induced curiosity scholars.
19. Non-specified awards may provide a stimulus for basic research, much as the
patent system works for applied research.
20. Tenure is likely to lower academic performance, unless the scientific community
continues to perform its auditing and disciplinary role.
21. Academic tenure may entail substantial rent-seeking costs as well as benefits.
22. Tenure protects the idiosyncratic investments of the tenured scholar.
23. The salary system is better attuned to the dual academic production of teaching
and research than is the (strict) fee system.
24. Teaching and research can be separated as long as academic output is freely
disseminated.
25. Loyalty and discipline reduce the monitoring costs of production.
26. Structural bureaucratic inefficiency results from information distortions.
27. Hierarchical loss of control is likely to occur when the span of control and the
number of hierarchical levels increase.
28. Economies of scale in information gathering can offset managerial overload.
29. The need for effective communication may offset information distortions.
30. Academic performance is likely to be lower in the public sector unless the
scientific community performs its auditing and disciplinary role.
31. The authority of a bureaucrat depends on the ability to maximize the budget of
the department in which he is working.
32. If monitoring by the sponsor takes place in order to modify bureaucratic over-
expansion, the authority of the bureaucrat depends on the ability to reduce the
financial and review constraints.
33. Bureaucrats who forgo the standard forms of compensation, create an
opportunity for independent behavior.
34. Professional ability and behavior strengthen the authority of a bureaucrat.
182 77i« Economic» o/Sc/Vnce o/u/ ScAo/arjAip.- /4/j /i/uj/y*/* o/rA
35. Rational deference strengthens the authority of the informed bureaucrat.
36. Bureaucratic performance is dependent on the informal services rendered to the
bureau.
37. Bureaucratic performance is dependent on the intensity and the extent of internal
networks.
38. Continuity is likely to improve selective bureaucratic behavior.
39. A public entrepreneur has to acquire a sufficient degree of autonomy.
40. Entrepreneurial capacity is determined by the extent and the intensity of the
networks that are set up by the entrepreneur.
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A.4. List or Hypotheses
1. The Allhoff system stimulated academie performance by keeping the scientific
community open and by improving the dissemination of knowledge.
2. The Althoff system created a transaction-specific governance structure for
academic production.
3. The hierarchical Althoff system captured more free externalities of academic
production than the decentralized academic system.
4. Althoffs independent research institutes and seminars stimulated formal
academic team production.
5. Althoff improved the selection of academic scholars in Prussia by processing
information generated by a network in the scientific community.
6. The Althoff system stimulated academic performance not only by appointing
productive scholars, but also by the incentive value of its screening method.
7. The Althoff system improved the quality of academic appointments by having
the residual claimant make the final decision.
8. The Althoff system is likely to have set an efficient level of compensation, since
the residual claimant determined academic rewards.
9. In accordance with human capital and implicit contract theory, the Althoff
system paid low starting salaries for young scholars and huge wages for top
scholars.
10. The Althoff system reduced the disadvantages of academic tenure.
11. A manageable span of control and a comparative information advantage
contained the bureaucratic costs of the Althoff system.
12. The multi-source financing system strengthened Althoffs authority.
13. Althoffs authority was based on professionalism.
14. Althoffs network improved the performance of the bureaucratic and academic
system.
15. Althoff was a public entrepreneur.
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A.5. List of Conclusions
1. The international recognition of German science and scholarship in the Althoff
era reflected its academic performance.
2. The Althoff system improved the performance of the German academic system.
3. Policy measures that aim at keeping the scientific community open are likely to
improve academic performance.
4. Policy measures that aim at enhancing the dissemination and verification of
academic output are likely to improve academic performance.
5. Policy measures can improve the quality of academic decisions, hence academic
performance.
6. Academic statistics have incentive value for scholarly performance, but should
not be used as policy targets.
7. The economic theory of science and scholarship demonstrates that institutional
conditions are an important determinant of academic performance.
8. The economic theory of science and scholarship points out how the institutional
conditions in the academic system affect scholarly performance.
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Summary
In comparison with the literature in sociology and philosophy, the economic analysis
of science and scholarship is a relatively infant line of research. The purpose of this
study is to make a theoretical and empirical contribution to this Held in order to
improve our knowledge about the institutional requirements for academic production
and productivity.
The analysis starts by investigating Prussian science policy at the turn of this century,
often referred to as the "AlthofT system" The system was named after the Prussian
administrator of science Friedrich Althoff (1839-1908) He introduced many
institutional innovations which were implemented in the academic system. Among his
reforms were the creation of independent research institutes, seminars and a pro-
fessional national library system, the uniformization of university regulations, the
creation of a performance-based compensation scheme for scholars and a multi-source
financing system. Being the leading bureaucrat at the Prussian Ministry of Culture in
Berlin, Althoff was mainly in charge of professorial appointments and academic
compensation. Well informed by a whole network of scholars, he was often in a
better position than the faculties to assess the qualities and productivity of candidate!.
He was particularly successful in identifying and helping researchers of true genius
and scholars belonging to minorities.
Using a micro-economic model that describes the economic behavior of scholars and
their interaction in the scientific community, an attempt is made to explain the effects
of the Althoff system on scholarly performance and to spell out the institutional
requirenments for productive academic activity. Building on the new institutional
economics, the basic model is further developed by taking into account the transaction
costs of scholarly production and the effect of the distribution of academic property
rights, in particular the right to appoint and to determine compensation, on academic
performance. The role of science administrators, in general, and Althoff, in
particular, is analysed with the help of the public choice theories of bureaucratic
behavior and public entrepreneurship.
The economic analysis draws to the conclusion that the Althoff reforms signiricantly
upgraded the academic productivity of German scholars, who were internationally
recognized. Finally, the study lays down some guidelines for an active science policy.
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Samenvatting
In vergelijking met de wetenschapsfilosofie en de wetenschapssociologie is de
economische analyse van de wetenschap een jonge discipline. Deze studie tracht een
theoretische en empirische bijdrage te leveren tot dit domein.
Meer bepaald wordt getracht een (economische) verklaring te vinden voor de
uitzonderlijke wetenschappelijke produktiviteit van het Pruisisch academisch systeem.
Daarbij gaat bijzondere aandacht uit naar het wetenschapsbeleid van Friedrich Althoff
(1839-1908), wiens politiek vaak aangeduid werd met het "Althoff systeem". Eerst
wordt gewezen op de talrijke institutionele innovaties die Althoff invoerde, gaande
van de oprichting van onafhankelijke onderzoeksinstituten en seminaries, de
professionalisering van het bibliotheeksysteem, de gelijkschakeling van
univcrsiteitsregels en de vernieuwing van het vergoedingsstelsel van wetenschappers
en het financieringsstelsel van het academisch systeem tot en met de invoering van
een daadwerkelijk "internationaal" wetenschapsbeleid. Opmerkelijk is echter vooral de
wijze waarop Althoff als hoge ambtenaar te Berlijn direct ingreep op de academische
arbeidsmarkt. Uitstekend geïnformeerd door een netwerk van wetenschappelijke
informanten, benoemde hij de professoren vaak tegen de wil van de faculteiten in.
Toptalenten en minderheden konden rekenen op zijn voortdurende steun en inzet.
Met behulp van een micro-economisch model, dat het gedrag van wetenschappers en
de rol van de wetenschappelijke gemeenschap beschrijft, wordt geprobeerd de
verwezenlijkingen van het Althoff systeem te verklaren en de institutionele
voorwaarden voor academische productiviteit vast te stellen. De invalshoek die
daarvoor gekozen is, is die van de neo-institutionele economie. Aandacht wordt dan
ook besteed aan de transactiekosten van wetenschappelijke produktie en het effect van
de verdeling van academische beslissingsrechten zoals het benoemings- en
beloningsrecht, op de wetenschappelijke produktie. Ook het bureaucratisch gedrag of
publiek ondernemerschap van hoge wetenschapsambtenaren in het algemeen en
Althoff in het bijzonder wordt geanalyseerd.
Als besluit van de (neo-institutionele) economische analyse kan gesteld worden dat de
maatregelen die in het Althoff systeem genomen werden, de wetenschappelijke
productiviteit van de academische wetenschapper ten goede kwamen. Tot slot tracht
de studie aan te geven waar de mogelijkheden en de beperkingen liggen voor een
actief wetenschapsbeleid.
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Zusammenfassung
lm Vergleich mit der WisKiuchaftsphilosophie und der Wissenssoziologie ist die
ökonomische Analyse der Wissenschaft und der Wissensordnung eine junge Disziplin.
Diese Studie stellt einen theoretischen und empirischen Beitrag zu dieser jungen
Disziplin dar.
Der Versuch wird unternommen. die auAerordentliche wissenschaftliche Produktivitit
des histonschen Preussischen akademischen Syslems zu erkliren und die wesentlichcn
Determinanten dieses Erfolges herauszuarbeiten. Die historisch abgeschlossene
Periode fïllt zusammen mit der Wissenschaftspolitik Friedrich Althoffs. die oft als
'System AlthofP bezcichnet wird. Zunachst gehl es urn eine Zusammenstellung der
vielfaltigen institutionellen lnnovationen, die Althoff einführte, angefangen von der
Errichtung unabhangiger Forschungsinslilute und Seminare über die
Professionalisierung der Bibliotheken und der Bibliothekare, die Gleichstellung der
UniversitiLsprüfungen und die Modernisierung des Entlohnungswesens für die
Wissenschaftier und des Finanzierungsslatuts des akademischen Systems bis hin zur
Einführung einer international abgestimmten Wissenschaftspolitik. Besonders ins Augc
fallt die Tatsache, dafl Althoff als hoher Beamier in Berlin direkt und indirekt in den
akademischen Arbeitsmarkt eingriff. Hervorragend durch ein Netzwerk
wissenschaftlicher Gutachter informiert, setzte er manchmal auch gegen den Willen
der FakultSten die Bemfung von Professoren durch, so dafl die hochqualifizierten
Wissenschaftier auch dann auf seine Unterstützung rechnen konnlcn, wenn sie
Minderheiten entstammten, gegen die die offizielle Politik diskriminierend auftrat.
Mithilfe eines im Grunde mikroökonomischen Modells, das das Verhalten der
Wissenschaftier und die Rolle der wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaft beschreibt, wird
versucht, die wesentlichcn Kennzeichen und Funktionsweisen des Althoff Systems zu
erklaren und die institutionellen Determinanten produktiven akademischen Arbeitens
herauszuarbeiten. Diese Analyse schlieBt bei den Entwicklungen auf dem Gebiete der
neuen Institutionenökonomik an. Deshalb stehen die Transaktionskosten bei der
wissenschaftlichen Produktion im Mittelpunkt der Analyse, ebenso die Folgen der
Zuweisung academischer Entscheidungsrechte, wie des Berufungsrechtes und des
Rechtes, die Entlohnung festzusetzen, auf die wissenschaftliche Produktion. Ebenfalls
analysiert werden bürokratische Verhaltensweisen und politische Unternehmerschaft
hoher Wissenschaftsbeamter im allgemeinen. und natürlich Althoffs im besonderen.
Als Ergebnis dieser (neo-institutionellen) ökonomischen Analyse können wir
festhalten, dafi die meisten Mafinahmen, die das Althoff System konstituieren, die
Produktivitit des Wissenschaftssysterns unter Althoff erhöhten. Aus dieser Fallstudie
lassen sich aber auch Möglichkeiten und vor allem die Grenzen bestimmen, die einer
aktiven Wissenschaftspolitik gezogen sind.
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